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Abstract 
THE LINKAGE BETWEEN HOSPITALS AND NURSING HOMES: 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO MINIMIZING TRANSACTION COSTS 
By Hemg-Chia Chiu, Ph.D. 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor 
of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University 
Medical College of Virginia Campus, Virginia Commonwealth University, 1995 
Major Director: Robert E. Hurley, Ph.D., Associate Professor 
Finding more efficient ways to organize and deliver medical care is a major policy 
and management concern in the United States. High levels of expenditures for 
administrative and coordinating functions are attributed to the fact that health care systems 
are not "seamless" and that excessive transaction or friction costs are incurred in the 
exchanges between providers and purchasers and among providers. Renewed interest in 
vertical integration as a means to addressed these problems is being explored in the 
empirical literature, but rigorous theory-based investigations are rare. This study is a 
theory-based exploration of how hospitals address the "make-or-buy" decision of acquiring 
nursing home services for patients requiring post-acute stay placement. 
The purpose of the study is to investigate under what circumstances hospitals chose 
to undertake formal arrangements to acquire nursing home services for patients to be 
discharged, rather than simply arranging for each discharge in the "spot market." In some 
instances this may be long-term contracting or leasing of beds, while in other instances it 
may mean the hospital acquires or develops its own skill nursing facility--a form of vertical 
integration. The study adopts Oliver Williamson's transaction cost economics theory as the 
theoretical basis for the study. This framework argues that the most efficient mode of 
transacting is determined by analyzing three dimensions of the transaction: uncertainty, 
frequency, and asset specificity (supplier identity). At higher levels of each of these 
dimensions, organizations are more likely to observe that "markets fail" and that formal 
arrangements between buyers and sellers are preferable, with vertical integration 
representing the "make" versus "buy" option. 
The study uses data from the American Hospital Association Survey and other 
sources to identifY if and how hospitals have made formal arrangements for nursing home 
services. It tests ten hypotheses derived from the theory that focus on the three dimensions 
of transactions and interactions among them. The methodology uses several analytical 
approaches to establish the validity of the measures of the dimensions, and then tests the 
hypotheses using multivariate logistic regression to contrast various modes of transaction. 
The importance of transaction uncertainty and specificity are strongly supported in the 
findings, while transaction frequency is weakly correlated to higher degrees of integration. 
The results are consistent with both the theoretical arguments advanced by transaction cost 
xii 
economics and with prior research, which is only available from non-health care 
applications. 
The study makes an important, and perhaps unique, contribution to empirically 
operationalizing and testing a transaction cost economics-based interpretation of the 
decision to vertically integrate in health care. It also provides useful insight into the need 
for vertical integration to be selectively adopted as it may not be the most efficient mode of 
organization in all "make or buy" decision opportunities. 
Xlll 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Acute care hospitals are facing a fundamental challenge - to reconstruct their 
boundaries by providing a variety of related services to their consumers. New 
reimbursement policies, the growth of managed care networks, and the development of 
medical technology and disease epidemiology all are changing hospitals' delivery 
patterns. Traditionally, hospitals provided care only to patients who needed acute care. 
They now have to provide an integrated care delivery system that includes preventive 
medicine, and services from acute care to long-term care. 
The integrated hospital care delivery system will require hospitals to expand 
services either forward to ambulatory care or backward to subacute care, such as long­
term care services for nursing home and home care. It has been the trend in the past 
decade for hospitals to vertically integrate various hospital-related services (Conrad, 
Mick, Madden, & Hoare, 1988; Robinson, 1994) in response to the pressure of 
environmental change. The trend raises several significant que�ons. Why have some 
hospitals recognized the trend and vertically integrated different technological services, 
while others have not? What are the major determinants that explain the differences? 
Most importantly, what degree of vertical integration have hospitals employed? 
All these questions fit into the framework of transaction cost economics. 
Transaction cost economics proposes that the emergence of organizations is due to the 
failure of markets. The present study investigates hospitals' decisions to "make or buy" 
nursing home services, by using the approach of transaction cost economics. The study 
seeks to identify the most efficient design that a hospital may choose under certain 
circumstances, such as specific levels of environmental uncertainty, transaction 
frequency, and transaction specificity. 
Background 
2 
The development of "seamless" or " boundary less" delivery health care systems 
has become the expressed goal of health care reformers or strategists in the United States 
in recent years (Conrad & Jeppson, 1993; Gauthier, Rogal, Barrand, & Cohen, 1992; 
Hurley, 1993; Johnsson, 1992), after the efforts in the 1980s to control costs were 
unsuccessful. The failure of the efforts by the public and private sectors to contain health 
care costs is shown by the continuous growth of health care costs during the last decade at 
an annual rate of 8 to 16% (Levit & Cowan, 1991 ). National health expenditures in 1991 
amounted to $751.8 billion (Letsch, 1993), equal to 13.2% of the nation's gross domestic 
product (GDP). This was a big jump from health care expenditures in the 1980s, which 
amounted to $250.1 billion. The expenditure's growth rate from 1980 to 1991 was over 
300%. Much of that expenditure could be saved if health care could be successfully 
vertically integrated (Conrad & Jeppson, 1993 ). 
3 
A large portion of health care expenditures has been for transaction-related costs. 
Administrative cost is a typical example. The administrative costs of ids-integrated 
transactions accounted for 5.8%, or $38.6 billion, of U.S. health expenditures in 1990 
(Gauthier, Rogal, Barrand, & Cohen, 1992). The interest in seamlessness arises from the 
likelihood that inattention to reducing the friction from imperfect linkages along the care 
continuum has impeded the efficiency of the system. Savings associated with the change 
to a single-payor system, for example, are estimated to exceed $100 billion (Gauthier, 
Rogal, Barrand, & Cohen, 1992). The ultimate goal of health care reform is to provide a 
full continuum of health services and maintenance to defined population groups within 
limited budgets. The goal is impossible to realize until all sectors providing health care 
are successfully vertically integrated (Conrad & Jeppson, 1993). 
When considering the fast growth of health expenditures and the large amount of 
transaction-related costs, it is worth noting that substantial portions of these are for care 
of the elderly. The health care system for the elderly has been criticized as "fractionated" 
(Kane & Kane, 1987). Fractional care means that the different types of care for the 
elderly's various needs are provided independently of each other. The artificial 
distinction between acute and long-term care, for example, is actually causing 
dysfunction and raising costs (Kane & Kane, 1987). The situation of fractional care was 
made worse by the implementation of the prospective payment system (PPS). Since PPS 
began, the implications of exchanges between providers and between levels of care have 
been sharpened by purchasers' adoption of risk-based payment methods (Coburn, 
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Fortinsky, McGuire, & McDonald, 1993; Federal Register, 1984; Hu, Sullivan, & 
Scheffler, 1992; Weissert & Musliner, 1992). Methods such as prepayment per person or 
per case make care providers bear the financial consequences of inadequately managed 
transactions or patient dispositions. Delayed diagnostic tests, slippage in referral 
consultations, and poorly planned hospital discharges all contribute to potentially 
avoidable expenses that a prepaid provider would clearly not wish to incur. 
The transfer of hospital patients to nursing homes is a particularly noteworthy 
transaction. It is relatively common (Kane, Matthias, & Sampson, 1983; U.S. 
Department of Health, 1994) especially among the elderly, who constitute the largest 
volume of patients in most community hospitals. The frequency of transactions is 
increasing (Gianfrancesco, 1990; Lewis, Leake, Leai-Sotelo, & Clark, 1987; Morrisey, 
Sloan, & Valvona, 1988b) because of the complicated consequences of the Medicare 
PPS. The PPS pays a hospital for each Medicare patient on a predetermined, diagnosis­
specific basis. Before the implementation of PPS, hospitals were able to obtain third­
party reimbursement for administratively necessary days (ANDs), the days of continued 
hospitalization while a patient waits for an available nursing home bed. Previously, 
Medicare reimbursed hospitals for ANDs of care at below-acute rates. Since PPS, 
prolonged stays have become costly to hospitals, since no revenue beyond the fixed 
Diagnosis Related Group (DRGs) payment is available. This motivates hospitals to 
discharge patients earlier to either the community or post-care agencies, for nursing home 
service. Yet, post-acute care services in the U.S. are widely acknowledged to be in short 
5 
supply. This fact makes it difficult for hospitals to discharge patients expeditiously when 
acute care services are no longer medically necessary. The situation is especially difficult 
for those hospitals located in areas with relatively fewer nursing home beds (Kenney & 
Holahan, 1991 ). 
For both hospitals and nursing homes, the elderly are one of the most important 
consumer groups. It is critical for both sectors, facing similar financial constraints, to 
consider reshaping their linkage or boundaries. The linkage should take forms that best 
match provider organizational structures, and should benefit not only the elderly patients 
and the care providers, but also the entire health care system. However, under the 
pressures of third party payors, it is very difficult to have boundaries that meet the interest 
of all the providers. Hospitals have to search for the particular governance structure that 
will enable each institution to provide effective care and operate efficiently. A hospital's 
behavior may conflict with the interest of the nursing homes in the same area. This study 
will analyze how a hospital makes a decision in this conflict. 
The balance of this chapter first examines the transactions between hospitals and 
nursing homes in the cost-containment era of the 1980s, discusses the factors that 
reshaped the relationship, and explores the changes in hospital utilization patterns. It then 
examines hospitals' use of vertical integration as a management strategy to overcome 
nursing homes' hold-up behaviors. The chapter concludes by presenting the significance 
of the study, and research questions that are formulated to guide the study then follow. 
The Era of Transitional Care 
This section focuses on the linkage between hospitals and nursing homes before 
and after the cost-containment era. The two-way channel distributing patients between 
acute care hospitals and nursing homes as well as the factors that affect the relationship 
are examined. Understanding how Medicare PPS and managed care networks have 
affected hospital behavior and hospital utilization patterns is critical to understanding the 
conflicts between hospitals and nursing homes and the consequent actions of both. 
Transactions between Hospitals and Nursin� Homes 
The linkage between hospitals and nursing homes is a two-way traffic: the 
discharge of hospital patients to nursing homes and the hospitalization of nursing home 
patients. A close relationship between these two care sectors can create several 
advantages, including reducing hospitalizations (Zimmer, Eggert, Treat, & Brodows, 
1988), improving quality of care, and reducing costs and the inappropriate use of health 
care resources (Kane & Kane, 1987; Shapiro & Roos, 1981 ). However, in the current 
system the linkage is not well-managed (Kane & Kane, 1987). With the advances in 
medical technology, changes in financial mechanisms, and regulations, the separation 
between these two sectors has grown wider, worsening the quality of care and increasing 
the costs of care. 
The two-way patient flow can be referred to as upstream and downstream 
transfers. In this study, which views the flow from the hospital's standpoint, upstream 
transfer is from nursing homes to hospitals, and downstream is from hospitals to nursing 
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homes. Using marketing terms, in the process of discharging patients to post-care 
services, hospitals are buyers and nursing homes are sellers. Hospitals depend on 
discharging their patients to nursing homes, to reduce the risks of delayed discharges and 
maintain profitability. Nursing homes, on the other hand, depend on hospitals as their 
main source of patients. This heavily interdependent relationship and its transactions 
have been described by various concepts: "core technology" (Thompson, 1967), 
"reciprocal dependencies" (Powell, 1987), "asset specificity" (Williamson, 1975, 1991 ), 
or "countertrade relationship" (Hennart & Anderson, 1993). 
7 
The importance of each health care sector can be measured by the dollar amounts 
that individuals spend on it. Among all health care sectors, hospitals and nursing homes 
are ranked as the first and fourth, respectively, in terms of personal health expenditures. 
Of $660.2 billion in personal health spending in 1991, $288.6 billion ( 44%) was spent on 
hospitals and $59.9 billion (9%) on nursing homes. This distribution has been stable over 
the years. Because the two sectors together comprise a significantly large portion of 
health care expenditure, the establishment of a closer linkage may bring about favorable 
results in cost containment. 
The strength and magnitude of each stream of the two-way patient flow can be 
measured by two elements. The first is the percentage of a facility's total number of 
patients transferred between the two sectors, i.e., the frequency of transactions. The 
second is the characteristics of these patients compared to all characteristics of the 
facility's patients. Upstream (a hospital admitting patients from a nursing home), the 
8 
percentage of hospitalization of nursing home residents ranges from 24.8% to 54% 
(California Center for Health Statistics, 1985; Lewis, Cretin, & Kane, 1985; Lewis, Kane, 
Cretin, & Clark, 1985; Meiners, 1984; Van Nostrand, 1986; Weissert & Scanlon, 1985). 
Lewis and associates (1985) reported that 54% of their study sample frequently 
transferred between nursing homes and hospitals. The trend of declining hospital 
occupancy makes the transfers from nursing homes to hospitals especially critical to 
hospital operation, since nursing home residents are an important source of patients. 
In downstream transfers (a hospital discharging patients to a nursing home), 
hospitals become the buyers and nursing homes the sellers of nursing home services. 
Gorden (1973) reported that 3.7% of patients in New York hospitals stayed at extended 
care facilities three months after discharge. The proportion of individuals admitted to 
hospitals from the community and then discharged to nursing homes ranged from 5% to 
37% (Davis, Shapiro, & Kane, 1984; Kane & Matthias, 1984; Kane, Matthias, & 
Sampson, 1983; Lamont, Sampson, Matthias, & Kane, 1983). In Massachusetts, 
Maryland, and South Carolina, 4.5% to 9.4% of hospital patients were estimated to be 
discharged to nursing homes (Densen, 1987). Analyzed in terms of admission source, 
70.4% of nursing home admissions in Massachusetts and 74% in Maryland came from 
acute hospitals (Densen, 1987). The risk factors associated with discharge from hospitals 
to nursing homes varied among studies. Possible risk factors include activities of daily 
living (ADL) dependency, mental disorders, and age. 
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Several factors have changed the relationship between hospitals and nursing 
homes. These include the implementation of Medicare PPS, the growth of managed care 
organizations and the number of their enrollees, changes in medical technology and 
disease epidemiology, and providers' loss of bargaining power due to the increasing 
proportion of patients covered by third parties. Providers began to compete for those 
patients who could bring in the most profit. Providers also became reluctant to accept 
patients who could bring in only little revenue. The conflict of interest between hospitals 
and nursing homes became intensive in the cost containment era of the 1980s; the 
following paragraphs illustrate the effects caused by the above four factors. 
Effective October I, 1983, the Medicare program changed its method of paying 
for hospital care from a retrospectively determined, cost-based payment system to a 
prospective payment system (Federal Register, 1984; Hu, Sullivan, & Scheffler, 1992). 
The PPS pays hospitals a fixed, predetermined price for each patient's admission, based 
on one of the 474 DRGs into which the patient's conditions and treatment are classified. 
The payment is largely determined by the average expected cost of resources consumed 
by persons in a specific DRG, including an expected duration of inpatient stay. Because 
the DRG payment is fixed (except for extreme outliers), hospitals can anticipate the 
amount of payment and the standard length of stay for patients in each DRG category. 
During the first years of its implementation, reimbursement rates were weighted for 
hospital- and region-specific costs, with little weight given to cost nationally. 
Massachusetts, Maryland, New York, and New Jersey were exempted at first from the 
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DRG system, because they already had similar systems in place consistent with the intent 
of the legislation. Later on, New York and Massachusetts joined the Medicare PPS, in 
1985 and 1986, respectively. 
The objective of the Medicare PPS is to change patterns of hospital management 
as well as to change physicians' behaviors indirectly through financial incentives (Muller, 
1993). If a patient is not discharged when the expected period ends, no further revenue is 
forthcoming, and the costs of the continued stay are borne fully by the hospital, i.e., the 
hospital loses money. Thus, hospitals have become particularly intense about early and 
aggressive discharge planning since the implementation of the PPS (Morrisey, Sloan, & 
Valvona, 1988a; Morrisey, Sloan, & Valvona, 1988b). Hospitals now act oppositely to 
how they acted in the pre-PPS period (Hochstein, 1985; Jonsson & Lindgren, 1980; 
Markson, Steel, & Kane, 1983), because hospitals, especially those with lower occupancy 
rates, then had little incentive to discharge patients on ANDs. The goal of reducing 
inpatient days seems to have been achieved. 
The 1986 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act requires the Department of Health 
and Human Services to investigate whether the PPS adversely affected hospitals located 
in areas with limited access to nursing homes, as compared to other hospitals. Congress 
was concerned that hospitals might bear the costs of unavoidable added days of care, or 
that quality of care might be deteriorating as hospitals discharge patients earlier (Holahan, 
1990). Under the PPS, the frequency of transfers, the changes in utilization patterns of 
hospitals and nursing homes, and the behavioral changes owing to reimbursement all 
have affected the relationship between hospitals and nursing homes. 
II 
Managed care networks are innovative organizations for health care financing and 
delivery. They are distinct from the traditional fee-for-service providers in that they 
deliver health care by selecting and packaging provider arrangements for covered benefits 
based on utilization and associated costs. HMOs (health maintenance organizations) and 
PPOs (preferred provider organizations) are the most important managed care networks in 
the 1990s. HMO-affiliated providers often receive a predetermined and prepaid fee 
regardless of how often beneficiaries use medical services; therefore, they accept the 
financial risk of providing a certain level of services. On the other hand, PPOs contract 
with providers to cover a range of services on a discounted fee-for-service basis. 
The adoption of managed care, with risk-sharing, has changed utilization patterns 
and the linkage among health services. A randomized study comparing HMOs with fee­
for-service sectors between 1950 and 1980 found that HMO patients used 30% fewer 
hospital days (Luft, 1980). Two studies reported a similar result, with fee-for-service 
plans having around 40% more hospitalization than HMOs did (Greenfield, 1992; 
Newhouse, 1985). 
The third factor that changes utilization patterns is the development of medical 
technology and changes in disease epidemiology. Advances in diagnostic and therapeutic 
technologies permit more procedures to be performed noninvasively and thus reduce 
postoperative days in acute care beds. With the advances, the length of stay in an acute 
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care unit can be reduced by moving patients to a subacute care unit; subacute care is still 
reimbursed by third party payors. The instances of such care are increasing 
(Gianfrancesco, 1990). The interest in using subacute care is augmented by recent 
changes in disease epidemiology, which continues to shift from acute care episodes 
toward chronic conditions. 
Another influence on the hospital-nursing home relationship is health care 
providers' loss of bargaining power. The health care system has changed from being a 
market dominated by providers to one dominated by third-party purchasers. Medicare 
and Medicaid demonstrate monopsony power, since one is the major acute-care 
purchaser, while the other is the major long-term care purchaser. Rather than pay the 
market price, the government establishes a rate schedule to reimburse eligible institutions. 
In this situation, health care providers tend to accept the stipulated rates and have to 
compete for those patients who can bring in higher revenues. 
The proportion of health care paid by third parties was 51% in 1960, 66% in 1970, 
76% in 1980, and 81% (37% private and 44% public) in 1991. Governmental insurance, 
Medicare, covers health services for almost all persons age 65 and older and for certain 
disabled individuals under age 65. The market domination by Medicare has given the 
government strong bargaining power. The coverage includes most acute care, mainly 
hospital and physician services. Medicare paid $102 billion in 1991 for benefits to 34.9 
million enrollees. For 13% of Medicare enrollees, Medicare is their only third-payor 
source for health services. The state-based government program, Medicaid, is the 
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primary purchaser of nursing home services. In 1991, Medicaid paid 47.4% of total 
nursing home expenditures ($59.9 billion). The 14% of Medicare enrollees who qualified 
for Medicaid incurred 6.6% of nursing home cost, i.e., almost $4 billion is paid directly 
by Medicare (Letsch, 1993). The states' Medicaid policies on eligibility for nursing 
home care and on reimbursement rates heavily affect the transactions between hospitals 
and nursing homes (Bishop & Dubay, 1991; Dubay, 1990). Policy changes in either 
Medicare or Medicaid can also greatly influence the linkage between acute care and 
subacute care. In short, because of purchaser pooling, health care providers have 
gradually lost bargaining power. The transactions between hospitals and nursing homes 
then become intensified, as an increasing proportion of health care dollars is controlled by 
major purchasers. 
The environmental changes such as reimbursement policy, new technology, the 
growth of managed care systems, and the increasing percentage of hospital and nursing 
home revenue coming from third parties all reshape the relationship between the two 
sectors. Knowledge of these significant changes is essential to understanding the 
conflicts that face the two kinds of organizations. 
Conflicts between Hospitals and Nursing Homes 
The changes in financing mechanisms, especially the Medicare PPS and the 
prepayment system adopted by HMO/PPOs in recent years, have changed hospital 
behaviors in many ways, which in turn have altered nursing homes' behaviors and the 
14 
linkage between the two providers. Hospitals are motivated to reduce the length of stay 
(LOS) of patients whose needs can be met by long-term care (Kenney, 1991; Lewis, 
Leake, Leal-Sotelo, & Clark, 1987; Meiners & Coffey, 1985; Morrisey, Sloan, & 
Valvona, 1988b ). As a result of hospitals' determination to discharge patients quickly, a 
portion of hospital LOS days is transferred to the nursing home stay (Morrisey, Sloan, & 
Valvona, 1988b; Neu & Harrison, 1988), and consequently nursing home use increases 
(Hing, 1989; Morrisey, Sloan, & Valvona, 1988a). Because inpatient services are 
replaced by nursing home care (Gianfrancesco, 1990; Morrisey, Sloan, & Valvona, 
1988b ), hospitals become more dependent on nursing homes when discharging patients. 
Hospitals try to discharge patients quickly to avoid the cost of delayed discharge. 
The average LOS in 46 states for Medicare patients was 9.33 days before the PPS, and 
dropped to 7.89 in 1984, the lowest LOS since PPS began, possibly because 1984 was 
the transition year of the PPS implementation. However, the hospital LOS days actually 
were transferred to subacute care, sometimes as many as 4 or 5 days per patient (Neu & 
Harrison, 1988): The Rand Corporation found that during 1981, 1984, and 1985, skilled 
nursing care was used by 2.5% to 3.2% of Medicare patients discharged from hospitals, 
and LOS declined from 9.9 to 7.8 days (Neu & Harrison, 1988). An issue associated with 
this situation is that the risk of malpractice liability is bound to occur if hospitals 
discharge patients prematurely under the pressure of the PPS. To avoid accusation of 
malpractice, hospitals tend to transfer patients to nursing homes or to home care agencies 
rather than discharge them to the community, i.e., simply send them home (Long, 
Chesney, & Ament, 1987). 
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This change in hospital behavior has a great impact on the next level of care: 
earlier hospital discharges force nursing homes to accept sicker patients needing greater 
post-acute care (Kosecoff, Kahn, Rogers, et a!., 1990; Morrisey, Sloan, & Yalvona, 
1988b ). Such patients usually need only short-term, post-operative care rather than long­
term custodial care (Pfeiffer & Christian, 1987; Tellis-Nayak & Tellis-Nayak, 1986). 
Nursing homes, reacting as hospitals shift the burden to them, are reluctant to accept such 
patients, since post-operative care requires higher levels of skill than nursing homes 
traditionally provide. The nursing homes certainly prefer admitting either private-pay 
patients (to gain more revenue) or light-care public-payment patients (to contain costs). 
This conflict of interests between hospitals and nursing homes should be alleviated, 
especially if hospitals suffer from "information asymmetry," that is, if nursing homes are 
likely to take advantage of information to maximize their profits by price discrimination. 
In addition, each state's financial condition and reimbursement policy for nursing 
homes also affect nursing home behavior. The number of states that pay their Medicaid 
providers prospectively instead of per service cost is increasing. The change in 
reimbursement method has shifted the burden of controlling costs to the nursing homes. 
Consequently, nursing homes now prefer to admit those patients who are more profitable 
(Shapiro & Roos, 1981 ). 
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The reimbursement policy together with the short supply of nursing home beds 
accrues advantage to nursing homes in selecting patients. If there is a shortage of nursing 
home beds, hospitals become more dependent on nursing homes to take their patients, 
and so nursing homes are in a superior position. They are free to select the patients they 
consider able to bring higher profits. Furthermore, nursing homes may take advantage of 
hospitals' Jack of information about the availability of nursing home beds. Hospitals try 
to combat price discrimination in nursing home behavior by delaying their discharge of 
patients, which increases the hospitals' operational costs. Some hospitals successfully 
use nursing homes or home health services for patients when all their own beds are 
occupied (Conner & Greene, 1983; Feder & Scanlon, 1985). However, the nursing home 
market still fails to provide prompt care for patients who are medically ready for 
discharge, which increases hospital operational costs through delayed discharges (Welch 
& Dubay, 1989). 
The situation described above is reflected in two studies. Weissert and Cready 
(1988) examined the effect of delayed discharge to nursing homes and found that within 
twelve months 3,500 unnecessary patient days cost the hospital about half a million 
dollars that could have been taken in if the beds had been filled by new patients. Welch 
and Dubay (1989) investigated the impact that administratively necessary days had on 
hospital costs. Their results show that as the nursing home market loosens up, hospital 
costs fall, presumably because discharging patients to nursing homes becomes easier. 
About 50% of the studied hospitals' ANDs appeared to increase costs, from 1.9% to 
4.5%. 
Vertical Integration as A Management Strategy 
( 
The impact of the external environment on the behaviors of health care 
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organizations is unquestionable (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Philips, 1967; Provan, 1987; 
Thompson, 1967). As the government becomes more actively involved in financing and 
regulating health services and more intent on accountability and cost containment, health 
care providers become more affected by the environment (Fottler, Schermerhorn, Wong, 
& Money, 1982; Gay, Kronenfeld, Baker, & Amidon, 1989). 
Vertical integration has been asserted to be a sensible strategic reaction to 
environmental forces that restrict reimbursement (Brown & McCool, 1986; Coddington 
& Moore, 1987; Murphy, 1985). Over the past decade, hospitals have made attempts to 
integrate activities at various stages of production (Conrad, Mick, Madden, & Hoare, 
1988; Robinson, 1994). For two reasons, vertical integration is considered an appropriate 
management strategy for hospitals. First, due to the nature of transactions of care in the 
downstream-upstream relationship, a hospital can cross that boundary with relatively low 
risk of failure. Second, hospitals have found they can reduce costs by acquiring skilled 
nursing facility (SNF) beds or home health agencies; the reduced LOS resulting from 
such acquisitions will eventually either produce more revenues or reduce costs (Newald, 
1986a; Newald, 1986b; Moore, 1985)-f.JAlthough empirical assessments are lacking, 
vertical integration has occurred frequently (Mick & Conrad, 1988; Robinson, 1994). 
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Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) Perspective 
Transaction cost economics provides a plausible theoretical framework within 
which to explore the topic of vertical integration. (The transaction cost economics theory, 
developed by Williamson, represents organizational economics (Williamson, 1975, 
1985). The theory incorporates concepts of economic and contract law into a broader 
mode to explain how organizations respond to "market failure" and to provide the most 
efficient model of exchange (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1991). Williamson has proposed 
that measurement in TCE should focus on the performance or attribute ambiguities 
associated with the supply of a good or service. The theory focuses on the transaction --
the exchange between buyer and supplier-- as the unit of importance, and suggests that 
the dimensions and attributes of transactions determine the preferred transacting 
framework. ) 
( 
These frameworks may include 1) "spot market" exchanges, in which buyers and 
sellers may have no prior established relationships; 2) contracting of mid- or long-term 
duration (via contract or joint venture arrangement) where a transacting setting has been 
developed to guide exchanges, called a "hybrid" mode of governance; and 3) vertical 
integration, wherein the buyer ultimately gains permanent control over the supplier. 
Vertical integration is termed as "hierarchy." Overall, transaction cost theory suggests 
that the design of organizations may be the result of the continuing calculation of "make 
--�� 
_l?gY�' decisions by exchange partners. l 
/ 
19 
( That hospitals can consider Rro_��d.ingE����<l.<:��e
-��
re either 
-
��ug��facilities they 
own or through formal long-term contracting (including joint ventures) reflects 
imperfection in the nursing home market. The situation is better explained by 
Williamson's transaction cost economics concept that the failure of market function gives 
rise to the emergence of organizations. Market failure in this context refers to the 
situation where long-term care providers are few, and information is impacted. 
"Impacted" information arises from uncertainty about the supply of long-term care, and 
nursing home opportunistic behaviors that keep hospitals from having perfect information 
about the availability of nursing home beds. Nursing homes, out of self-interest, tend to 
select patients who can provide the most possible profits. Consequently, hospitals 
encounter difficulty in placing their readily dischargeable patients in nursing homes. In 
market terms, to overcome the imperfections of the nursing home market, hospitals 
should adopt different modes of governance, according toJ_b_e__three dimensions suggested 
by Williamson-- transaction uncertainty, transaction frequency, and t:ansaction asset 
__ specificity (Williamson, 1975, 1985). ) 
Research Questions 
In evaluating the reasons for and conditions under which a hospital vertically 
integrates into nursing home care, this study addresses the following research questions: 
I. To what degree do hospitals choose vertical integration to solve the delayed discharge 
problem that may be caused by environmental uncertainty and other conditions? 
2. What are the major determinants that affect hospitals' different modes of control 
(ranging from market, to hybrid, and to vertical integration) over nursing home care 
services, i.e., wh
_
at fac�ors deter01ir1e hospitals' 01ake-or.��l1y d��i�i��s_? _ 
3. Can Williamson's transaction cost economics be applied in the health care sector, 
especially to acute care hospitals and nursing homes? More specifically, can 
transaction uncertainty, transaction specificity, and transaction frequency explain 
hospital behavior in choosing an efficient governance form? 
Significance of the Present Study 
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As competition in the health care market becomes increasingly intensive and the 
scarcity of related resources becomes more severe, operational efficiency of health care 
organizations has become a major concern of management. The efforts of health care 
reform to restructure the current health care system reflect the society's concerns about 
the system's deficiencies. With the population rapidly aging and with the change in 
reimbursement policy, more and more patients are expected to be transferred from acute 
care to extended care sites (i.e., from higher-cost to lower-cost sites). Providers of acute 
care, under such pressures, may strive to reduce costs by adopting such strategies as 
vertical integration with up- or down-stream providers. This study may provide 
information about the relative benefits of different degrees of vertical integration. 
Despite the widespread recognition that transaction cost economics is potentially 
applicable to a number of health service research questions (Conrad & Dowling, 1990; 
Conrad, Mick, Madden, & Hoare, 1988; Hurley & Fennel, 1990; Mick & Conrad, 1988), 
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little empirical evidence has been gathered in this area. The growing interest in 
promoting vertically integrated delivery systems in health care, either implicitly or 
explicitly, to reduce transaction-related friction suggests that this model should be 
revisited and operationalized. This study reviews literature on hospital management 
strategies for remedying market failure and examines whether transaction cost economics 
is applicable to health care. 
� 
The assumption of this study is that hospitals can use vertical integration to 
expand hospital boundaries and thus minimize deficiencies in the nursing home market. 
( \ 
I 
In seeking the most efficient governance form, a hospital should select the one that is the 
I best for its own situation. The transaction cost economics framework will provide 
\ 
\ hospitals with a theoretical foundation for such "make or buy" decisions. 
' 
Outlines of Remaining Chapters 
Chapter 2 first reviews the demand for and supply of nursing home beds and the 
factors associated with delayed discharges from hospitals. Particular attention is directed 
toward nursing homes' behaviors related to the short supply of beds. The definition of 
vertical integration, and different approaches to interpreting vertical integration are 
presented. The motivations and risks for hospitals employing vertical integration as a 
management strategy are examined. Some examples of vertical integration in the health 
care industry are described. 
Chapter 3 lays out the theoretical framework that guides the study. The core 
concept and the three dimensions of transaction cost economics are presented. The 
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chapter reviews articles in the health care field that use TCE to interpret the emergence of 
health care organizations due to market failure. Empirical studies in other disciplines that 
test or explain the transaction cost economic theory are reviewed as well. Finally, 
hypotheses based upon the three-dimensional conceptual model are derived. 
Chapter 4 begins with a statement of the study design and description of the 
sample. This is followed by descriptions of the data sources, model specification and 
measurement variables. The section on the analytic plan includes a discussion of model­
building analyses and multivariate logistic regression analysis. 
Chapter 5 presents the results of data management and statistical analysis, 
including descriptive statistics, model building, and multivariate logistic regression 
analysis. 
Chapter 6 presents the results of individual hypothesis testing of the three 
constructs. A discussion of whether the study has successfully answered the research 
questions follows. Then the application of the transaction cost theory to the health care 
field is assessed by using Bacharach's (1989) criteria. This chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the limitations of the study. 
Finally, Chapter 7 presents several important implications of the findings from 
this study that are useful for hospital administrators, policy makers, and researchers in the 
areas of health service organizations and long-term care. Suggestions for future research 
are also presented. 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
Several areas that are important to the study are reviewed in this chapter. The first 
section is about the demand for and supply of nursing home beds; the second section 
covers factors associated with delayed hospital discharges. The third section presents the 
definition and different interpretations of vertical integration given by researchers from 
both health care and non-health-care fields. The last section presents the motivation, 
risks, and determinants of success that are associated with vertical integration, and offers 
some examples of vertical integration in health care industry. 
Demand and Supply of Nursing Home Beds 
The basic economic concept, the contrast of demand and supply, is used to review 
the nursing home market, since this study is concerned with organizations' behaviors 
related to demand and supply. On the demand side, factors that increase the demand for 
nursing home beds, such as changes in population and technology, are explored first. On 
the supply side, the oligopoly features of the nursing home market, such as certificate-of­
need (CON), price regulation, and bed supply associated with delays and costs for 
hospital patients are discussed. 
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Demand for Nursing Home Beds 
Several factors have increased the demand for nursing home care. The aging of 
the population, the changes in the most prevalent types of illness, and the advancement of 
medical technology are the main reasons. 
The over thirty million older persons (age 65 or older) as of 1990 (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 1990) represent the largest consumer group for nursing home services. Total 
annual population growth was 1% between 1965 and 1990, and a 0.6% growth rate is 
projected for the years 1990 to 2030, along with dramatic changes in the population's 
composition. Currently, persons age 65 and over comprise 12.4% of the entire 
population, and persons age 75 and over comprise 5.3%. By 2015, these two groups will 
increase to 14.6% and 6.0%, respectively, of the total population. The aging trend will 
continue as the baby boomers enter their seventies and eighties, and these proportions 
will increase to 20.1% and 9.0% by 2030. 
The population age 65 and older faces higher risks of institutionalization, and that 
is especially true of the group age 75 and over, even though only 5% of them reside in 
nursing homes. It is estimated that 25-35% (Ingram & Barry, 1977; Liang & Tu, 1986; 
Palmore, 1976) or an even higher percentage (Cohen, Tell, & Wallack, 1986; McConnell, 
1984; Vicente, Wiley, & Carrington, 1979) of the current cohorts of older adults will 
become institutionalized at some point in their lives. Provided the current pattern 
continues, the number of elderly who need nursing home care will increase from 1.8 
million in 1990 to 3-3.4 million in 2010, and to as high as 4.3-5.3 million, tripling today's 
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demand, in 2030. Health care providers, hospitals and nursing homes must stay alert to 
the demographic trend, because it will bring about changes in the utilization patterns for 
different levels of care (Zedlewski & McBride, 1992). 
In addition to the aging population, the changing morbidity pattern is another 
factor increasing the demand for post-acute care. Despite declining mortality rates since 
1957 (Tellis-Nayak & Tellis-Nayak, 1986), chronic diseases that increase with longevity 
are becoming more prevalent. Cerebrovascular disorders, hip and femur procedures, 
pneumonia and pleurisy, heart failure and shock, and major joint replacement are the five 
most frequent DRGs among the hospitalized Medicare patients discharged to post-acute 
care (Kenney & Holahan, 1990). The elderly are more vulnerable to chronic diseases and 
more likely to require nursing home care for them. 
Advances in treatment also have fueled the growth of post-acute care. Between 
1980 and 1987, the number of hip replacements, one of the most common procedures of 
modern medicine, increased by over 90%, while total hospital discharges decreased by 
I 0% (Friedman & Elixhauser, 1993). Hospitals that have more patients with hip 
replacements are likely to need more nursing care beds, since nursing home care is 
typically transitional care for patients with joint replacement (Morrisey, Sloan, & 
Valvona, 1988b). 
Supply of Nursing Home Beds 
The growth of nursing home beds, unfortunately, has not responded to the 
increased demand. The supply of nursing home beds grew quickly after the 
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implementation of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, but in the 1980s it did not match the 
growth rate of the aged population. During the 11 years from 1978 to 1989, the total 
nwnber of nursing home beds increased by 24%. However, in 1989 the ratio of nursing 
home beds to the elderly population had dropped 2% below that of 1978. The average 
nursing home occupancy rate was 89.54% in 1978, 91.18% in 1989 (Harrington, Preston, 
Grant, & Swan, 1992), and as high as 95.4% in 1992 (Marion Merrel Dow, 1993). 
Among the many reasons that the growth of nursing home beds has not responded to 
market demand are certificate-of-need (CON), control mechanisms to limit access, and 
reimbursement policies. 
The nursing home industry is quite complex, because its development is heavily 
influenced by changes in regulations and policies. By 1970, several states had 
implemented CON regulations requiring state approval of the establishment or expansion 
of health facilities, usually including nursing homes. By 1979, almost all states had 
enacted CON, differing only in the degree of stringency. The 1982 Social Security Act 
was intended to reduce the variation by requiring all nursing homes with capital 
expenditure over $100,000, located in over 30 states, to undergo review by the state CON 
administrator (Feder & Scanlon, 1980). It has been argued that the CON laws and 
construction moratoria limited the growth of nursing home beds (Ettner, 1993; Feder & 
Scanlon, 1980; Nyman, 1993; Zinn, Aaronson, & Rosko, 1992), wh ich led to an 
excess demand (Nyman, 1993). CON stringency is also used by regulators to control 
Medicaid health expenditures: Feder and Scanlon (1980) studied CON in eight states and 
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speculated that the government may have restricted the growth of nursing home capacity 
in order to cut the costs of providing nursing home services for Medicaid recipients. 
State Medicaid reimbursement policies certainly have considerable impact on the 
supply of nursing homes. Medicaid pays for about half of all nursing home patient days, 
representing its near-monopsony power. Of nursing home expenditures ($59.9 billion) in 
1991, Medicaid paid 47.4%, private or out-of-pocket payments paid 43.1 %, Medicare 
paid only 6.6%, and the rest was paid by private insurance, philanthropy, and others 
(Letsch, 1993). Should reimbursement rates be increased, more firms are likely to enter 
the market, assuming that CON permits expansion of existing services and that incentives 
to admit and care for Medicaid patients are in place. The impact of Medicaid 
reimbursement on nursing home supply will be further discussed in the next section. 
Another factor constraining the increase in nursing home beds is preadmission 
screening. In the 1980s, at least thirty states adopted more stringent eligibility and 
preadmission screening policies for Medicaid SNFs, as a strategy to reduce demand. In 
1987, moreover, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) made preadmission 
screening mandatory as a part of legislation on nursing home reform. This regulation 
managed only to curb the growth in the number of Medicaid's nursing home care 
recipients, but not to reduce Medicaid's share of costs, which rose from 45.1% in 1990 to 
47.4% in 1991 (Zedlewski & Melnick, 1988). 
The extent of the supply shortage can be measured by hospitals' delayed 
discharges. Patients in this situation are generally referred to as "hold-over patients" or 
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"long-stay patients," and the situation as "blocked bed" or "back-up." The "blocked bed" 
problems had been noted as early as in the 1950s (Philips, 1967). The principal patient 
group associated with "blocked beds" are the geriatric patients who no longer need acute 
care, yet are not immediately discharged to nursing homes or rehabilitation/chronic care 
institutions (Shapiro & Roos, 1981 ). Hospital utilization review teams often put such 
patients on "administrative necessary days," since the patients, though still needing care, 
have recovered from the acute stage of illness. 
In order to use resources efficiently, a method has been developed to assess the 
misutilization of hospital resources and detect unnecessary hospital stays (Gertman & 
Restuccia, 1981; Selker, Beshansky, Pauker, & Kassirer, 1989). Many studies have 
identified the days waiting for discharge to nursing homes, along with the nursing home 
bed supply (Gruenberg & Willemain, 1982; Hing, 1989; Kenney & Holahan, 1990; 
Restuccia & Holloway, 1976; Shapiro & Roos, 1980). In general, hospitals located in 
areas of proportionately more SNF bed supply tend to have fewer discharge delays, 
because high numbers of hospital transfers may be offset by fewer transfers from 
intermediate care facilities (ICFs) (Kenney & Holahan, 1990). Hospitals in areas with 
lower nursing home bed supply have fewer transfers to nursing homes and slower 
discharges (Hing, 1989). 
To summarize this section, the growing elderly population, changing disease 
patterns, and advances in treatments have spurred an escalating demand for post-acute 
care. However, the constrained supply of nursing home beds due to CON stringency and 
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reimbursement policies has intensified the delayed discharge problem, to varying degrees 
in different states. 
Factors for Hospital Delayed Discharges 
The medical process involves not only patients but also their families, the support 
system, the physicians, the care provider, and the entire environment (Donabedian, 1973). 
Discharge delays happen through a complex process. Several factors may be involved, 
including hospital characteristics (Falcone, Bolda, & Leak, 1991; Markson, Steel, & 
Kane, 1983; Weissert & Cready, 1988), patient and family characteristics (Shaughnessy, 
Kramer, Schlenker, & Polesovsky, 1985), poor coordination of acute and long-term care 
sectors (Baker, Williams, Zimmer, Van Buren, Vincent, & Pickrel, 1985; Restuccia & 
Holloway, 1976), the nursing home market (Hing, 1989; Holahan, 1990; Kenney & 
Holahan, 1990), and nursing home behaviors (Payne, 1987; Selker, Beshansky, Pauker, 
& Kassirer, 1989). This section examines the impacts of hospital characteristics and 
nursing home behaviors. 
Hospital Characteristics 
In the past, under the retrospective payment system, hospitals tended to keep 
patients (Hochstein, 1985; Holahan, 1990). In the pre-DRG era, the main concern was 
the backup of geriatric patients in acute hospitals who had recovered from acute illness 
but were not immediately transferred to extended care facilities (Shapiro & Roos, 1981 ). 
Third party payors still covered the hospital's costs. The implementation of the PPS 
motivated hospitals to discharge patients sooner (Holahan, 1990; Kenney & Holahan, 
\ 
) 
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1990; Weissert & Cready, 1988). Given the competition for nursing home beds, it is 
difficult for most hospitals to avoid discharged delays. Those hospitals with long-term-
care units or swing beds, or with close affiliations with nursing homes are the winners in 
a tight nursing home market. They usually have more transfers to nursing homes (Hing, 
1989), fewer discharge delays (Hing, 1989; Kenney & Holahan, 1990), and lower acute 
care costs (Welch & Dubay, 1989). On the other hand, hospitals with higher occupancies 
(Falcone, Bolda, & Leak, 1991; Gruenberg & Willemain, 1982; Markson, Steel, & Kane, 
1983 ), larger proportions of patients aged 60 and over (Markson, Steel, & Kane, 1983 ), 
larger size (Falcone, Bolda, & Leak, 1991 ), and inadequate discharge planning (Baker, 
Williams, Zimmer, Van Buren, Vincent, & Pickrel, 1985; Restuccia & Holloway, 1976) 
are found to have more delayed discharges. 
Hospital-based long-term-care units or swing beds make it possible for patients 
who need long-term care to be transferred promptly, avoiding delayed discharges. 
Providing two levels of care in one facility makes patient transitions smoother and more 
natural. Most importantly, the integrated arrangements can fill the gap between the 
relatively intense medical needs of post-acute patients and the limited capacity of the 
\ current nursing home system to meet those needs (Shaughnessy & Schlenker, 1986). '-
Another important factor affect the hospital delayed discharge is nursing homes' price 
discrimination behavior. This regard will be discussed next. 
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Price Discrimination by Nursing Homes 
Price discrimination does not observe first-come-first-served as a guide to 
admissions policy. Rather, to maximize profit, nursing homes give preference to private 
patients over Medicaid or Medicare patients. Nursing homes' price discrimination 
supports the assumption that people are self-interested, and that this applies to 
organizational behavior, because an organization is a collective of people. Such 
opportunism is more likely when suppliers are few. Hospitals need nursing home beds to 
discharge their patients to, while nursing homes, the suppliers, if left free to pursue self­
interest and opportunism, will prefer self-pay patients or those with relatively less severe 
conditions. This preference introduces so-called hold-up behavior. 
Since Medicaid or Medicare reimbursement rates and the marginal revenue from 
caring for Medicaid patients are lower than those from private payors (Dor, 1989), 
nursing homes tend to first calculate the optimal number of private or light-care 
admissions, then limit the beds for public-pay patients to the number remaining. 
Therefore, Medicare and Medicaid patient access largely depends on private patients' 
demand and nursing home bed supply. The existence of price discrimination behavior 
by nursing homes is demonstrated in several studies (Dubay & Cohen, 1990; 
Massachusetts Hospital Association, 1979; Scanlon, 1980; Shapiro & Roos, 1981 ). 
Medicaid reimbursement and nursing home hold-up behavior. Medicaid 
reimbursement policies are an important influence on the operation of nursing homes, 
since Medicaid pays almost half of all nursing home costs. Medicaid reimbursement for 
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SNFs varies among states. Researchers have found a pattern in the interaction between 
rate setting systems and the supply of SNF care for Medicaid patients. When nursing 
homes are located in states where Medicaid reimbursement policies and private nursing 
home markets support high-intensity care, nursing homes are motivated to admit more 
Medicaid patients. With higher levels of Medicaid reimbursement, nursing homes can 
afford staffing for patients with greater needs and put Medicaid patients into the 
appropriate patient mix under Medicaid full-cost reimbursement. Facilities in states that 
have flat rates (a fixed rate per diem for each resident) or strong prospective 
reimbursement are less willing to serve Medicaid patients (Bishop & Dubay, 1991). In 
other words, the willingness of nursing homes to take Medicaid patients becomes less 
when public payment for them is comparatively low and they are relatively sicker 
(Bishop & Dubay, 1991; Dor, 1989; Dubay & Cohen, 1990; Shaughnessy, Kramer, 
Schlenker, & Polesovsky, 1985). 
The nursing home market is dominated by prospective payment, which gives 
nursing homes an incentive to admit lighter-care patients, since their care costs are below 
average. The number of Medicaid beneficiaries' admissions increased the most in states 
where Medicaid fee-for-service reimbursement was used (Dubay, 1990). As a result, 
hospital discharges of heavy-care patients in those states were delayed, particularly in 
areas with low bed supply or excess demand for nursing home care. 
Several studies have revealed unmet demand for nursing home beds for Medicaid 
patients, but not for private patients. With all else held constant, being a Medicaid 
beneficiary has been found to be the most restrictive factor for access to long-term care 
beds, especially in areas where beds are relatively limited and demand is relatively 
higher (Coburn, Fortinsky, McGuire, & McDonald, 1993; Ettner, 1993; Nyman, 1989; 
Nyman, 1993; Weissert & Musliner, 1992). 
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Medicare reimbursement and nursing home hold-up behavior. Most of Medicare 
beneficiaries are either aged or disabled and therefore are more likely to use medical 
services. Medicare beneficiaries are eligible for nursing home admissions within 30 days 
of hospital discharge after at least three consecutive days of hospitalization. The benefits 
cover up to I 00 days of nursing care, including daily skilled nursing or rehabilitation 
services. Beneficiaries do not have to pay for the first 20 days, but some amount of 
copayment for the 21st to I OOth days is required. As of 1992, Medicare paid all but 
$81.50 per day from the 21st day to I OOth day (Government Printing Office, 1992). 
Significant differences exist between Medicare and non-Medicare SNF patients 
(Shaughnessy, Kramer, Schlenker, & Polesovsky, 1985). Medicare patients are by 
definition at a post-acute care stage and consequently tend to need more medical and 
nursing care than non-Medicare patients do. Non-Medicare patients, for example, have 
more incontinence problems; they receive more traditional, custodial nursing home care. 
In short, Medicare enrollees have greater than average needs for care, yet certified 
nursing homes are more reluctant to admit them because their care has higher marginal 
and average costs as well as lower reimbursement (Bishop & Dubay, 1991; Coburn, 
Fortinsky, McGuire, & McDonald, 1993; Dor, 1989; Shaughnessy, Kramer, Schlenker, & 
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Polesovsky, 1985). Dor ( 1989) studied the costs and behaviors of SNFs and found that 
the average cost per Medicare patient day is $122, compared with $53 for Medicaid and 
$66 for private patients. These figures explain why nursing homes resist admitting 
Medicare patients. 
One of the indicators of nursing homes' unwillingness to admit Medicare patients 
is the small proportion of Medicare patient days in SNFs. While approximately two­
thirds of all SNFs are certified by Medicare, the vast majority of SNFs provide very few 
Medicare days. In a recent GAO survey of hospital discharge planners, 97 % of those 
sampled reported that they had difficulty placing Medicare patients in nursing homes 
(GAO, 1987). Unless Medicare reimbursement policy is based on actual costs of 
Medicare inpatients, the vast majority of nursing homes will continue to prefer non­
Medicare patients, thus restricting the access of Medicare beneficiaries to nursing home 
care. 
Factors associated with hospital delayed discharges can be briefly summarized. 
The hospital characteristics of hospital occupancy, affiliation with long-term-care 
facilities, and proportion of elderly patients are associated with delayed discharges. The 
incidence of nursing homes' hold-up behaviors depends on Medicare and Medicaid 
reimbursement policies. 
Vertical Integration 
Since this study examines how hospitals choose different degrees of vertical 
integration to manage discharges to nursing homes, a clear definition of vertical 
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integration is essential. For that purpose, examining the term's meaning across different 
disciplines will be useful. 
Definitions of Vertical Integration 
Vertical integration can be defined in terms of organizational boundaries, types, 
and production stages. Thompson ( 1967) defined vertical integration as an "expansion of 
the organization's domain that incorporates functions on which the core technology 
depends (backward integration) or for which the core technology is an input (forward 
integration)." The central notion underlying vertical integration control is the value chain 
(Porter, 1980), which describes the flow of inputs and outputs involved in producing a 
particular good or service. The value chain suggests a vertical ordering from "upstream" 
stages of production (inputs) to "downstream" (final outputs) stages. 
Williamson (1985) proposes two broad types of integration, mundane integration 
and vertical integration. He specifies that the mundane integrates successive stages 
within the core technology, whereas the vertical integration involves integrating 
peripheral or off-site activities I) backward into basic material, 2) laterally into 
components, and 3) forward into distribution. Williamson ( 1985, 1991) argues that, 
regardless of stage, vertical integration is a continuum anchored by the options of market 
and hierarchy. Movement along the continuum from market, to long-term contracting 
(hybrid), to vertical integration (hierarchy) is accompanied by higher levels of resource 
commitment (capital, labor, land) and risk. 
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Among definitions and interpretations of vertical integration of health care 
organizations, Harrigan's interpretation (1984) is the most frequently cited by health care 
researchers (Conrad & Dowling, 1990; Conrad, Mick, Madden, & Hoare, 1988; Mick & 
Conrad, 1988). Harrigan proposes four dimensions: 1) the successive stages of 
integration in the production process; 2) the degree of internal transfers at a given stage of 
production; 3) the breadth of integrated activities undertaken at any one productive stage; 
and 4) the form of ownership. Among these four dimensions, the concept of successive 
stages of integration in the production process is most frequently adopted by health care 
researchers in developing frameworks of vertical integration (Clement, 1988; Conrad, 
1993; Conrad & Dowling, 1990; Conrad, Mick, Madden, & Hoare, 1988; Gillies, 
Shortell, & Anderson, 1993). 
Clement (1988) argues that the production process involves four stages: raw 
materials, intermediate products, production chain, and distribution. Conrad and 
colleagues (1988), combining Hornbrook's and Harrigan's concepts, suggest a six-part 
vertical ordering in their Health Service Value Chain model. The six stages are raw 
material input, intermediate inputs/outputs to services, service outputs, episodic-patient­
care service lines, chronic-patient-care service lines, and payment for health services. 
According to Clement (1988), vertical integration refers to "owning more than 
one link in a linear chain extending from insurance through ambulatory care, secondary 
inpatient care, and tertiary care to nursing home care and home care." As Conrad and 
Dowling (1990) put it, vertical integration is the coordination or linkage of businesses 
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(service lines) that are at different stages in the production process of health care. An 
example is when an acute-care provider owns facilities providing various other types of 
care such as long-term care. Mick and Conrad (1988) also have taken the hospital 
inpatient as a strategic business unit for which backward integration (upstream) can range 
from urgent to primary care, to wellness programs; and forward integration (downstream) 
can take the forms of skilled nursing facilities or rehabilitation units. 
Conrad ( 1993) argues that vertical integration in health care requires integration 
of both the clinical and the administrative dimensions intra- and inter-organizationally, 
and that the clinical integration of patient care is central to achieving vertically integrated 
regional systems of health care. Clinical integration refers to the "coordination of 
services across the continuum of various forms of acute inpatient care to secondary 
specialty care, tertiary subspecialty care, long-term care, rehabilitation services, primary 
care to health promotion and disease prevention" (Conrad, 1993). 
Recognizing that there are several approaches to interpreting vertical integration, 
this study focuses on the definition proposed by Williamson's transaction cost economics 
perspective. Comparison of Harrigan's ( 1984) concept with Williamson's (1985) reveals 
that Harrigan's breadth and stage of vertical integration is conceptually the same as 
Williamson's "efficient boundary," and Harrigan's ownership of vertical integration is 
Williamson's "efficient governance." 
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Different Interpretations of Vertical Inte�ration 
Each discipline interprets vertical integration according to its own perspective and 
purposes. Management, marketing analysts, and organization theorists all interpret 
vertical integration differently. Rangan et a!. (1993) proposed that, assuming two 
dimensions of integration: production/distribution economics and governance, vertical 
integration can be classified into four models. The managerial model lays out product-
market factors relevant to various levels of vertical integration, but identifies no 
underlying causes (Miracle, 1965). Monopoly models (Coughlan & Wernerfelt, 1989; 
Moorthy, 1988) focus on production and distribution economies. The third model, a 
market power model that considers governance costs, theoretically explains how vertical 
integration is affected by product-market competition and firm profitability. The 
transaction cost model accommodates both production/distribution economies and 
governance considerations (';Villiamson, 1975, 1985). 
Organizational theorists who have interpreted the concept of vertical integration 
fall into three general groups: institutional theorists, resource dependency theorists, and 
transaction cost theorists. Institutional theorists argue that structural change is driven 
more by imitation pressures for organizations to resemble each other than by market 
forces (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983 ). Another line of reasoning maintains that the early 
adopters of vertical integration mainly seek efficiency and market advantages, but the late 
adopters seek legitimacy (Arndt & Bigelow, 1992). 
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Resource dependency theory offers insight into interorganizational relationships. 1 
Interdependency can be controlled by joining or participating in industry associations and 
coordinating councils, or establishing favorable linkages with external entities through 
boundary spanning, or forming joint ventures or coalitions with other organizations 
(Fottler, Schermerhorn, Wong, & Money, 1982). According to resource dependency 
theorists, interdependency can also be managed through organizational design, by adding 
sep��� full_c_ti.<>!l�_tJQ.its for each major source of external dependency, by centralizing or 
(;(!�--· 
decentralizing production, or by performing activities of either horizontal or vertical 
integration (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967). 
In recent years, the transaction cost economics perspective of Williamson 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1991) has been adopted by organization theorists as one way of 
explaining vertical relations between organizations (Barney & Ouchi, 1986; Hill, 1990; 
Hurley & Fennel, 1990). Their argument is that vertical integration can overcome market 
imperfection and suppliers' opportunism. 
Non-market governance is viewed similarly by resource dependency theorists and 
transaction cost theorists, as a strategic response to dependency and environmental 
uncertainty (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).Jh� ll}_ajQr __ differenc<: between these two theories 
is thaqe�ource dependency theory limits its treatment of performance to effectiveness 
- .- . ��- . 
consid�ratj_Qn�__,__wbile transaction cost theory explicitly spells out.efficiency jr.npJL�ations 
I -
--· ' ·  
of organizational n:!lationships (Heide.,_ 1994). Dependency results from asset specificity, 
I 
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\ 
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which makes it difficult to substitute a partner in the exchange at similar cost (Barney & 
Ouchi, 1986). 
Vertical Integration in Health Care 
-
�--
Vertical integration has been put forward as a sensible strategic reaction to 
environmental forces in health care. The following section explains the motivation, risks, 
and determinants of success for vertical integration in the health care industry. Some 
examples of vertical integration are provided. 
Motivation for Vertical Integration 
Health care providers may be motivated to vertically integrate for various reasons, 
but most often for the following: to reduce transaction costs (Conrad & Dowling, 1990; 
Conrad, Mick, Madden, & Hoare, 1988; Mick & Conrad, 1988; Williamson, 1975, 1985), 
to reduce production costs (Conrad, Mick, Madden, & Hoare, 1988; Mick & Conrad, 
1988; Williamson, 1975, 1985), to maintain viability (Wheller, Wickizer, & Shortell, 
1986), to increase market share (Brown & McCool, 1986; Starkweather & Carman, 1987; 
Wheller, Wickizer, & Shortell, 1986), and to enhance market forces (Conrad, Mick, 
Madden, & Hoare, 1988; Harrigan, 1984; Williamson, 1975). These reasons correspond 
to the premise of economic theories that "firms react to changes in their economic 
environment in ways that maximize their position in the new setting" (Conrad, Mick, 
Madden, & Hoare, 1988). The following discussion explains the motivation of vertical 
integration in terms of efficiency, market share, and effectiveness. 
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The concept of transaction cost emphasizes efficiency (Arnould, Pollard, & 
VanVorst, 1988; Conrad, Mick, Madden, & Hoare, 1988). Several researchers even 
identify efficiency as the major motive driving health care organizations to adopt vertical 
integration (Conrad & Dowling, 1990; Conrad, Mick, Madden, & Hoare, 1988; Hurley & 
Fennel, 1990; Williamson, 1975, 1985). When one investigates the possible advantage 
(efficiency) of vertical integration for hospital operation, a major financial benefit is seen 
to be economies of scale, that is, achieving operating economies and improving 
utilization of existing resources. With an expanded scale of operation, a hospital can 
spread fixed costs over more patient days or services, thus immediately reducing the 
average unit cost with little impact on its revenue (Giardina, Fottler, Shewchuk, & Hill, 
1990; Whitman, DeAngelis, & Knapp, 1986). 
Several studies suggest that organizations should work on finding synergy 
between different levels of the care process, by fully using the resources available in one 
part of a facility. Relatively short inpatient stays at acute-care hospitals are thought to be 
attributable to the hospitals' close affiliations with extended-care facilities (Tresch, 
Simpson, & Burton, 1985). Patients discharged to a hospital-affiliated nursing home 
usually have fewer delayed discharges than do those discharged elsewhere (Weissert & 
Cready, 1988). In this sense, vertical integration of nursing homes into hospitals may 
lead to financial or economic success, either increasing revenue through expanded market 
share or decreasing expense by fully using the existing personnel, equipment and beds 
(i.e., economies of scale). This analysis indicates that hospitals with certain degrees of 
vertical integration could hasten discharges. 
It is not appropriate to attain efficiency unless effectiveness is also safeguarded. 
As with the situation of hospitals and nursing home care, the advantages of hospital­
based SNFs cannot be evaluated only on how much cost is contained; how well patient 
care is coordinated is equally essential. Hospital-based SNFs allow hospitals to 
coordinate the care provided beyond the acute-care phase, thereby improving overall 
continuity. Cost savings are justified only if the process also improves quality, for 
example by giving physicians better access to facilities and to patients' medical records, 
and by allowing patients better access to physicians and nursing personnel (Whitman, 
DeAngelis, & Knapp, 1986). 
Risks of Vertical Integration 
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It is important to note that vertical integration does not guarantee improved 
financial performance (Clement, 1987; Smith, Piland, & Phillipp, 1991). Many of the 
new service lines (such as wellness programs and emergency services) in some system 
hospitals are not profitable (Shortell, Morrison, & Hughes, 1989). How much hospitals 
should be involved in directly providing long-term care is controversial. Several studies 
have found that costs are higher at hospital-based SNFs than at freestanding SNFs 
(Shaughnessy, Kramer, Schlenker, & Polesovsky, 1985; Sulvetta & Holahan, 1986; 
Wiener, Liu, & Schieber, 1986). Another study found that expanded services, such as 
43 
swing bed, long-term care, and home care, in rural New Mexico hospitals are not 
positively related with hospitals' overall gross revenue (Smith, Piland, & Phillipp, 1991 ). 
Theoretically, firms prefer producing ("making") key supplies and services over 
buying those key supplies and services, because "making" maintains autonomy over 
certain resources critical to survival. Therefore, managers may sometimes operate on the 
fallacious premise that more integration is always preferable. In fact, vertical integration 
does not guarantee success, especially when adopted inappropriately for the 
circumstances (Harrigan, 1984). According to some practitioners, it is difficult for 
vertically integrated organizations to operate in areas where management is shared by 
different owners (Ross, Williams, & Schafer, 1984). Some multi-system organizations 
in health care have been reported as pursuing "de-integration," divesting themselves of 
subsidiaries that have not met expectations or that are difficult to run (Graham, 1982; 
Shahoda, 1986). Managers need to understand the key dimensions of vertical integration 
better in order to avoid errors and gain the most benefit from joining dissimilar entities. 
Determinants of Vertical Integration 
Successfully designed vertical integration can help a hospital in several ways, 
including firming up the referral channels from providers of primary and secondary care, 
forestalling competitive physician activities, attracting more ambulatory business, and 
feeding more patients into the inpatient unit. The next question to be asked, then, is 
"what determines the success of vertical integration?" 
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The success of vertical integration is determined by complex factors: 
environmental conditions, competition, bargaining power, organization goals and culture, 
and managerial factors (Conrad & Dowling, 1990; Harrigan, 1984 ). Among all these, 
environmental conditions are the most extensive factors. They include demand or supply 
uncertainty, regulatory or technological change, and the relationships among different 
stages of a product. 
As an example, the Medicare PPS, probably the single most significant 
environmental force in recent years, has dramatically changed the interdependencies 
among economic units at many levels in health care systems, and the interdependencies 
among informational intermediaries and payor parties. Reimbursement has shifted from 
specialists toward primary care physicians and so has motivated specialists to adopt risk­
and gain-sharing arrangements with primary care physicians (Christensen, 1992; Fahey, 
1992). The key to success for health care providers who adopt vertical integration is the 
ability to coordinate different levels of care efficiently. 
Several articles have examined the factors that affect whether health care 
organizations can achieve the goal of vertical integration. Conrad ( 1990, 1993) argued 
that the success of vertically linked strategies is influenced by integrative 
instrumentalities. The instrumentalities can be categorized as I) inter-organizational 
administrative coordination mechanisms; and 2) intra-organizational administrative 
coordination and patient care coordination. To fully coordinate units within a health care 
organization, patient care has to be managed first, through such mechanisms as case 
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management and discharge planning. Intra-organizational coordination closely links 
different units or stages in the production of health services, for example, through the use 
of a program coordinator. Inter-organizational coordination ranges from tapping the 
benefits of single ownership to utilizing the advantages of proximity among different 
organizational units (Conrad & Dowling, 1990). 
Shortell, Morrison, and Hughes ( 1989) identified four factors leading to 
successful operation in eight hospital systems. The factors included strategies for 
working effectively with physicians, learning to combine centralized and decentralized 
strategic planning approaches, understanding diversification, and applying an early 
adopters' experience curve. Because hospitals rely on physicians to bring in patients, 
strong hospital-physician relationships are a crucial factor for hospitals implementing 
integration strategies or responding to various diversification requirements. 
In sum, the success of vertical integration is determined by complex factors: 
environmental conditions, integrative instrumentalities, organizational experience, and 
managerial factors. The time, place, type of service or good, and a hospital's ability 
should all be evaluated when considering vertical integration. 
Examples of Vertical Integration 
Health care organizations today are adopting vertical integration in "a tidal wave" 
(Bisbee, 1986; Robinson, 1994). Vertical integration is emerging among them in 
different forms, degrees, breadths, and stages. Managed care networks, regional health 
systems, local health care systems, and hospital-based integrated systems are some 
examples. 
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The experiences of vertical integration in health-care delivery systems range from 
macro levels (multi-stage, inter-organizational) to micro levels (single stage or intra­
organizational). The macro levels include regional hospital systems, HMOs, PPOs, 
physician-hospital organizations (PHOs), and local health-care organizations (Brown, 
Clement, Hill, Retchin, & Bergeron, 1993; Gillies, Shortell, & Anderson, 1993; Luft, 
1981; Shortell, Morrison, & Hughes, 1989; Thorpe, 1992). The micro level includes 
hospital or organization intra-structures such as case management programs, and hospital­
based services such as primary care groups, hospital-based skilled nursing facilities, and 
hospital-based home care (Robinson, 1994; Sullivan & Flynn, 1992; Wheller, Wickizer, 
& Shortell, 1986). 
At the macro level, is a typical integrated health care system is the managed care 
network. The integration of risk-based capitation payments with the provision of services 
seems to be a key factor in describing the various organizational forms of a capitated 
system (Rossiter, 1987). According to the extent to which the capitation payment is risk­
based, there are four types of HMO models: I) staff HMO, 2) group HMO, 3) network 
independent practice association (network IPA), and 4) Traditional independent practice 
association (traditional IPA) (Luft, 1981 ). Another organizational form of risk-based 
capitation payment is PPO. Compared to the four types of HMO models, PPO is the least 
integrated. 
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The continued growth ofHMOs and PPOs indicates the acceptance of these 
structures by the general public. The growth of vertically integrated firms, particularly 
HMOs, also reveals how health care organizations respond to high transaction costs 
(Thorpe, 1992). In order to promote cost containment by health-care providers, Medicare 
has aggressively encouraged its beneficiaries to enroll in HMOs (Wilensky & Rossiter, 
1991 ). In addition to the federal trend, state governments have also adopted managed 
care as an instrument to achieve cost-effective medical care for the poor (Freund & 
Hurley, 1987). This has quickly increased the number of HMOs and the number of 
Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in them, even though patients' satisfaction with HMOs 
varies among groups, and the quality and cost of care are not necessarily better than from 
fee-for-service providers (Brown, Clement, Hill, Retchin, & Bergeron, 1993). 
HMO growth is reflected in the increase in their members from only 12.5 million 
in 1983 to almost 42 million by the end of 1992 (Group Health Association of America, 
1993). Total membership in the 546 HMOs in 1992 represented 16% of the nation's 
population and almost 19% of those insured. The same trend was present in another type 
of managed care network, PPOs; by the end of 1991, the 584 corporate entities operating 
978 individual PPO plans had established networks of various providers caring for 
approximately 85.4 million eligible employees and their family members in every state of 
the U. S. (Marion Merrel Dow, 1992). 
Significant total cost savings have been demonstrated in managed care plans. 
Luft (1980) reported up to 40% saving among HMOs as compared to fee-for-service 
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plans, and somewhat more hospital utilization savings in staff and group models than in 
individual practice associations (IPAs). Wolinsky (1980) also suggested that service use 
and costs are generally lower among staff models as compared to group models. The 
literature implies that the most integrated models may maximize cost savings. 
At the micro level, on the other hand, many hospital-based integrated delivery 
systems have proven to be powerful and successful (Hurley, 1993; Sullivan & Flynn, 
1992). The hospital-based services can take different forms and be at different levels. 
The most frequently used include ambulatory primary care groups, hospital-based SNFs, 
and home health care services. 
An analysis conducted by Wheeler, Wickizer and Shortell (1986) provides an 
example of hospital-based primary care group practices. Wheeler and colleagues 
concluded that among the selected set of hospitals participating in a national 
demonstration program, the average hospital's inpatient days and admissions increased, 
by 9.0 % and 8.2 %, respectively. The increase was accompanied by an increase in the 
hospitals' patient days (3.6%) and in the market share of admissions (4.9%) after the 
development of hospital-based primary care group practice. Patients in the hospital­
based nursing homes were found to need more medical and highly skilled nursing 
services than did patients in freestanding nursing homes. This indicates that hospital­
based nursing homes have the capacity to care for more severe patients (Shaughnessy, 
Kramer, Schlenker, & Polesovsky, 1985). 
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The literature makes clear that organizational researchers have advocated vertical 
integration as a management strategy. They suggest that the advantages of a hospital's 
taking more control over critical resources are efficiency, increased market share, and 
improved quality of care. However, vertical integration in itself does not guarantee 
success. The success of vertical integration depends on reimbursement policies, 
competition, organizational experience, and managerial ability to coordinate various 
activities in an organization (Conrad & Dowling, 1990; Harrigan, 1984). 
Summary 
The literature review comprised four sections. The first section reviewed demand 
and supply in the nursing home market. The growing elderly population, the change in 
disease patterns, and treatment advances have stimulated demand for post-acute care. 
The demand has not been met, however, because of regulations and nursing home 
responses to reimbursement policies. The consequence has been difficulties for hospitals 
in discharging patients to nursing home care, as described in the second section. 
The third section presented the varying definitions and interpretations of vertical 
integration offered by different disciplines. In this study, vertical integration is defined as 
efficient governance that is not restricted to dichotomous decisions, but based on a 
spectrum of choices, as proposed by Williamson's transaction cost economics. 
The last section of this chapter examined the motivation and risks for health care 
organizations in vertically integrating different levels of services. The success of vertical 
integration is not always guaranteed. The time, place, type of service or good, and the 
hospital's ability should all be evaluated when considering vertical integration. Finally, 
examples of macro-level and micro-level vertical integration were discussed. 
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical Framework 
In this chapter, the theory of organizational economics is outlined first. The 
definition of transaction cost economics, assumptions of market failure, and three 
dimensions of efficient governance of transactions are presented. This is followed by 
illustrations of how health care researchers have adopted TCE to interpret health care 
phenomena. In order to determine which indicators truly represent the three dimensions 
of transactions, a comprehensive literature review is conducted of empirical studies that 
have tested TCE in fields other than health care. After the literature review, a set of 
hypotheses is derived for each construct. 
Organizational Economics 
In recent years economists have considerably expanded their scope by adding to 
the phenomena they examine. In doing so they have developed a body of theoretical 
work labeled organizational economics (OE), or new institutional economics, (Barney, 
1990; Perrow, 1986; Williamson, 1975, 1985). Organizational economics has made an 
important, even revolutionary, contribution to organization theory, providing an answer 
to the most fundamental question in organizational research, "Why do organizations 
exist?" (Hesterly, Liebeskind, & Zenger, 1990). 
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Previous theories of organizations have studied their evolution, but have not 
explained why organizations are necessary in the first place. From the perspective of 
organizational economics, organizations are neither collectivities oriented to the pursuit 
of relatively specific goals nor coalitions of shifting interest groups that develop goals by 
negotiation, as Scott (1987) defined them. Rather, to scholars of organizational 
economics, organizations are the sets of arrangements that govern the collectivities and 
permit efficient exchange among interest groups. 
The new organizational economics is preoccupied with the origins, incidence, and 
ramifications of transaction cost economics theory. Fundamentally, transaction cost 
theory is a new economic model based on individual competitive self-interest. 
An early statement about the role of costs of using market organizations in 
governing market exchange in given circumstances was that provided by Coase (1937). 
However, it was not until the 1970s that Oliver Williamson made a significant 
contribution to refining transaction cost economics as a systematic framework for 
organizational economics. Williamson initial statement in his book Markets and 
Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implication (1975), not only provides insight into 
how economic and other organizations differ in their behaviors from the pure market 
model, but also synthesizes some earlier applications of transaction cost economics to 
internal labor markets, vertical integration, and the economics of internal organizations, 
to name a few. Another work, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms. Markets. 
Relational Contracting (Williamson, 1985), further extends the boundaries ofTCE. His 
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more recent work (Williamson, 1991) has emphasized the importance of the hybrid form 
to organizations. 
;y/ Transaction Cost Economics 
( Transaction cost economics is a theory that incorporates concepts from economic 
and contract law into a broader model explaining how organizations respond to market 
"failure" to provide the most efficient model of exchange (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 
1991 ). The theory focuses on the transaction -- the exchange between buyer and supplier 
-- as the primary unit of importance and suggests that the dimensions and attributes of 
transactions determine the preferred transacting form. The form may be "spot market" 
exchanges, in which buyers and sellers may have no prior established relationships; 
contracting of a mid- or long-term duration (via contract or joint venture arrangement), 
where a transaction setting has been developed to guide exchanges (called a "hybrid 
arrangement"); or vertical integration, where the buyer ultimately gains permanent 
control over the supplier.) Vertical integration is also characterized as "hierarchy." 
Transaction cost theory suggests that the design of organizations may be interpreted as 
the result of the exchange partners' continuing calculation of "make or buy" decisions. \ 
...... 
Definition of Transaction Costs 
Formal definitions of transaction costs are remarkably rare in the literature 
(Robins, 1987). Defined by Arrow ( 1969), transaction costs are the "costs of running the 
economic system." They are different from production costs, on which neoclassical 
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analysis has concentrated. Transaction costs are the economic equivalent of a physical 
system's friction, which is inevitable between or among the technological units. 
In basic terms, transaction costs are those costs associated with economic 
exchange that vary independently of the competitive market place of the goods or 
services. They include all search and information costs, as well as the costs of 
monitoring and enforcing contractual performance; the opportunity costs associated with 
contracting and administrative costs; and legal action costs as a result of contracting 
I 
violations. (In short, transaction costs include costs incurred in consulting, completing or 
\ 
revising inter-organization agreements (Williamson, 1975, 1985). ) v 
� J 
Consider opportunity costs, an important category of transaction costs, as an 
example. Opportunity costs can be defined as "the loss of the benefit the resources could 
have produced had they been put to the next-best use," or "the lost opportunity to invest 
in that alternative" (Thorpe, 1992). The benefits from the next-best use may be smaller or 
larger than those of the current use, depending on the situation. With a hospital bed, for 
example, discharging a medically stable patient could bring in more revenue if the bed is 
immediately taken up by a new acute patient, or could cause a loss if no other patient is 
ready to be admitted . 
. � Williamson ( 1985) gives this explanation of transaction costs: "Holding the nature 
of the good and service to be delivered constant, economizing takes place with reference 
to the sum of production and transaction costs." He further suggests that t�� different 
organizational modes will be used to minimize two types of transaction costs -- ex ante 
and ex post. Ex ante costs refer to those of drafting, negotiating, and safegu<;�rding a 
contract, while ex post costs refer to the setup and operational costs associated with 
, governance stru<_:t_ures. These two types of costs are difficult to quantify and have to be 
i 
l addressed simultaneously, as they are actually independent. 
Several health care researchers have used the TCE perspective to interpret the 
scope and definition of the transaction costs in health care. Mick and Conrad (1988) 
interpreted transaction costs in markets and inside organizations, following Williamson 
and Ouchi's definition ( 1981 ). They divided market transactions into two categories. 
The first category consists of transaction costs incurred in the market search process: 
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costs associated with searching for firms that produce, supply, or distribute the product or 
service of interest; the second category consists of transaction costs incurred in the 
contracting process: costs associated with negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing the 
provisions of a contract. 
The transaction costs in the market search process can be further decomposed into 
I) costs of determining what is necessary for the goods or service; 2) scouting, 
environmental scanning and intelligence costs, such as costs to obtain information about 
the reputation of a specific firm; 3) costs of developing requests for contract proposals; 
and 4) costs associated with deciding which firms will enter into contract-related 
proceedings (Conrad, Mick, Madden, & Hoare, 1988). In sum, excessive transaction or 
friction costs are incurred in the exchanges between providers and purchasers and among 
providers. 
Assumptions of the Market Failure Framework 
,__ 
·' 
In proposing the market failure model, Williamson (1975) made certain paired 
assumptions. One pair of assumptions concerns uncertainty/complexity and bounded 
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rationality, the other small numbers and opportunism (Figure 1). Further, anirnportl!nt 
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f��!_qr j����i�Wg_wjth.thes� two pairs� iD{o_npa�ion impactedne.ss. Information 
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impactedness means that information pertaining to a transaction, or set of transactions, is 
frequently asymmetrically distributed between the parties to an exchange, that is, often 
one party has more information than the other has. Bounded rationality refers to the 
limitations of any individual as an information processor. Actors or parties cannot 
anticipate every contingency and objectively deduce the optimal response. As the 
environment becomes more complex or uncertain, these limitations are quickly reached. 
Williamson's second pair of concepts -- small numbers and opportunism -- is used 
to develop a different argument about the relative advantages of the market and of 
WiJliam.�QU_(j9_75,.l2.85J_asserts th;:1t _jfJh�re.&re fe"Y available_p_ar.t11:ers .Jhe _buyer may be 
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Human Factors Environmental Factors 
BOUNDED ...... ·----------.. � UNCERTAINTY' 
RATIONALITY 
- � 
INFORMATION � 
�IMPACTEDNES  
' 
OPPORTUNISM .. .. SMALL NUMBERS,' 
Source: Market and Hierarchies. (p.40) by 0. E. Williamson, 1975, New York, The Free Press. 
Figure 1. The Organizational Failures Framework 
In another work, Williamson ( 1985) has mentioned again the importance of 
understanding how opportunism shapes organizational economics. Opportu11ism ��[���-to 
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organizations, understanding transactions that are subject to ex post opportunism can be 
beneficial in that appropriate safeguards can be devised ex ante. 
Three Dimensions of Efficient Governance 
Although the degrees of integration presumably are on a continuum, it can be 
classified as vertical integration (hierarchy), long-term contracting (hybrid), and spot 
market trading, moving from fullest to non-integration. Williamson's early work (1975, 
1985) introduced a governance form, mixed governance, in which some firms tend to buy 
and others to make, yet none feel satisfied with their decisions. However, the mixed 
governance form is now less emphasized. Several years later, Williamson revised his 
argument, based on the transaction-cost-minimization hypothesis, and proposed that 
intermediate-level transactions tend to be governed by hybrid forms including long-term 
contracting, reciprocal trading, regulation and franchising (Williamson, 1991 ). 
/ 
( Three major dimensions of transactions: asset specificity, uncertainty, and '-. 
frequency, are proposed by Williamson (1975, 1985) as central to selecting an exchange 
mechanism from among market, hybrid, or hierarchy. In other words, the choice of 
governance structure is contingent upon a) the amount of uncertainty associated with the 
availability of desired resources, b) the level of interchangeability of the sought-after 
good or service (asset specificity), and c) the frequency of good or service exchange. 
Asset specificity, among the three, is regarded as the most influential. Buyers may find 
themselves at different degrees of risk of overpaying, due to the interaction of these three 
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dimensions. Such risk can be managed or even avoided by adopting alternative 
transaction arrangements (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1991 ). 
Efficient boundaries are important to efficient governance. To achieve an 
efficient boundary, Williamson (1985) suggests that the make-or-buy decision should be 
made only after the consequences of alternative modes for production and transaction 
costs have been assessed. The production cost is generally measured by the unit of 
service or goods sold in the market. The more units a firm can produce, the more it can 
reduce the marginal production cost at certain levels of outputs. 
Transaction uncertainty, being one of the principal factors affecting the choice 
of governance form, arises from the firm's lack of ability to predict contingencies, which 
makes contract writing difficult. Market contracts should be adapted to changes when 
unforeseen situations occur, because opportunistic partners may interp':_�unsQ_�cified 
clauses to their own advantages. 
To internalize transactions is considered a sensible response to envir
_�
�ental 
UQCertainty,_because a vertically integrated administrative mechanism enables sequential 
and adaptive decision making as well as smoother processing. Furthermore, an authority 
structure can quickly resolve conflicts over differing interpretations of new 
circumstances. Thus, the information flow between two entities can be enhanced and 
they can react better to uncertainties (Williamson, 1975, 1985). lJ?..�d_dition to 
environmental uncertainty, Williamson notes behavioral uncertainty, defined as the 
. 
� 
. 
. 
. - . .- . - .... 
"difficulty of ascertaining the actual performance or adherence to contractual agreement" 
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(Williamson, 1985). It is different from environmental uncertainty, which is exogenously 
imposed on the exchange; behavioral uncertainty rather arises within the exchange itself 
because of the opportunistism of the parties involved. 
Asset specificity refers to "durable investments that are undertaken in support of 
particular transactions, the opportunity cost of which investments is much lower in best 
alternative uses or by alternative users should the original transaction be prematurely 
terminated" (Williamson, 1985). In other words, the significant attribute of transactions 
refers to the extent to which specialized, i.e., nonredeployable, investments are needed to 
support an exchange. Four types of asset specificity are suggested by Williamson-- site 
specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset specificity, and dedicated assets. The 
nature of all but dedicated assets is clear in the common sense meaning of the words. 
Dedicated assets refer to "general investment by a supplier that would not otherwise be 
made but for the prospect of selling a significant amount of product to a particular 
customer" (Williamson, 1985). In his more recent paper (Williamson, 1991 ), Williamson 
added two types of asset specificity-- brand name capital and temporal specificity. The 
latter is akin to technological nonseparability and can be thought of as a type of site 
specificity in which timely responsiveness by on-site human assets is vital. 
Williamson explf!ins site specificity by borrowing Thompson's ( 1967) concept of 
"core technology," which suggests that some stages in the production process are the 
technological core and should be consolidated in order to produce a good or service 
efficiently. In considering modes of control, site specificity should be favored for 
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vertical integration (Williamson, 1985). The degree of asset specificity can range from 
nonspecific, to mixed, to highly specific (idiosyncratic). 
Transaction frequency also affects the choice of governance structure. 
Frequency of transactions clearly has to do with scale economies. That neoclassical 
concept is derived from Adam Smith's famous theorem that "the division of labor is 
limited by the extent of the market." More generally, the object is to economize not only 
transaction costs, but both transaction and neoclassical production costs. In other words, 
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whether the volume of transactions through a specialized governance structure utilizes 
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permits an organization to monitor or evaluate the goods or services provided by the 
suppliers, to ensure their desireci behavior and reduce the organization's own risk, since it 
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accumulates knowledge from the frequent transactions. 
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Additional implications arise from considering the effects of quantity (or firm 
size) and organizational form. The basic proposition is that diseconomies associated with 
own-production will diminish as the quantity of the component to be supplied increases. 
In other words, the firm is better able to realize economies of scale as its own 
requirements increase relative to the market size. Therefore, Williamson has ascertained 
that, ceteris paribus, larger firms will be more likely to integrate components than smaller 
firms will be (Williamson, 1985). According to Williamson's taxonomy, the frequency of 
exchange can range from one-time, to occasional, to recurrent. 
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The interaction between and among the three dimensions -- asset specificity, 
w1certainty, and frequency of exchange -- deserves attention. The nature of institutional 
arrangements tends to vary with different combinations of these three dimensions. To 
minimize costs, a firm may choose from among simple anonymous market (spot market) 
contracting, more complicated long-term contractual arrangements with protective 
provisions, or internalizing organization. Williamson terms these three institutional 
arrangements classical contracting, non-classical contracting, and relational contracting. 
He further points out two types of relational contracting: I) bilateral structure, in which 
the autonomy of the parties is maintained, and 2) unified structure, in which transactions 
are removed from the market and integrated into the organization. 
Several propositions based on Figure 2 can be derived. For nonspecific 
transactions, the market is perfectly competitive. In a perfectly competitive market, many 
buyers and sellers deal with an interchangeable product or service, and no one can 
influence pricing. For such transactions, spot market contracting is the most appropriate 
(left cell). Long-term contracting suits transactions that are either I) occasional and of 
mixed specificity, regardless of uncertainty, or 2) very specific with high uncertainty and 
not frequent enough to achieve scale economies. Vertical integration is favored when 
transactions are very idiosyncratic, frequent, and with high environmental uncertainty 
(the upper right cell) (Williamson, 1991 ). 
TRANSACTION 
FREQUENCY 
Recurrent 
Occasional 
Inter-changeable Mixed Idiosyncratic 
TRANSACTION SPECIFICITY 
Low 
TRANSACTION 
UNCERTAINTY 
Figure 2. Three Dimensions of Williamson's Framework ofTransaction Cost Economics 
To internalize or vertically integrate, standardized transactions for which market 
aggregation economies are greater tends to cause loss. In contrast, for highly specific 
transactions, increasing degrees of uncertainty will lead to larger contractual gaps and 
increasingly important and numerous sequential adaptations; under such situations, 
vertical integration becomes favorable. For the in-between transactions for which the 
cost disadvantage decreases but remains positive (at intermediate degrees of asset 
specificity), a firm may find itself better off with mixed or hybrid governance, such as 
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long-term contracting with outside suppliers. Briefly, market competition results in scale 
economies when asset specificity is low; internalizing an organization is advantageous 
when asset specificity is tangible; and mixed governance is favored when transactions 
have an intermediate degree of specificity. 
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Three examples make these notions clearer. If a buyer is interested in acquiring a 
good or service which the buyer frequently needs and of which there is an abundant 
supply and many suppliers, the (spot) market is the most efficient source. The buyer does 
not incur substantial search costs, comparisons of suppliers are easily made, and no 
supplier can monopolize or corner the market if the supply is ample. On the other hand, 
if a frequently acquired product must be specifically developed by a few suppliers or a 
single qualified supplier, open market exchange is compromised, and the buyer is in 
many respects at risk of exploitation by an opportunistic supplier in negotiating price and 
other terms. Such a situation requires more careful delineation of the exchange 
framework, for example by formal contractual relationship. Sometimes, even a joint 
venture or quasi-firm is needed. In the most extreme case, a crucial supplier would 
become a target for acquisition by a buyer who wants both to avoid exploitation and to 
maximize control over the supplier's performance. 
TCE Interpretation of Vertical Integration in the Health Care Industry 
Studies which examine transaction cost economics in health care are quite limited. 
One article has attempted to examine vertical integration by using TCE (Mick & Conrad, 
1988); but, with exceptions, they have failed to incorporate Williamson's core concepts: 
market failure and the three dimensions of transactions (Hurley, 1993; Hurley & Fennel, 
1990). Only one paper uses Williamson's model to test the theory (Chiu, Hurley, & 
Chen, 1993). The studies' arguments and findings are briefly described below. 
Conrad and colleagues (Mick & Conrad, 1988) used the concept of transaction 
cost to explain the'hospital-physician and provider-insurer relationships. They 
- - - --� -- ----- ---- ------ -- - -- . . 
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formulated seven propositions which relied heavily on Williamson's concepts, such as the 
conditions under which vertical integration can offset uncertainty or opportunism. They 
used other studies' findings to examine their propositions, even though those studies were 
not designed to test the theory. Consequently, they were not able to test the three 
dimensions of transactions. 
Hurley and Fennell (1990) extensively used �.��son's market_
��i
_
lur� and two 
dimensions of transactions to interpret the emergence of case-management programs. 
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Case-management programs may emerge as a result of market failure, in which for many 
transactions the spot market of the health service system is not cost-effective for 
individual patients seeking care. Case management gives primary physicians 
responsibility for arranging a certain range of medical services. The primary physicians 
act as case managers as well as gatekeepers, serving as the enrollee's only starting point 
of access to medical services. 
Case management is intended to replace inefficient transactions with a pre-
arranged governance structure of sustained contractual relationships. The characteristics 
of case management fit into the two dimensions -- asset specificity and frequency. Asset 
specificity exists in that primary physicians link patients with medical specialists, decide 
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on patients' particular needs for care, and restrain patients' opportunistic behaviors, thus 
minimizing transaction costs. The relatively high frequency of visits to primary 
physicians helps explain why case managers, by controlling physician visits, can 
minimize costs (Hurley & Fennel, 1990). The gatekeeping function of case management 
is seen as the potential solution to Medicaid's problems of unnecessary care, curbed 
access to primary care (Freund & Hurley, 1987), and inefficiencies and discontinuities in 
care seeking (Hurley & Fennel, 1990). 
Adopting Williamson's governance forms, Hurley (1993) discussed integrated 
health care systems ranging from fully to least integrated: provider-sponsored integrated 
systems, bilateral compact models, and network/selective contracting models. In a 
provider-sponsored integrated system, the decision to integrate vertically is based 
primarily on human and site specificity, and the system's facilities and resources can 
provide continued care efficiently through case management and integrative mechanisms. 
The bilateral compact model is characterized by the existence of a long-term bilateral 
contract between the provider and an intermediary such as a product distributor, and the 
product is jointly sponsored by both. The fast-growing network/selective contracting 
model represents the broker-developed spot market contracting with a provider. The 
bilateral compact model is exemplified by group model HMOs, and the network/selective 
contracting model is exemplified by PPOs. 
The growth of each of the three models suggests how distinctively providers can 
be reconfigured to meet consumers' needs. The co-existence and popularity of different 
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types of integrated health care systems indicates that some are superior to the others 
under particular conditions. The pressure to restructure comes mainly from care 
purchasers, because the "buyers-market" (Brink, 1986) has arrived, in which care 
providers face tremendous challenges. The selection of vertical integration types largely 
depends on the objectives of the purchasers (Hurley, 1993). 
Chiu, Hurley and Chen (1993) attempted to apply transaction cost economics to 
health care settings. In their pilot study, they used 507 acute hospitals in the mid-Atlantic 
region (New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania) as the study sample. The three 
dimensions of Williamson's TCE were used to derive hypotheses. The authors proposed 
that hospital's make-or-buy decisions about discharging elderly patients would depend on 
transaction uncertainty, transaction specificity and transaction frequency. Their findings 
supported the model's fit in distinguishing between spot market and hybrid/hierarchy. 
But in distinguishing between hybrid and hierarchy arrangements the model was less 
successful. 
Empirical Studies ofTCE in Fields Other than Health Care 
The following review synthesizes various findings from studies using TCE in 
fields other than health care. These studies are categorized as 1) comparisons of pairs of 
governance forms, that is vertical integration vs. hybrid; 2) comparisons of spot market, 
hybrid arrangement, and vertical integration; and 3) theory testing by economic 
simulation and case studies. Attention is directed toward type of industry, governance 
forms (market, hybrid, and vertical integration), uncertainty, asset specificity, and 
frequency (scale economies). 
A pair comparison of governance forms, hybrid arrangement vs. vertical 
integration, is presented in Appendix A. 
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To understand why GM and Ford integrated backward into selected components, 
Monteverde and Teece (1982) investigated 133 component groupings that contain major 
items of a vehicle. Whether or not the component was manufactured internally was 
chosen as an indicator of integration. Existence of engineering effort to develop a 
component, and whether the component was specific to a particular auto company or 
generic to all companies indicated asset specificity. Monteverde and Teece (1982) 
concluded that a company with more application engineering effort, more specific 
specificity, and large size is more likely to adopt vertical integration. Their finding 
supported the proposition that the higher the specificity and the volume of transactions, 
the higher the possibility that a firm will choose hierarchy (vertical integration). 
Decisions by firms in the electronic components industry to integrate the 
marketing function were measured by Anderson and Schmittlein (1984), using the firms' 
reliance on either direct sales people (employees) or independent sales agents 
(manufacturer's representatives). The product lines that individual firms sold in specific 
sales territories were the units of analysis. The authors focused on integrated governance 
forms as affected by asset specificity and scale economies. Asset specificity was 
measured by variation in service territory characteristics and difficulty in monitoring the 
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performance of sales personnel. Scale economies were measured by source of 
internalization costs. They found positive associations between integration and levels of 
asset specificity, difficulty of performance evaluation, and the combination of these two. 
Employees at larger firms were more likely to have to market their own products. The 
construct of transaction uncertainty did not have a significant impact on integration. 
A study by Masten (1984) analyzed an aerospace firm in its make-or-buy 
decisions about components sold to the government on contract. The study compared 
two governance structures, direct incorporation and market procurement. The dependent 
variable was whether a certain component was produced internally or purchased in the 
market. Asset specificity contained design specificity and site specificity. The degree of 
specialization and the complexity of components were found to affect the make-or-buy 
decision. Vertical integration became more likely as contracting became more costly, 
supporting Williamson's argument. 
Walker and Weber (1984) also studied automobile manufacturers, but focused on 
the comparatively simple parts used in the initial assembly stage. In examining the 
effects of asset specificity, uncertainty, and scale economies, they analyzed 60 decisions 
and evaluations by a component division about making or buying a certain component. 
Their findings showed significant effects of supplier production advantage and volume 
uncertainty on the make-or-buy decision. 
Palay ( 1984) studied transportation transactions between manufacturers and 
railroads. Most rail shipment contracts were for standardized services, but some 
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shipments created problems of special car design and handling. The study revealed that 
the highly idiosyncratic nature of the rail equipment favored its ownership by the railroad. 
Next, the governance forms of spot market, hybrid, and hierarchy are compared. 
Four studies are reviewed-- two dealing with forward integration and two with backward. 
All the studies compared governance forms by pair. Outlines of each study are presented 
in Appendix B. 
Rangan and colleagues ( 1993 ), interested in understanding complex channel 
phenomena rather than testing the theory, interviewed managers in five industries (50 key 
informants in 15 selected manufacturing firms, and 20 key informants in seven related 
distribution firms) about their rationales for channel choice decisions. The authors 
examined the polar modes and also studied two important but less explored aspects of 
forward vertical integration-- channels in the hybrid mode (sharing of tasks between 
"direct" and "indirect" channels rather than assigning them wholly to one or the other) 
and channels in transition (evolving from one form to another). Taking one industry as 
an example, the study noted the responses of two leading blood collection systems to 
environmental uncertainty in health care. After the PPS took effect, manufacturers 
became more integrated by switching from performing only the function of product 
communication, to undertaking all channel functions except inventory support and 
physical delivery. The authors concluded that hybrid channels affect transactions that 
require intermediate or mixed levels of asset specificity, and that channel functions are 
allocated among direct and indirect channels according to gains in efficiency. 
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Klein, Frazier, and Roth ( 1990) surveyed I 0 Canadian companies with 925 items 
in order to understand why they adopted channel integration in the international market 
and how governance forms were affected by asset specificity, external uncertainty, and 
production cost or channel volume. They used the extent to which durable, transaction­
specific assets were found in the export market as an indicator of asset specificity; 
volatility (the degree to which the environment changes and allows a company to be 
caught by surprise) and diversity (the number of final customers and competitors) as 
indicators of external uncertainty; and channel volume as an indicator of production cost, 
a proxy for transaction frequency. Governance forms had four modes as follows: I) 
hierarchy mode through the establishment of a foreign sales subsidiary, 2) hierarchy 
mode serving the foreign market from home, 3) intermediate mode (the use of 
commission agents or joint ventures), and 4) market mode (the use of merchant 
distributors). 
Some of their results supported propositions of TCE, while others did not. The 
decisions about channel structure in a foreign country depended on how well the market 
could limit the opportunistic tendencies of outside intermediaries. Various forms of 
forward integration emerged as alternatives when the enforcement of contractual 
arrangements by relying on the market failed. Such integration in channel international 
markets was influenced by channel volume, the use of shared channels, and country 
destination. What did not support Williamson's theory was the finding that firms used 
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intermediaries in foreign markets that had high environmental diversity, to cope with the 
inherent complexity yet maintain flexibility. 
Walker and Poppo (1991) inquired about the influence of asset specificity on 
transaction costs at hybrid manufacturing organizations, by examining supply 
relationships of one large assembly division. They investigated how transaction costs or 
governance forms are influenced by asset specificity, preselection investment in 
technology, and supplier market competition. Transaction costs were measured by the 
difficulty the assembly division had in reaching agreements with suppliers on the 
allocation of adjustment costs (costs of material and engineering change). The three 
exogenous variables-- asset specificity, preselection investment, and market competition 
- were represented, respectively, by the uniqueness of the supplier's technical labor skills 
and equipment to manufacture the product delivered to the assembly division; by whether 
the supplier invested in new technology to promote its chance of being selected as a 
supplier; and by the degree to which there were enough potential suppliers to ensure 
adequate competition to supply the product. Similarly to Klein, Frazier, and Roth's study 
(1990), not all of this study's results supported Williamson's transaction cost theory. The 
results confirmed that supplier specificity within the corporation is more related to lower 
transaction costs than is asset specificity in the market. 
Joskow (1985) examined vertical integration and long-term contracts to supply 
coal to coal-burning electric utilities. A variety of coal supply relationships existed: 15% 
of utility coal was supplied by utility subsidiaries, another 15% purchased in a spot 
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market, and the rest purchased under contracts with terms ranging from one year to fifty 
years. Mine-mouth plants were compared with other types of electric generating plants 
burning coal, to test the relationship between site specificity and the governance form. It 
was found that mine-mouth plants (site specific) were more likely to vertically integrate, 
and that when vertical integration was not chosen, long-term contracts were often used to 
govern exchanges. 
Another approach found in the literature to test the TCE is case study and 
economic simulation. Stuckey's (1983) research is a case study, and Garvey's (1993) is 
an economic simulation study. Stuckey (1983) explored vertical integration and joint 
ventures in the aluminum industry. He found that physical asset specificity and site 
specificity result in reliance on vertical integration of the bauxite and aluminum 
refineries. Information asymmetries about the quality and extent of bauxite deposits are 
an incentive to integrate. 
Garvey ( 1993) investigated the problem of adaptation to information emerging 
after governance structures and contracts have been established. The study compared the 
efficiency of pre- and post-adaptations when the buyer and seller were independent to 
those when they were integrated. In the pre-stage, aspects of technology, preferences, 
distribution of uncertainty, and obligations exchanged under the alternative organization 
modes were common knowledge. The buyer was assumed to have private information 
regarding the potential benefits of adaptation, and the seller was assumed to have private 
information as well, about the costs to be incurred by the adaptation. The results support 
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the transaction cost theory in that hierarchy is favored when asset specificity increases, 
and market-based models are favored when asset specificity is slight. Hierarchy tends to 
be efficient under high asset specificity, when bargaining costs are likely to exceed the 
costs caused by opportunism. 
Conceptual Models and Hypotheses \.lu" 
Williamson's concept of transaction cost economics can be applied to the 
relationship between hospitals and nursing homes. In their two-way channel, the 
hospital is a seller of hospital services as well as a buyer of nursing home services, while 
the nursing home is a buyer of hospital services and a seller of nursing home services. 
Dependency is critical to such relationships, according to the concepts of social exchange 
and resource dependency (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). As buyers' needs can be met by 
substitutes, suppliers can benefit little from acting opportunistically. Any cost increase 
motivated by the seller's opportunism is likely to have a negative impact in turn on the 
sellers. The uniqueness of each patient's needs for a hospital discharge ��a.� �nd
_
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home admission established the idiosyncrasy of transactions between hospitals and 
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nursing homes (Williamson, 1975, 1985). 
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The transfers between hospitals and nursing homes that are tapped by 
Williamson's three dimensions are essential to this study. Uncertainty is highly 
associated with environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty, �s, the demand 7 _, 
and supply of SNF beds and the opportunistic behaviors of nursing homes. Hospitals in 
areas with an undersupply of nursing home beds and a higher percentage of indigent 
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integration (hierarchy) to overcome nursing homes�. opportunism. On the other hand, if 
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located in areas with sufficient nursing home beds, hospitals may take no formal 
arrangement (market). If located in areas where the supply of nursing home beds is 
between these two extremes, hospitals may use formal arrangements (hybrid) to discharge 
their patients (Figure 3). 
TRANSACTION 
FREQUENCY 
Recurrent 
Occasional 
Inter-changeable Mixed Idiosyncratic 
TRANSACTION SPECIFICITY 
Figure 3. Three Dimensions of Patient Transfers: An Application of 
Williamson's Framework of Transaction Cost Economics 
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However, the choice of governance may well depend on two other factors, as 
well. Hospitals with special experience and expertise in elderly care may have higher 
expectations from nursing home outlets. Such
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experience or expertis� al�o protects 
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hospitals from risks in employing vertical integration. In addition, hospita.ls with a high 
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use
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f t��-d��?s�_ream services are more likely to vertically integrate extended care 
facilities, because doing so can reduce costs of transaction and production. More 
76 
importantly, the hospital's financial loss due to unnecessary stays may be reduced, and its 
space and equipment fully utilized. In short, hospitals with a high volume of patient 
exchanges have learned what is critical to the elderly's needs through constantly serving 
the elderly, and that knowledge encourages a hospital to vertically integrate nursing home 
care. Hospitals with low volumes of patient exchanges and thus a lack of experience will 
be likely to prefer no formal arrangement (spot market). Other hospitals in between the 
two extremes may use formal arrang:_ments (hybrid). 
" 1)11/. ' < ,,;!·· ' ' � • Y J i'-,.<, ··l ' /'' ' ,.,.�' • 1 "l t L1 _l h l 
T 
. U . I I ' I I �- ' J " •' I I , . f·\ -'
?"" 
' .  
_
ransactwn ncertamty I '"'r.j)!2-t'J t T¥· v'--- '\ ��I Vj! �-'' ·t•·'R � ... If 
. ' .. . •·- ' ,.,_ll,';/· I h ---· 
l r: '  .. ,- 0 ·I . . ,. ..., ,-, J /3--b�'lf>t�it( Williamson (1985) has 'proposed two types of uncertainty, environmental and 
behavioral. Environmental uncertainty, here, refers to the unpredictability coming from 
the environment as a hospital discharges patients. The number of available nursing 
home beds represents the degree of difficulty faced by a hospital when it intends to 
discharge patients for post-acute care. Behavioral uncertainty occurs when there are only 
a small number of suppliers, so the suppliers can exploit their advantage in information 
asymmetry over hospitals. 
Hospitals used to enjoy a steady growth in profits due to growing population, 
higher incomes, mounting insurance coverage, limited competition, and retrospective cost 
reimbursement, until implementation of the Medicare PPS and other third parties' cost-
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sharing reimbursement policies (Conrad, Mick, Madden, & Hoare, 1988). Cost 
consciousness replaced the laissez faire attitude toward costs that had characterized 
hospitals in the 1980s. That situation will continue and become more intense in this 
decade with the government's and the public's concerns about costs of health care. 
f Tfie.relmbursement cha�ge� · have significantly increased the interdependencies in 
'····--·-··---··-·· · · · ·  -···- . •. .  ___ .....) 
the health care market The ability to arrange a patient's timely discharge to an 
appropriate facility is crucial to hospital profits in a DRG-dominated or risk-sharing 
market Thus hospitals are now more dependent on nursing homes to receive their 
patients and to end the financial drain of patients' unnecessary stays. Furthermore, as 
both acute care costs and the general public's morbidity increases, the opportunity cost a 
hospital bears is high, because a bed occupied by a medically transferable patient could 
have accommodated another patient and generated more revenue for the hospital. 
The DRG payment system also has encouraged hospitals to discharge patients 
earlier (Morrisey, Sloan, & Valvona, 1988a; Morrisey, Sloan, & Valvona, 1988b). In 
order to avoid malpractice suits, however, hospitals try to discharge patients to the next 
available health care institutions, such as nursing homes or home care agencies. Earlier 
discharges increase the volume of transactions between hospitals and nursing homes 
(DesHarnais, Kobrinski, & Chesney, 1987; Gornick & Hall, 1988; Kahn, Keeler, 
Sherwood, et al., 1990; Lewis, Leake, Leal-Sotelo, & Clark, 1987; Long, Chesney, & 
Ament, 1987; Morrisey, Sloan, & Valvona, 1988b; Neu & Harrison, 1988; Tresch, 
Simpson, & Burton, 1985). 
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In addition to the impact of the DRG payment system hospital characteristics and 
-
- - --r 
competiti�n_..a[fect hospital decision making. Hospital acute care occupancy is an 
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indicator of the degree to which a hospital encounters uncertainty in the market, 
represented by the unavailability of discharge sites for hospitals with high occupancy. 
Hospital occupancy can be examined in two forms. One is an individual hospital's 
occupancy and the other is average hospital occupancy in the same market area. 
Hospitals with high occupancy rates have pressures to discharge their patients sooner so 
that they can admit new patients and avoid costs from the late discharges. Hospitals with 
high census and more patients waiting to be admitted usually deal with higher 
opportunity costs than do those with low occupancy rates. Hospitals in a high occupancy 
market area or neighboring area will demonstrate more urgency about relocating their 
elderly patients than will those in areas with relatively low occupancy rates. In other 
words, higher occupancy creates higher uncertainty in the disposition of elderly patients. 
In any event, hospital occupancy is an ostensible measure of uncertainty. <"""7 . \>' , 1.:.t r •' ' 
-,,.L,. 
li ' �-��l �l t.._. ) 
Hl: A hospital that has a relatively higher occupancy rate and/or is located in an · 
area with a high average occupancy rate is more likely to employ a higher 
degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services. 
Since hospitals' abilities to discharge patients depend on the availability of 
nursing home beds, transactions will differ with the supply and/or occupancy of nursing 
homes (Gruenberg & Willemain, 1982; Nyman, 1993). Nyman's (1993) study showed a 
significant problem of access to nursing homes, but those findings were not consistent 
with his 1988 study, probably because of changes in nursing home occupancy rates. In 
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Wisconsin, problems of the elderly in gaining access to nursing homes were present in 
1983 but disappeared in 1988. The overall occupancy rate dropped by about 2% 
between 1983 and 1988, from 94.5% to 92.4%. Another study found that applicants' 
waiting time increased as the occupancy of nursing homes increased (Gruenberg & 
Willemain, 1982). 
Several styg��..E�..:.��±!1_€li�!!t�d that the shortage .oLnJJrsiug.home.b.e_d.s..is_p.Q�i!i!'.�ly 
associated wi�h the costs of delay�£.9 Jl;�b.a!g�,or financial lQ.�s .. due to. acute_ca.n�-b� 
-----··-·-�··-r•�- -.., • ·--· --� ·- - - ·�--,· - ·• · - • . . •·• ••- ' '• 
being occupied by medically transferable patients. Kenney et a!. (1991) found the 
- -�---- ---·--··· 
elasticity of nursing home bed supply to be -0.07 in relation to inpatient length of stay. In 
other words, LOS decreases by 0. 7% with a 10% increase in nursing home beds per 
elderly patient. Abramowitz ( 1986) has indicated that the nursing home bed supply is 
inadequate to meet the demand at all times, leading to costly (for the hospital) delays in 
discharge. 
To minimize transaction costs, Williamson ( 1985, 1991) suggests two options 
with different degrees of contml. The one with more control is vertical integration 
(hierarchy), and the other, with less ccw.trol, is long-term contracting or hybrid mode. In 
- - - ----·- - -. 
- . - ·-
- . . . . .  -· 
areas with ver.yJow supply of nursing home beds, vertical integration is more appropriate, 
-'.._
-
-,..;_�----
-
,.""' 
be_cause �apjt::t! !o_SS(!S _are. yery _unlikely. In areas with high nursing home occupancy, 
however, special caution has to be used in assessing the sufficiency of supply in the 
market. When high occupancy rates are coupled with sufficient supply, long-term 
contracting is adequate to overcome environmental uncertainty. !f�..!�.in_gb_Q!!l�-�-e_?S. �!e 
sufficient and occupancy rates are low,_ hospitals may use market arrangements for 
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discharging patients, because the probability of delayed discharges and consequent ··· · · · · . . . . ., 
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financial loss is low. \vWV'"> r.•-t-.L' , . � 
• , LUl {;[by,/ ·" • �"J-
H2: 
vr � \2:.3L-I"" {f�"�.:�/<\ J._ 
A hospital that is located in an area with a relative shortage of SNF beds / 
and/or a high average SNF occupancy rate i.s more likely to ��pl�y-;-higher 
degree of vertical iilteg;�tion in- p�o�iding SNF services. 
���Q maximize profitS,}}ursing homes may preferentially select private-
pay patients, since they pay as charged. This price discrimination behavior, which rejects 
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first-come-first-served as a criterion, has been proved to exist by several studies (Dubay 
. 
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· 
.
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& Cohen, 1990; Massachusetts Hospital Association, 1979; Scanlon, 1980; Shapiro & 
Roos, 1981 ). :r_:�.:_ willingness ()f nursing homes to take public patients becomes less 
when beds �r � in cri�i-�aJU11��rsupply (Coburn, Fortinsky, McGuire, & McDonald, 1993; 
Ettner, 1993; Nyman, 1989; Nyman, 1993; Weissert & Musliner, 1992),_Qf. 'Yhen the 
pu�lic paymen_!._i� rt:latively low �nd patients are relatively sicker (Bishop & Dubay, 
1991; Dor, 1989; Dubay & Cohen, 1990; Shaughnessy, Kramer, Schlenker, & 
Polesovsky, 1985). 
� 
\,Opportunistic discrimination against patients by nursing homes increases 
\.....--------··-·--·�-- --- ----· ---- '-· - . . . .  
h()�pitals' uncertainty and_.
the costs associated with it This_situation appears more severe 
����ea_s "_V�e��.t4�.lJ�.�s:tctpJ?IY is tight and many residents are p<;>9r. Two examples 
support this argument. Ettner (1993) used patient's length of delay (LOD) on a waiting 
list before being admitted to a nursing home as a proxy for the access measure, in a profit 
maximization model of for-profit facilities and a size maximization model of not-for-
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profit facilities. The results indicated that nursing homes have incentives to favor 
admitting those patients, usually private patients, who offer more revenue and need less 
expensive care. Medicaid patients are kept waiting most often in counties where the 
capacity of nursing homes is limited and a high proportion of potential nursing home 
residents are private payors (Ettner, 1993). 
Coburn and colleagues (1993) investigated how nursing home costs and access to 
care for public patients were affected by the adoption of prospective payment for nursing 
homes services in Maine during the period 1979 to 1985. Responsiveness to the 
efficiency incentives of the payment mechanism declined and problems arose in 
achieving further cost reductions, which in turn affected public patients' access to nursing 
homes. For Medicaid patients, the share of patient days declined, from 80.2% in year 
three to 75.9% in year six. Moreover, Medicare's share of patient days also declined, 
from 83.2% in year three to 75.9% in year six. ..,.,.� c�, ·v? $.o. t. vh" t 4.· ;fl.<: .n· th '. f' -t-,/ . . I 
H3: A hospital in an area with relatively more indigent persons and a shortage of 
SNF bed supply is more likely to employ a higher degree of vertical 
integration in providing SNF services. 
Transaction Asset Specificity 
-�� f,/� 
Experience in geriatrj� services and/or experience in caring for elderly patients 
- ------ - --· ·-..:;-..--: -
who ne�d su�a�ute�a�� gives_ a hospital advantages in human asset specificity as well as 
managerial expertise when developing nursing home services. Experience enables a 
--- -- -- ·- . 
hospital to thoroughly evaluate the advantages and risks of penetrating to the next stage 
of business services. Hospitals without such experience are less likely to be aware of or 
i 
l. 
concerned about variations in quality among their suppliers, and they may also be less 
demanding when selecting nursing homes, doing so mostly according to what is 
available. 
A hospital's experience with the elderly health care market is essential to the 
decision to make, contract, or buy. The expertise in providing geriatric services can 
represent asset specificity or hospital identity. The geriatric service areas may include 
geriatric assessment units (GAUs), Alzheimer's diagnosis/assessment, geriatric clinics, 
and others. Geriatric assessment, for example, is defined as a "multi-dimensional --
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usually interdisciplinary -- diagnostic process designed to quantify an elderly individual's 
medical, psychosocial, and functional capabilities and problems with the intention of 
arriving at a comprehensive plan for therapy and long-term follow-up" (Rubenstein, 
1988). GAUs are acknowledged to yield improvements in patient functioning and to 
facilitate appropriate use of nursing homes and hospitals (Rubenstein, 1988; Saltz, 1988). 
The effects of GAUs are found to be especially on discharge efficiency, coordination and 
continuity of care (Bowl yow, 1994). In addition, home care is an important proxy for a 
hospital's capacity to integrate nursing homes, because home care services, which are 
extended to the community as a substitute for nursing home care, represent a hospital's 
expertise in caring for elderly patients. 
U_s_��__!)e_£OJ1.C:luded that the more experienced and knowledgeable a hospital is in 
caring for the elderly� the more discriminating it will be in selecting nursing homes for its 
-
- --..._ ��/:�--�.._ - . - .. -- -- .. - ""· ' .. - .  
discharged patients. 
-- ------- -- --· 
. 
\)H4: 
HS: 
A hospital that provides a wider variety of geriatric services to elderly 
patients is more likely to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in 
providing SNF services. 
A hospital that provides home health services to elderly patients is more 
likely to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF 
services. 
���·\\•Q.�\C ?\
:�, 
Transaction Frequency 11 0 -C'IC.tr'l ··. ·' ;·. ·, 
l � I (j- � ? I '\). 1_1� (.\ -;.� 
The dimension of trats��t��� fr�quency refers simply to the number of transfers 
that a hospital makes. Since most nursing home residents are elderly, the number of 
Medicare patients should reflect the frequency of exchanges between hospitals and 
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nursing homes. !!!creased transfer rates were found after the implementation o£Medic1!r.�. 
_I>PS._ One study reviewed hospitalization and mortality data for Medicaid and the general 
population in Wisconsin for 12 months after the implementation of PPS (Sager, Alaine, 
Leventhal, & Easterling, 1987). The average annual hospitalization for the community 
elderly fell, but for nursing home residents the rate rose sharply. Hospital length of stay 
dropped for both groups, but less so for nursing home residents (Sager, Alaine, 
Leventhal, & Easterling, 1987). In 1984, 72% of the Medicaid institutionalized elderly 
had been hospitalized; most admissions had followed on hospital discharges (Sager, 
Alaine, Leventhal, & Easterling, 1987). 
The Rand Corporation's study of Medicare asserted that 2.5% to 3.2% of 
Medicare hospital-discharge claims are incurred for post-hospital care in skilled nursing 
facilities (Neu & Harrison, 1988). Mo�!s�ey and his
·�-
O.�!���u�s� -��-��I}-...S.._(!_2_��p) not only 
·, 
confirms what has been claimed by Neu and Harrison (1988), but also shows a substantial _ 
- ·�- ....... ·-· · .  , .. . ---····· ---. •.. 
•""\ 
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:· 
84 
increase in patients __ t�<msferred from hospital to_ �tl�acute care after the i1ppl�me.ntation of.. __ _ 
--- ---
-
------
-
--·-- . 
' - -·-· . . 
Medj£_a._r�_!>X��- _Ihe increase in exchanges holds true especially for hospitals with higher 
proportions of elderly patients. Several studies have used channel volume as a proxy for 
--- - . 
. ·- � 
exchange frequency (Anderson & Coughlan, 1994; Anderson & Schrnittlein, 1984; Klein, 
----- --· ------·-·· .... -� -
.. 
Frazier, & Roth, 1990), and others found that volume of exchange was positively 
associated with firms' decisions to make rather than buy (Anderson & Coughlan, 1994; 
Klein, Frazier, & Rot_h1 1990)._ ... 
V H6: A hospital with a relatively higher proportion of Medicare patients is more likely to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF 
services. 
HMOs are generally characterized by receiving a fixed and prepaid fee, 
I irrespective of service use, thereby accepting financial risk for providing or arranging a stated range of services (Boland, 1991 ). PPOs, on the other hand, have contractual agreements with defined groups of providers -- typically both hospital and physician -- to 
offer discounted fee-for-service to particular groups of individuals (Rice, Lissovoy, 
Gabel, & Ermann, 1985). Under risk-sharing, hospitals and physicians have an incentive 
. 
. 
¥-
not to admit patients to costly acute care units, and to make(subacute care ii?-sti_t�tions the 
patients' next destination when they are no longer acutely ill. Physicians are known to 
affect the demand for medical care and would be motivated under the risk-sharing 
reimbursement to send patients home or to long-term care units more quickly in order to 
·
,
_::educe acute care use_J'hat behavior, in turn, increases patient transfers to nursing 
homes, raising the demand. 
-4��: 
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Several studies reported that �ospit<l:� utilization and management have been 
changed due to contracting with managed care organizations. In a randomized study 
comparing HMOs with fee-for-service sectors between 1950 and 1980, it was found that 
HMO patients used 30% fewer hospital days, attributable to a lower level of spending 
(Luft, 1980). Greenfield (1992) also found that patients in fee-for-service plans had about 
40% more hospitalizations than did patients in HMOs. Adjusting these experimental data 
for the average level of copayment in the United States, Schwartz (1987) estimated that 
HMO enrollees used about 31% fewer days than did fee-for-service enrollees. To reduce 
hospital days, hospitals may be willing to offer §kil1eirn-urslng services through vertical 
___ _ ---- --·--·-- -- -···-----·- ..
.
. . . .  · _....__ __ s·� SPy.•.J...e.-5 ..... . . .... · 
integration arrangements, to serve a larger poo
_
l of patients. 
H7: A hospital affiliated with managed care organizations is more likely to 
employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing :�NF services. 
S,��-
Hospital size largely determines the volume of patient transfers, because the more 
beds a hospital owns, the more patients it can care for and the more patients it will have 
to transfer. As Williamson ( 1985) has argued, the size of a firm affects its ability and-·-. 
___ ... 
-
------
-
---- ------
-
- ---
-· ---
. . 
willingness to vertically integrate, because costs can be spread over more units of goods 
- �-----·-·----
-
-·-P•�- •- ---� -�•••• 
or ser�i_c
_
e
_�
a�?_!hu�it_f._an achieve savings on production and transact
_
io
_
� �osts. Firm size 
has been used as a proxy for the transaction frequency or scale economies (Anderson, 
-
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-
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1985; Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984; John & Weitz, 1988; Monteverde & Teece, 1982). 
Several studies have found size to be positively and significantly associated with the 
hierarchy mode of control (Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984; Monteverde & Teece, 1982). 
\( 
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�_o-���!�e alone is not fully representative of the volume of exchanges between 
hospitals and nursing homes, since with larger size there may be only a larger portion of 
'------···---· 
- --
__122!!.-elde�!f:patients. But hospitals with both larger size and higher proportions of 
; <JL\1_ :j� ' ·- - .. . 
11edi�are p��iel!.t� h_a_ve more transactions between hospitals and extended care facilities 
than do those hospitals without these characteristics. The interaction of the proportion of 
Medieare patient discharges and hospital size should well represent the frequency of 
. 1'-i,t,�f;.c- . - - ---. ---! <;�_. •.! 
patie�Jrerrsfers. 
f• ,' t ..,. - -<  
H8: 
., '·> \ \_ /' --...} 
A hospital with a higher proportion of Medicare patients and a relatively 
larger size is more likely to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in 
providing SNF services. 
Interaction of Three Dimensions 
The dynamics between and among governance structure and the three dimensions 
-- uncertainty, asset specificity, and frequency of exchange-- can be analyzed. The 
interaction effects of each two of the three factors (i.e. first-order interaction effects) are 
tested in H9. First-order interaction terms represent the interactions of uncertainty and 
specificity, uncertainty and frequency, and specificity and frequency. 
Several studies have analyzed interaction terms of different constructs associated 
with the mode of efficient governance. Anderson (1985) compared the use of employees 
and outside agents as salespersons, to test TCE. He concluded that the combination of 
environmental unpredictability and transaction-specific assets is positively associated 
with the likelihood of a direct sales force. Walker and Weber (1984) used the interaction 
of frequency and environmental uncertainty to investigate the combined effect of those 
two dimensions. To test the interaction of each two of the three constructs, H9 is 
decomposed into three sub-hypotheses (H9a, H9b and H9c). 
H9: The higher interaction effects of each two of the three constructs are (i.e., 
uncertainty x specificity, uncertainty x frequency, and specificity x 
frequency), the more likely the hospital is to employ a higher degree of 
vertical integration in providing SNF services. 
H9a: The higher the environmental uncertainty, and the more knowledge the hospital 
has in elderly care, the more likely the hospital is to employ a higher degree of 
vertical integration in providing SNF services. 
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H9b: The higher the environmental uncertainty, and the higher the frequency of patient 
transfers, the more likely the hospital is to employ a higher degree of vertical 
integration in providing SNF services. 
H9c: The more knowledge the hospital has in elderly care, and the higher the frequency 
of patient transfers, the more likely the hospital is to employ a higher degree of 
vertical integration in providing SNF services. 
Williamson ( 1985) emphasizes that the selection of vertical integration is 
simultaneously determined by three dimensions of transaction. HI 0 is used to test the 
interaction effect of three constructs, that is, to examine the second-order interaction 
effect. The interaction effect of environmental uncertainty, hospital specificity in 
providing elderly care, and frequency of patient transfers is hypothesized to affect the 
hospital's make-or-buy decision. 
HlO: The higher the environmental uncertainty, the more knowledge the hospital 
has in elderly care, and the higher the frequency of patient transfers, the 
more likely the hospital is to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in 
providing SNF services. 
The main purpose of this study is to test whether transaction cost economics 
theory can be applied to a hospital's make-or-buy decision in channeling their most 
important consumers (i.e., the elderly) to extended care facilities. Distributed by 
dimension, three hypotheses are derived for transaction uncertainty, two for transaction 
specificity, and three for transaction frequency. One further hypothesis is developed to 
test the interaction of the three constructs. Hypotheses and propositions for the 
corresponding constructs are summarized in the following paragraphs. 
Table 1 presents a summary of the study hypotheses. HI, H2 and H3 relate to 
transaction uncertainty and encompass five indicators. These hypotheses are primarily 
intended to address the proposition, "The greater the uncertainty of the nursing home 
market, the more likely a hospital is to use the hierarchy or hybrid mode of control." 
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Two hypotheses, H4 and H5, are developed from transaction specificity construct. 
They are to test the proposition, "The more experience or expertise a hospital has in 
caring for the elderly, the more likely is to employ the hierarchy or hybrid mode of 
governance." 
H6, H7, and H8 are derived for the construct of transaction frequency. They 
address the proposition, "The higher the volume of exchange frequency is, the more 
likely the hospital is to employ the hierarchy or hybrid mode of governance." 
The last proposition of this study is: "A hospital's decision on hierarchical 
arrangements depends on the degree of integration among the three constructs." H9 
(H9a, H9b, and H9c) and HI 0 are derived to test this proposition. 
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Table I 
Summary of the Study Hypotheses 
vHI: 
vH2: 
J H3: 
A hospital that has a relatively higher occupancy rate and/or is located in an area with a 
high average occupancy rate is more likely to employ a higher degree of vertical 
integration in providing SNF services. 
A hospital that is located in an area with a relative shortage of SNF beds and/or a high 
average SNF occupancy rate is more likely to employ a higher degree of vertical 
integration in providing SNF services. 
A hospital in an area with relatively more indigent persons and a shortage of SNF bed 
supply is more likely to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF 
servtces. 
v' H4: A hospital that provides a wider variety of geriatric services to the elderly patients is 
more likely to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services. 
HS: A hospital that provides home health services to elderly patients is more likely to employ 
a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services. 
,, H6: A hospital with a relatively higher proportion of Medicare patients is more likely to 
employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services . 
.J H7: A hospital affiliated with managed care organizations is more likely to employ a higher 
degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services. 
v H8: A hospital with a higher proportion of Medicare patients and a relatively larger size is 
more likely to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services. 
H9: The higher interaction effects of each two of the three constructs (i.e., uncertainty 
specificity, uncertainty x frequency, and specificity x frequency) are, the more likely the 
hospital is to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services. 
HI 0: The higher the environmental uncertainty, the more knowledge the hospital has in 
elderly care, and the higher the frequency of patient transfers, the more likely the 
hospital is to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services. 
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Summary 
This chapter presents the concepts of organization economics through its 
representative theory -- transaction cost economics. Williamson's concept of market 
failure and the three dimensions of efficient governance are described. The three 
dimensions (transaction uncertainty, specificity, and frequency) are presented to build 
testable hypotheses. Two figures are presented to illustrate the importance of each 
dimension and the interaction of these three dimensions. The figures are also intended to 
map out Williamson's TCE approach developed in the 1980s. 
Even though many health care organization researchers have adopted transaction 
cost economics as a theoretical framework to interpret health care phenomena, most of 
the studies concentrated on the interpretation or descriptive stage with little effort to 
validate the theory by empirical studies. Fortunately, a number of organization 
researchers have attempted to test transaction cost economics in many other fields, such 
as transportation (aerospace, automobile, railroad) and industry (electronic components). 
In terms of the direction of channels, some focus on forward vertical integration 
(downstream), and some on backward vertical integration (upstream). Most of the studies 
use the three-dimensional approach and employ bivariate analysis to examine a firm's 
decision to make or buy. TCE has been proven to be a theory that can be used to explain 
the emergence of organizations, even though some results are mixed. 
The conceptual models and hypotheses in this study are derived for acute care 
hospitals and nursing homes, using the three dimensions related to governance forms, 
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while other demographic and hospital attributes are controlled. Since the purpose of this 
study is to test TCE, all the hypotheses closely tap these basic constructs of TCE. A total 
of 4 propositions and I 0 hypotheses are proposed in this study. 
Chapter 4 
Methods 
This chapter begins with a description of the study design and sample. There 
follows a description of data sources, model specification and measurement of variables. 
Then the analytic plan, including model building and multivariate logistic regression 
analysis, is presented. This chapter concludes with a summary of methods. 
Study Design and Sample 
The purpose of this study is to investigate why and how hospitals vertically 
integrate into skilled nursing facilities, by using Williamson's transaction cost economics 
theory. As explained by Williamson, the selection of a governance structure is contingent 
on three dimensions of transactions, i.e. transaction uncertainty, asset specificity, and 
frequency. A cross-sectional design is used to examine the association of different modes 
of hospital governance and the three dimensions of transactions. Cross-sectional design 
means that the study population is observed at a single point in time. 
The study sample consists of all the non-federal, acute-care general hospitals in 50 
states and the District of Columbia of the United States (excluding associated areas such 
as the Virgin Islands) that responded to the American Hospital Association's (AHA) 1990 
annual survey. The year 1990 is chosen because managed care networks and the 
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Medicare PPS had matured by then, so that effects of those two developments can be 
included. The criterion for a hospital to be selected for the sample is that the hospital 
must have been in full operation for at least one year by the time of the survey. In all, 
4,908 hospitals met the criterion and are included in this study. 
There are two advantages of studying almost all non-federal hospitals. First, the 
sample is close to the entire population of interest (i.e. non-federal, acute general 
hospitals), so selection bias becomes very unlikely. Second, since the population 
includes all hospitals in the United States, the generalizability of the results is more 
assured. 
Data Sources 
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In this study, data are extracted from four sources: the American Hospital 
Association (AHA) 1990 Annual Survey of Hospitals Data Base, the 1993 Area Resource 
File (ARF), the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCF A) National Minimum 
Data Set for Skilled Nursing Facilities (SNFs), and state stringency measures for CON 
regulation. Details of each data source are described below. 
The AHA annual survey data contain information on all hospitals in the U.S. that 
are registered with the AHA and respond to the organization's annual survey. The 
information describes organizational structure, facilities and services, utilization, 
personnel, medical staff and financial status. This data source has been the most 
recognized and informative of individual hospital data bases. It has been used 
extensively by health care researchers (Alexander & Morrisey, 1989; Fennell & 
Alexander, 1987). 
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The 1993 Area Resource File is a county-based file that includes all counties in 
the U.S. The file provides data related to health facilities, health professions, utilization, 
population, economics, environment, and vital statistics. It is widely recognized and used 
in different disciplines (Alexander & Morrisey, 1989). The file for 1993 is chosen 
because it contains information for 1990, which matches the time period of the AHA 
data set. 
The SNF data were obtained from the Health Care Financing Administration's 
National Minimum Data Set, which covers the period of October 1990 to September 
1991. The data set includes the most current cost reports and organizational 
characteristics of Medicare-certified skilled nursing facilities. 
The state stringency measures for CON regulation are based on 1984-1986 data 
collected by the Center for Health Services and Policy Research, Northwestern 
University. It has been used in several studies (Abu-Jaber, 1992; Begun, Ozcan, & Luke, 
1992). 
Model Specifications 
Many hospitals face tremendous difficulties and financial risks in the competition 
for skilled nursing beds in their market area. When market uncertainty increases to the 
extent that a hospital can no longer rely on spot-market purchasing to release its burden 
of delayed discharges, two options remain -- long-term contracting or leasing 
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arrangements with SNFs (hybrid), or vertical integration of SNFs (hierarchy). In short, 
the market, hybrid, and hierarchy modes are three types of arrangements by which 
hospitals can provide skilled nursing care services. The hospital's decision about which 
to use usually has two stages. In the first stage, hospitals decide between the spot market 
and integration. If integration is chosen, hospitals have to decide on its degree, that is, 
either hybrid or hierarchy. Extreme vertical integration is always reserved as a last resort 
(Williamson, 1991 ), since capital costs are higher with hierarchy than with hybrid 
governance. 
There are two phases to the model specification. In phase one, five primary 
models are established to examine the variations in the arrangements hospitals make to 
discharge patients to skilled nursing facilities. In phase two, the model specification 
focuses on interaction effects. As Williamson proposed, three dimensions of 
transactions, transaction uncertainty (UNCER), transaction specificity (SPEC) and 
transaction frequency (FREQ), are used as independent variables across all the study 
models. In order to avoid the bias that may be caused by other variables, variables such 
as CON stringency, demographic factors, and hospital characteristics are entered as 
control variables (CONTRL). 
Table 2 presents the five primary models as well as the interaction term models. 
Model 1 differentiates whether or not a hospital decides to integrate skilled nursing 
facilities (Hierarchy/Hybrid vs. Market). Model 2 examines why hospitals adopt the 
extreme mode to manage patient discharges (Hierarchy vs. Market). Model 3 identifies 
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the factors affecting a hospital's choice between the different degrees of integration 
(Hierarchy vs. Hybrid). Model 4 examines whether hospitals that use the hybrid form 
differ from those that use the market option (Hybrid vs. Market). Model 5 examines the 
factors affecting a hospital's decision to use vertical integration rather than hybrid and 
spot market (Hierarchy vs. Hybrid/Market). In phase two, Model 6 examines whether 
there is an interaction effect of each two of the three factors on the hospital's governance 
decision. Model 7 examines the interaction effect of three dimensions. 
Table 2 
Description of Model Specifications 
Phase One 
Modell 
Model2 
Model3 
Model4 
ModelS 
Phase Two 
Model6 
Model7 
Hierarchy /Hybrid vs. Market= f (UNCER, FREQ, SPEC, CONTRL) 
Hierarchy vs. Market= f (UNCER, FREQ, SPEC, CONTRL) 
Hierarchy vs. Hybrid= f (UNCER, FREQ, SPEC, CONTRL) 
Hybrid vs. Market= f (UNCER, FREQ, SPEC, CONTRL) 
Hierarchy vs. Hybrid/Market= f (UNCER, FREQ, SPEC, CONTRL) 
Hierarchy/Hybrid vs. Market= f (UNCER x SPEC, UNCER x FREQ, 
SPEC x FREQ, CONTRL) 
Hierarchy/Hybrid vs. Market= f(UNCER x SPEC x FREQ, CONTRL) 
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Measurement of Variables 
The variables in this study can be divided into three categories. The first group is 
the dependent variables, hospitals' forms of governance in discharging patients to SNFs. 
The second group is theory-driven independent variables, including transaction 
uncertainty, transaction frequency and transaction specificity. The last group is the 
control variables to reduce bias in estimating effects of the theory-driven variables. 
Dependent V arjables 
The dependent variables, the three types of arrangements a hospital takes to 
discharge its patients to skilled nursing facilities, are abstracted from the AHA 1990 
Annual Surveys of Hospitals Data Base. The AHA survey asked two questions central to 
the current study: whether a hospital offered a Medicare-certified, distinct, skilled nursing 
unit, and whether it offered other skilled nursing care. Possible answers to each of these 
two questions by a hospital were: 1) not provided by the hospital, 2) provided by other 
providers through a formal contractual arrangement (including joint ventures), and 3) 
provided by the hospital (AHA, 1991 ). 
These responses represent three levels of vertical integration, the dependent 
variable of interest, such that 1 = spot market (hospital providing no SNF services); 2 = 
hybrid or long-term contracting (hospital not maintaining SNF services, but providing 
them through long-term contracting); and 3 =hierarchy (hospital providing in-house SNF 
services). The three levels of distribution channels for goods or services have been 
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adopted in many studies testing transaction cost economics (Klien, Frazier, & Roth, 1990; 
John & Weitz, 1988; Rangan, Corey, & Cespedes, 1993). 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables are chosen to represent three transaction constructs. 
Table 3 presents the variables for measuring transaction uncertainty. The transaction 
uncertainty dimension has two subcomponents: environmental or market uncertainty (i.e., 
market competition for nursing home beds), and behavioral uncertainty. The county is 
used as the hospital market area in this study, because it is widely recognized and used by 
researchers as a health care market or environment boundary (Alexander & Morrisey, 
1989). 
Table 3 
Operational Definitions of Transaction Uncertainty Variables 
AH OPY 
H OPY 
SNF OLD 
SNF OPY 
BEH UNC 
Hospitals' occupancy rate in a hospital market area (HI) 
Individual hospital occupancy rate (H 1) 
Skilled-nursing-bed-to-elderly-population ratio in a hospital market 
area (H2) 
Skilled nursing facility occupancy rate in a hospital market area 
(H2) 
cross-product term of the SNF beds to elderly population ratio and 
persons-below-the-poverty-level percentage in the hospital market 
area (H3) 
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The W1Certainty of the nursing home market measures the degree of hospital 
competition for SNFs. In this study, competition for skilled nursing beds is measured by 
four continuous variables. The first variable is the average occupancy rate of all acute 
care hospitals in the market area (AH _ OPY). It is used as a proxy that measures the 
degree to which hospitals are competing for limited nursing home beds. The second is 
the occupancy rate of an individual hospital (H _ OPY). Hospital occupancy indicates the 
urgency that a hospital experiences in discharging patients. Area hospital occupancy rate 
and individual hospital occupancy rate are used to test HI. The third variable is the ratio 
of skilled nursing beds to the elderly population in the hospital market area (SNF _OLD); 
the fourth variable is the average skilled nursing facility occupancy rate in the hospital 
market area (SNF _ OPY). These last two variables, representing the availability of SNF 
beds to which hospitals can discharge patients, are used to test H2. 
Behavioral uncertainty (BEH _UN C) is measured by the cross-product term of the 
SNF -beds-to-elderly-population ratio and the persons-below-the-poverty-level percentage 
in the hospital market area. The rationale is that the relatively low reimbursement for 
Medicaid patients motivates SNFs to preferentially admit private-pay patients, especially 
in areas where an undersupply of beds exists. The cross-product term represents the 
interaction of opportunism and small numbers and is used to test H3. 
The second construct is asset specificity. Presumably, a hospital evaluates the 
discharge sites more critically if the hospital has considerable experience or expertise in 
providing geriatric services. It is hypothesized that a hospital's geriatric experience or 
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expertise enhances the likelihood of using vertical integration. Table 4 presents the two 
variables that are chosen to represent experience and knowledge: the number of geriatric 
services that a hospital provides (GI_INDX), and the availability of home care 
(HOME_!). Each of the two variables is used to test H4 and H5, respectively. 
Table 4 
Operational Definitions of Transaction Specificity Variables 
GI INDX 
HOME I 
The number of geriatric services provided by the hospital, 
including adult day care program, Alzheimer's 
diagnostic/assessment services, comprehensive geriatric 
assessment, emergency response for the elderly, geriatric acute 
care unit, geriatric clinics, respite care, senior membership. It is 
coded as "1" if provided in-house or through contracts, and as "0" 
otherwise (H4). 
Whether a hospital provides agency home health care, through 
either the hospital or a long-term contract. It is coded as" 1" if 
provided in-house or through contracts, and as "0" if otherwise 
(H5). 
The geriatric service item is a continuous variable with few integer values, 
ranging from 0 to 8. The eight services include: I) adult day care program, 2) 
Alzheimer's diagnostic and assessment services, 3) comprehensive geriatric assessment, 
4) emergency response for the elderly, 5) geriatric acute-care unit, 6) geriatric clinics, 7) 
respite care, and 8) senior membership program. Each service item is coded as "1" if a 
hospital provides this service, either hospital-based or through long-term contract; 
otherwise it is coded as "0." The availability of home health care is coded as " 1 " if 
provided in-house or through contract, and as "0" if provided otherwise. 
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Table 5 presents four variables that represent transaction frequency between 
hospitals and skilled nursing facilities. Three hypotheses for this construct posit that the 
volume of exchange is positively associated with a hospital's use of hierarchy or hybrid as 
a management strategy. 
The first indicator is the proportion of Medicare discharged patients to total 
discharges (MCR_D). The rationale for selecting this indicator is that skilled nursing 
services are used primarily by elderly patients, and the majority of Medicare 
beneficiaries are over 65. A hospital with more Medicare patient days is likely to have 
more transactions between skilled nursing facilities. A relatively higher proportion of 
Medicare patient days imposes more pressure on a hospital's discharge-planning 
activities. Hospital-owned long-term care has been shown to be associated with shorter 
LOS and lower cost (Welch & Dubay, 1989). The proportion of Medicare patients may 
represent the extent to which a hospital is exposed to risk from an inadequate patient 
discharge process. This indicator is used to test H6. Furthermore, a hospital's affiliation 
with a managed care organization (HMO/PPO) is used to test H7. The cross-term of 
Medicare discharges and hospital size is employed to test H8. 
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Table 5 
Operational Definitions of Transaction Frequency Variables 
MCR D 
HMOs 
PPOs 
MCR SIZE 
Proportion of Medicare discharges to total discharges of the 
hospital, continuous variable (H6). 
Whether a hospital has a formal written contract with any HMOs: 
1 = yes, 0 = no (H7). 
Whether a hospital has formal written contracts with any PPOs: 
1 =yes, 0 =no (H7). 
Cross-product term of hospital size and the proportion of Medicare 
discharges, continuous variable (H8) 
It is important to evaluate Williamson's postulate that as uncertainty, asset 
specificity, and the volume of transactions increase simultaneously, the probability of 
vertical integration increases. To examine the interaction effects of the three dimensions 
of transactions on hospital SNF integration, and interaction between or among transaction 
specificity, transaction uncertainty and transaction frequency, first-order and second­
order interaction terms are tested in H9 and HI 0. First-order interaction terms represent 
the interaction of uncertainty and specificity, uncertainty and frequency, and specificity 
and frequency. The second-order interaction term represents the interaction of 
uncertainty, specificity, and frequency. Mathematically, the model with first-order 
interaction terms can be expressed as: 
Y = f(UNCER x SPEC, UNCER x FREQ, SPEC x FREQ); and 
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the model with the second-order interaction term can be expressed as: 
y = f(UNCER X SPEC X FREQ). 
Control Variables 
Environmental and hospital characteristics were included as control variables 
(Table 6). Two environmental variables that may covary with hospitals' managerial 
decisions are controlled in this study. One of the most important control variables is the 
state regulatory stringency of CON, which is controlled because of its impact on the 
supply of nursing home beds. The CON stringency for each state is a summated score 
based on the following five stringency indicators: I) 1986 CON review threshold levels 
for capital expenditures, 2) threshold levels for major medical equipment, 3) threshold 
levels for new institutional services, 4) 1984 state planning agency budget size per non­
federal hospital, and 5) 1984 CON application approval rates. Each of the five indicators 
is given an ordinal value from 0 to 3, depending on the breakpoints. These values are 
then summated to obtain overall stringency scores that range from 0 to 15. The other 
environmental control variable is locality (LOCAL), whether a hospital is located in an 
urbanized or a rural area. The criterion defining an urbanized or a rural area is whether 
the population is over or below I 00,000. 
The controlled hospital characteristics include hospital bed size (SIZE), the 
availability of swing beds at a hospital (SWING), membership in a multihospital system 
(MEMBER), and two dummy variables representing three types of ownership 
(OWN_PUB; OWN_NPRO). It is a common practice to control for hospital size. Swing 
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beds are a unique form of providing long-term care in that only certain hospitals, for 
example, those located in rural areas and those with less than 100 beds, are eligible to 
switch their acute beds to chronic care beds. In terms of memberships, hospitals are 
grouped as either belonging to a multi-health-care system or not. For ownership, 
hospitals are categorized into 1) public or government hospitals, 2) private not-for-profit 
hospitals, and 3) private for-profit hospitals. All four variables are dummy variables 
except for bed size, which is a continuous variable. 
Table 6 
Operational Definitions of Control Variables 
CON 
LOCAL 
SIZE 
SWING 
MEMBER 
OWN PUB 
OWN NPRO 
CON stringency in the area where a hospital is located - summated 
score ranging from 0 to 15 
Whether a hospital is located in an urbanized area: 
1 =rural, 0 =urban. 
Hospital staffed beds; continuous variable 
Whether a hospital operates swing beds: I = yes, 0 = no. 
Whether a hospital is in any multi-hospital system: 1 =yes, 0 =no. 
Measured as dummy variable for public hospitals (1 =yes), with 
profit hospitals as reference 
Measured as dummy variable for private non-profit hospitals 
(I =yes), with profit hospitals as reference 
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Analysis Plan 
The unit of analysis for this study is the individual hospital. A series of analyses 
are performed, beginning with univariate analysis, which examines the distribution of the 
study variables. The second segment of the analysis is model building to assess the 
proposed variables. Finally, multivariate logistic regression analysis is performed to 
examine the relative impact of each dimension on a hospital's governance form. 
Univariate Analysis 
Study variables are examined first in terms of distribution and normality, through 
univariate analysis. The observations that have unreasonable or extreme values or are 
incorrectly coded are considered for deletion. Nominal or ordinal variables are examined 
through frequency tables and bar charts. 
Model Building 
Model building includes factor analysis, univariate logit analysis, contingency 
table analysis, bivariate analysis, and collinearity diagnostic analysis to assess the 
proposed variables. 
Factor analysis. Factor analysis is performed to simplify complex and diverse 
relationships that exist among the selected independent variables. The purpose is to 
uncover common dimensions or factors that link together the seemingly unrelated 
variables (Dillon & Goldstein, 1995). 
Univariate logistic regression. Univariate logistic regression is applied to each of 
the proposed variables to evaluate whether a variable is statistically sufficient to be 
included in the multivariate models. The coefficient estimate, standard error, p-value, 
odds ratio, and the likelihood ratio test for the significance of the coefficient obtained 
from univariate logit regression for each variable are evaluated. 
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Contin!iency table analysis. Contingency table analysis is employed to evaluate 
nominal, ordinal, and continuous variables with integer values. This method entails an 
analysis of a two-way contingency table. The purpose of analyzing contingency tables is 
to determine whether or not the two variables, such as number of geriatric services and 
SNF integration, can be regarded as independent of each other, that is, to examine the 
association between two variables. 
Bivariate analysis. A correlation matrix is obtained to examine the two-way 
relationships between selected pairs of variables. The purpose is to detect possible 
collinearity problems. lf the correlation coefficient of any two variables reaches 0.95, 
one of the variables conveys essentially all of the information contained in the other 
(Afifi & Clark, 1990), and the variables are considered collinear. 
Collinearity diagnostic analysis. The inclusion of a variable with high 
collinearity may hinder the revelation of the true relationship between variables, by 
disturbing the directions or estimated regression coefficients of variables. Therefore, 
deleting hjghly collinear variables is necessary. Since correlation matrices detect only the 
possibility of collinearity problems, collinearity diagnostic analysis is used 
simultaneously to confirm their existence. 
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Multivariate Logit Analysis 
Hospitals' arrangements to discharge patients to nursing homes are predicted by 
using multivariate logistic regression. A logistic regression model is used when the 
dependent variable is measured by a binary or discrete variable, and the independent 
variables are continuous and discrete variables. Since the dependent variable is a discrete 
variable, the predicted probability lies in the unity boundary. Logistic regression is 
preferable to ordinary least squares (OLS), because OLS estimates are biased and yield 
predicted values that are not between 0 and I. 
Several studies of hospitals involving logistic response models have addressed 
hospital strategy formulation. Alexander and Morrisey (1989) used logistic models to 
examine the determinants of hospitals' entry into management contracts with 
multihospital systems. Logistic models have also been used by Fennell and Alexander 
( 1987) to examine why hospitals employ buffering or bridging as boundary spanning 
strategies to overcome regulatory stringency. Many researchers outside the health care 
field have used binary and logistic regression to test Williamson's transaction cost 
economics (Anderson, 1985; John & Weitz, 1988; Rangan, Corey, & Cespedes, 1993; 
Walker & Poppo, 1991 ). Logistic regression is an appropriate tool because here analysis 
of the transaction cost economics theory mainly involves comparing discrete institutional 
alternatives -- of which classical market contracting is located at one extreme; centralized, 
hierarchical organization at the other; and mixed modes of firm and market arrangements 
in between. 
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Logistic regression estimates the probability of the occurrence of an event. In a 
binary response model, an outcome is either an event (coded as 1) or a non-event (coded 
as 0). The event in this study is a hospital providing SNF services through either the 
hierarchy or hybrid mode. Each factor affecting the outcome is entered as the vector of 
explanatory variables. The probability function is specified as: 
where P = probability of hospital's SNF integration; 
B; =coefficient estimated from the data; 
Xj = vector of explanatory variable; and 
e = the base of natural logarithms, or approximately 2. 718. 
In order to interpret logistic coefficients (B;), the model can be expressed in terms 
of an odds ratio. Let P represent the probability of an event; the logit (P) = P/(1-P) is a 
linear function of the predictor variables. The log of the odds ratio (also termed the log-
odds ratio or log-odds) is defined as: 
Odds ratio= Pz/ (1-pz ). 
The concept of an odds ratio is used extensively in predicting the occurrence of a 
given event. For a dichotomous or polynomous variable, the odds ratio is a measure of 
association of a binary variable (predictor) with the occurrence of an event (in this study, 
SNF integration). For a continuous variable, it is necessary to develop a method for point 
and interval estimation for an arbitrary change of"X" units in the covariate. Certainly, 
any reasonable value can be used as an interval. Generally, changes in multiples of 5 or 
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I 0 may be most meaningful and easiest to understand (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 1989). In 
this study, the interval for area hospital occupancy rate as well as for the proportion of 
Medicare discharges is I 0%. 
To examine how well the logistic regression model predicts outcomes, two 
measures of goodness-of-fit are employed: Pearson chi-squares and correct classification 
rates (Afifi & Clark, 1990). The chi-square values based on the difference between the 
observed and fitted values reveal how well the logit equation fits the data. These 
differences between observed and fitted values are summated to form a chi-square value 
(x2) (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 1989). Large values of the test statistic indicate a poor fit of 
the model, and conversely, low values indicate a good fit. Equivalently, small p-values 
indicate poor fit. 
An intuitively appealing way to summarize the results of a fitted logistic model is 
with a classification table, in which estimated probabilities predict group membership. 
Presumably, if the model predicts group membership accurately according to some 
criteria, that is evidence that the model fits. Accurate vs. inaccurate classification does 
not address our criteria for goodness-of-fit: that the distance between observed and 
expected values may be unsystematic, and within the variation of the model. 
Nonetheless, the classification table may be a useful adjunct to other measures based 
more directly on residuals. In summary, the classification table is most appropriate when 
classification is a stated goal of the analysis; otherwise it should only supplement more 
rigorous methods for assessing fit. 
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Summary 
This chapter delineates the methods for this research. A cross-sectional design is 
used, and the hospital is the unit of analysis. Data sources are the 1990 AHA annual 
survey, the Area Resource File, and the SNF data set from HCF A. The definitions and 
measurements of the dependent as well as the independent variables for all the models 
are specified. The selected variables are validated and finalized in model building. Five 
primary models and one interaction-term model are used to test the likelihood of three 
forms of governance (hierarchy, hybrid, and market) by using multivariate logistic 
regression analysis. The results of the series of analyses are reported in the next chapter. 
Chapter 5 
Results 
This chapter presents the results of data management and statistical analysis, 
including descriptive statistics, model building, and multivariate logistic regression 
analysis. Data management is reported in terms of data sources and the process of data 
merging. Descriptive statistics of the study population are presented to illustrate the 
distribution of study variables. In the section on model building, the results of 
exploratory factor analysis are provided for construct validation. The results of univariate 
logit regression, contingency table analysis, and collinearity diagnostics, are presented to 
justify the modifications of final models. The findings of two-phase multivariate logit 
regression analysis are then delineated. This chapter concludes with a summary of 
statistical findings. 
Descriptive Statistics 
In this section, the data sources, the study population, and the distribution of study 
variables are described. 
Data Management and the Study Population 
The unit of analysis was the individual hospital. Four data files: the AHA File 
data, the ARF dataset, the HCF A SNF Minimum Data Set, and the state CON stringency 
Ill 
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The unit of analysis was the individual hospital. Four data files: the AHA File 
data, the ARF Dataset, the HCF A SNF Minimum Data Set, and the state CON stringency 
data file, were examined before they were merged. The unit of data collection varied by 
data set -- it was "hospital" in the AHA File (county code was available); "county" in the 
ARF Dataset; "skilled nursing facility" in the HCFA Minimum SNF Data Set (county 
code was available); and "state" in the state CON stringency data. All variables in the 
HCF A Minimum SNF Data Set were converted to county-based so that the first three 
detests could be merged by county code. The merged dataset was then further merged 
with the state CON stringency data by state. 
Nationwide, 4,908 hospitals met the selection criteria -- being a general, acute, 
non-federal hospital that had operated for at least one full year by the time of study. The 
normality of continuous variables was examined through univariate analysis. Extreme 
outliers were carefully investigated before being deleted. Nominal or ordinal variables 
were examined through the frequency tables and bar charts. A hospital was deleted if any 
of its key variables, namely Medicare discharges, affiliation with HMOs and PPOs, 
locality, or swing bed status, were missing, because those variables were crucial to the 
proposed multivariate regression models. 
In total, 4, 703 hospitals in the 50 states and the District of Columbia were retained 
for study. The geographic distribution of hospitals varied from region to region and state 
to state. For example, there were 211 hospitals in the New England region, and 722 
hospitals in the Southern Atlantic region. There was only one qualified hospital located 
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in Alaska, but 351 hospitals and 400 hospitals in California and Texas, respectively. 
About the same percentages of hospitals were located in rural (47.4%) and in urbanized 
areas (52.6%). The average hospital size was 168 beds, with a standard deviation of 173 
beds. 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable was the arrangement that a hospital chose to provide 
skilled nursing services to its medically ready discharged patients. Table 7 presents the 
distribution of the three types of arrangements, namely, hierarchy, hybrid, and market. 
For ease of identification, the hospitals that owned or operated at least one skilled nursing 
facility were considered the hierarchy group, representing the highest degree of vertical 
integration; the hospitals that provided skilled nursing services through long-term 
contracts or joint venture were considered the hybrid group; and the hospitals that relied 
solely on the spot market to provide skilled nursing services to discharged patients were 
considered the market group. 
As shown in Table 7, there were 1,098 hospitals (23.3% of all study hospitals) 
integrated with Medicare-certified SNFs, and 936 hospitals (19.9%) integrated with non­
Medicare SNFs. Since the interest of the study was focused on the occurrence of an 
event, namely, SNF integration, hospitals were considered as vertically integrating a SNF 
regardless of the SNF's certification status. 
In Table 7, the total number of hospitals that used the hierarchy arrangement was 
the sum of the cells with darker shading, totaling 1,681 (35.7% of all hospitals). The 
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lighter shaded cells represent hospitals that used the hybrid arrangement, a total of 394 
(8.4% of all hospitals). The last, white cell represents the majority of the study hospitals 
(2,628 hospitals, 55.9% of all hospitals). These hospitals did not provide any 
arrangement for skilled nursing services, but relied on the spot market. 
There were five primary multivariate logistic regression models. Each of the five 
models compared different contrasting groups. Model I compared the hierarchy/hybrid 
group and the market group; Model 2 compared the hierarchy group and the market 
group; Model 3 compared the hierarchy group and the hybrid group; Model 4 compared 
the hybrid group and the market group; and Model 5 compared the hierarchy group and 
the hybrid/market group. 
Table 7 
The Distribution of the Types of Medicare and Non-Medicare SNFs 
Medicare-Certified SNF 
Non-Medicare SNF Hierarchy Hybrid Market 
Hierarchy 
Hybrid 266 98 
Market 30 
Total 1098 (23.3%) 320 (6.8%) 3285 (69.8%) 
Likelihood ratio 1370.68; SIG: .0000 
Hierarchy group 
Hybrid group 
Market group 
= (1098 + 936 ) -353 =1681 
= 266 + 98 +30 =394 
= 2628 
Total 
936 (19.9%) 
400 (8.5%) 
3367 (71.6) 
4703 (100%) 
Independent Variables 
The descriptive statistics of independent and control variables are presented in 
Tables 8 and 9. Table 8 describes means and standard deviations for continuous 
variables, for the three subgroups as well as for the entire population. Table 9 presents 
the distribution of polynomous and dichotomous variables in the same manner. 
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Selection of the hierarchical arrangement was hypothesized to be determined by 
the uncertainty, specificity, and frequency of transactions. Transaction uncertainty was 
measured by area average hospital occupancy rate, individual hospital occupancy rate, 
SNF beds to elderly population ratio, SNF occupancy rate, and the percentage of 
population below the poverty level. The means and standard deviations are shown in 
Table 8. Overall, the average hospital occupancy rate in the county market area was 
59.6%, with a standard deviation of 16.3%. The hybrid group had the highest area 
average hospital occupancy rate (65.6%), as compared to the hierarchy group (58.9%) 
and market group (59.3%). On average, there were 27 beds available per 1,000 older 
adults. The average bed availability in the areas where hospitals used hierarchy 
arrangements was 21 beds per 1,000 elderly persons. Availability was 34 and 29 beds per 
1,000 elderly persons where hospitals took hybrid and market forms, respectively. The 
ratio of SNF beds to the elderly population was transformed by taking the natural 
logarithm to correct skewed distributions. Since the natural logarithm could be calculated 
only on positive values, .0001 was added to the values of the relevant variables before 
calculating the logarithm. 
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The indicators of transaction specificity included the number of available geriatric 
services and the availability of home health services. The two ordinal variables were 
recoded as dummy variables. It should be noted that the recoding differed among the five 
models. Models I and 4 differentiated two forms of providing geriatric services and 
home services -- the market form vs. either the hierarchy or hybrid form. In Models I 
and 4 the availability of a service was coded as "I" if provided in-house or through 
contract, and as "0" if otherwise. In Models 2, 3, and 5, which differentiate differently 
between the contracting forms -- the hierarchy form vs. the hybrid or market form, the 
availability of a service was coded as "I" if provided in-house and as "0" if otherwise. 
On average, all hospitals provided at least one geriatric service. In three groups, 
the hybrid group offered more geriatric service items (3.09 in Models I and 4; 1.53 in 
Models 2, 3, and 5) than the other two groups did. The market group provided the fewest 
geriatric services (1.04 in Models I and 4; 0.99 in Models 2, 3, and 5). 
For home services, substantial differences existed among the models. In Models 
I and 4, home services were provided by 91.6% of the hospitals (36I out of 394) in the 
hybrid group, by 68.I% of the hospitals (I, I4I out of I ,68I) in the hierarchy group, and 
by 59.I% of the hospitals (I ,555 out of 2,628) in the market group. In Models 2, 3 and 
5, only 42.9% of the hierarchy group, 35.8% of the hybrid group, and 32.9% of the 
market group provided home services. In general, fewer hospitals in the market group 
provided home services. 
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Table 8 
M�ans and SD for ContinuQJJS Ind�p�nd�nt Variabl�s. b::t Arrang�ments Qf SNF Services 
ConstructsN ariables Arrangement of Skilled Nursing Services 
Hierarchy 
(n=1681) 
Transaction Uncertainty 
Area average hospital 
occupancy rate .589 (.167) 
Hospital occupancy rate .483 (.189) 
SNF beds to elderly 
population ratio .021 (.024) 
SNF occupancy rate .642 (.200) 
Percentage of persons 
below poverty level .16 (.06) 
Transaction Specificity 
Number of geriatric services 1.41(1.69) 
(for models I & 4) 
Number of geriatric services 1.39 (1.37) 
(for models 2, 3 & 5) 
Transaction Frequency 
Proportion of Medicare 
discharges to total .44 (.13) 
Control Variables 
Hospital bedsize 123 (!57) 
CON stringency score 6.97 (3.55) 
Note. ( ) = Standard Deviation. 
Hybrid Market Overall 
(n=394) (n=2628) (N=4703) 
.656 (.140) .593 (.163) .596 (.163) 
.632 (.176) .556(.191) .536 (.195) 
.034 (.023) .029 (.022) .027 (.023) 
.766 (.146) .760(.168) .727(.184) 
.14(.07) .15(.07) .15 (.07) 
3.09 (2.55) 1.04 (1.27) 1.34 (1.66) 
1.53 (1.48) .99(1.15) 1.08 ( 1.28) 
.37(.12) .39 (.12) .40(.13) 
252 (194) 184 (183) 168(173) 
8.15 (3.58) 7.71 (3.69) 7.48 (3.65) 
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The proportion of Medicare discharges (Table 8) and the affiliations with HMOs 
and PPOs (Table 9) were used to measure transaction frequency. Overall, more than 40% 
of discharged patients of all hospitals were Medicare beneficiaries. The percentage of 
Medicare discharges was highest for the hierarchy group (44%), followed by the market 
group (39%) and the hybrid group (37%). As for HMO and PPO affiliations, 47.3% of 
all hospitals had formal contracts with HMOs, and 53.2% with PPOs. More hospitals in 
the hybrid group were affiliated with HMOs (64.5%) and PPOs (60.2%) than in the 
hierarchy group (HMO affiliation: 50.9%; PPO affiliation: 57.5%) or in the market group 
(HMO affiliation: 37.5%; PPO affiliation: 45.0%). About 75% of hospitals in the hybrid 
group were affiliated with either HMOs or PPOs. 
To investigate the pure effect of the three theoretical constructs on hospitals' 
decisions about providing SNF services, other hospital characteristics that might cause 
variations in hospitals' decisions were included in the models as control variables, as 
described in Table 9. More than half of the hospitals in the hierarchy group were certified 
by HCF A to switch their acute beds to subacute beds. Many fewer hospitals in the hybrid 
group (8.9%) and the market group (12.8%) were allowed to do so. The hybrid group 
had the highest percentage of hospitals that were members of health systems. A majority 
of hospitals in the hierarchy group (65.6%) were located in rural areas; much lower 
percentages of the hybrid group (24.9%) and the market group (39.1 %) were. Overall, 
about 60% of hospitals were non-profit hospitals, as compared to 28% of hospitals were 
public hospitals. 
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Table 9 
Distribution Qf Pol;rnomous and DichotQmQl.!S Variables b;r Arrangements of SNF 
Services 
Constructs/Variables Arrangements of SNF Services 
Hierarchy Hybrid Market Overall 
(n=l681) (n=394) (n=2628) (N=4703) 
Transaction specificity 
Availability of home health 1144 361 1555 3060 
service (for models I & 4) (68.1 %) (91.6%) (59.2%) (65.1 %) 
Availability of home health 721 141 865 1727 
service (for Models 2, 3 & 5) (42.9%) (35.8%) (32.9%) (36.7%) 
Transaction frequency 
Affiliation with HMO 633 254 1338 2225 
(37.5%) (64.5%) (50.9%) (47.3%) 
Affiliation with PPO 757 237 1510 2504 
(45.0%) (60.2%) (57.5%) (53.2%) 
Affiliation with HMO/PPO 909 294 1727 2930 
(54.1 %) (74.6%) (65.7%) (62.3%) 
Hospital characteristics 
With swing beds 798 35 337 1170 
(52.5%) (8.9%) (12.8%) (24.9%) 
Member of health system 513 184 989 1686 
(30.5%) (46.7%) (37.6%) (35.9%) 
Rural location 1103 98 1028 2229 
(65.6%) (24.9%) (39.1 %) (47.4%) 
Non-profit ownership 964 311 1520 2795 
(57.3%) (78.9%) (57.8%) (59.4%) 
Governmental ownership 591 54 676 1321 
(35.2%) (13.7%) (25.7%) (28.1 %) 
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Model Buildinji 
This section first describes the grouping and validation of the proposed variables 
by using exploratory factor analysis. Then findings of univariate logit regression 
analysis, cross-tabular analysis, and bivariate analysis are presented. Correlation analysis 
as well as collinearity diagnostics to detect possible collinearity problems are presented 
next. The dimensionalities of the finalized variables are identified by another factor 
analysis. 
Grouping the Proposed Variables by Exploratory Factor Analysis 
The major purpose of the study is to test the application of the three-construct 
theoretical model developed from Williamson's transaction cost economics to the linkage 
between hospitals and nursing homes. Whether the proposed variables tap the intended 
construct is critical to the assessment. Factor analysis is an appropriate statistical tool for 
testing the extent to which the multiple indicators measure the intended constructs. The 
theoretically-derived dimensionality is strongly supported if the variables proposed for a 
construct are grouped into one factor. 
Table 10 presents the results of orthogonal varimax rotated principal component 
factor analysis on all the proposed independent variables. Overall, the factor patterns 
concur with the proposed taxonomy. The nine variables were loaded on four 
unobservable common factors. Four factors explained 71.4% of the total variance, and 
the sum of eigenvalues was 6.424. The details follow. 
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Factor I accounted for 32.9% of the total variance, with an eigenvalue of 2.96. 
The area average hospital occupancy rate and individual hospital occupancy rate, which 
were proposed to measure transaction uncertainty and were grouped into Factor I, had 
factor loadings of 0.875 and 0.854, respectively. The high loadings indicated a strong 
relationship between the two indicators and the intended factor. Factor 2 accounted for 
14.2%, with an eigenvalue of 1.275. The ratio ofSNF beds to elderly population and the 
SNF occupancy rate, which were also proposed to measure transaction uncertainty, 
comprised Factor 2. Given the nature of the variables grouped together, Factor 1 could 
be labeled as "demand uncertainty" and Factor 2 as "supply uncertainty." 
Factor 3 accounted for 12.8% of total variances, with an eigenvalue of 1.152. 
Two of the three variables proposed to measure transaction frequency on Factor 3 had 
high factor loadings (HMO affiliation: 0.788; PPO affiliation: 0.875). The proportion of 
Medicare discharges had a moderate loading ( -0.337) on Factor 3. Therefore, Factor 3 
can represent transaction frequency. Finally, Factor 4 accounted for 11.5% of total 
variances, with an eigenvalue of 1.036. Two variables, the number of geriatric services 
and the home health service availability, were grouped together (factor loadings 0.733 
and 0.809, respectively.) Factor 4 represented transaction specificity. 
In summary, the results of factor analysis supported the variables proposed to 
measure their related constructs. The proposed variables appropriately measure the three 
dimensions of transactions suggested by Williamson. 
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Table 10 
Factor Analysis for Proposed Independent Variables 
Factor Loadings * Communalities 
ConstructsN ariables F, F2 F3 F4 h
2 
Transaction Uncertainty 
Area hospital occupancy rate 0.875 1 0.083 0.035 0.138 0.794 
Hospital occupancy rate 0.854 0.153 0.090 0.205 0.803 
SNF -beds-to-elderly-popu. ratio 0.041 0.931 1 0.072 0.078 0.880 
SNF occupancy rate 0.251 0.864 0.194 0.032 0.848 
Transaction Specificity 
Availability of home health service 0.165 0.047 0.096 0.733 1 0.577 
Number of geriatric services 0.018 0.047 0.075 0.809 0.662 
Transaction Frequency 
Proportion of Medicare discharges -0.472 -0.094 -0.337 0.121 0.360 
Affiliation with HMO 0.233 0.141 0.788 0.146 0.716 
Affiliation with PPO 0.010 0.097 0.875 0.099 0.785 
Factor contribution (eigenvalue) 2.961 1.275 1.152 1.036 6.424 
Variance explained(%) 32.9% 14.2% 12.8% 11.5% 71.4% 
* Vertical lines indicate large loadings. 
Validation of Proposed Variables 
Each variable was examined before being retained for the final multivariate logit 
regression models. In order to validate the nominal, ordinal, polynomous, and continuous 
variables with integer values, univariate logistic regression and a contingency table of 
outcome variables (y = 0, 1) versus the levels of the independent variables are provided. 
. 
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Univariate logistic regression was performed upon each of the independent 
variables except for cross-product terms. For nominal, ordinal, and continuous variables 
with fewer integer values, a contingency table with the chi-square test was generated 
(Hosmer & Lemeshow, 1989). The predicted probability of SNF integration by selected 
variables was plotted as supplemental to the contingency table. Bivariate analysis and 
collinearity diagnostics were performed to examine the relationships between individual 
variables as well as to detect potential collinearity problems. The dependent and 
independent variables of Model I (hierarchy/hybrid vs. market) were used to perform the 
validation procedure in preliminary analyses. 
Univariate logit regression analysis. Table II presents the results of univariate 
logit regression analysis of all proposed independent variables except two within­
construct interaction terms. The constant for each univariate regression model is not 
presented, since this information is unnecessary for the analysis. All proposed variables 
except the area average hospital occupancy rate had p-values at the .000 level, which was 
much smaller than the recommended .25 cutpoint of p-value (Bendel & Afifi, 1977). It is 
ascertained that all the proposed variables are associated with hospitals' make-or-buy 
decisions about SNF to some extent. Therefore, all proposed variables should be 
considered as candidates for predictor variables. 
The results of univariate logistic regression are further demonstrated by the 
probability plot. The probability scatterplot, done on the logit scale, is helpful in 
illustrating not only the potential importance but also the appropriate scale of a variable 
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(Hosmer & Lemeshow, 1989; Pindyck & Robinfeld, 1976). Examples are given of a 
continuous variable (Figure 4) and a polynomous variable (Figure 5). 
Table 11 
Univariate Lo2it Regression for Hierarchy/Hybrid vs. Market Groups 
ConstructsN ariables Expected Beta P-value Odds 
s1gn Ratio 
Transaction Uncertainty 
Area average hospital occupancy rate + 0.333 0.065 1.395 
Hospital occupancy rate + -1.191 0.000 0.304 
SNF -beds-to-elderly-popu. ratio -11.922 0.000 0.000 
SNF occupancy rate + -1.514 0.000 0.220 
Transaction Specificity 
Availability of home health service + 0.600 0.000 1.822 
Number of geriatric services + 0.261 0.000 1.298 
Transaction Frequency 
Proportion of Medicare discharges + 2.654 0.000 14.215 
Affiliation with HMO + -0.329 0.000 0.720 
Affiliation with PPO + -0.385 0.000 0.681 
Figure 4 shows the effect of Medicare discharges on the probability of SNF 
integration. The probability rose with the increase of Medicare patients. Hospitals 
without any Medicare patients were associated with .2 probability of vertical integration. 
When more then 50% of hospitals' discharged patients were Medicare beneficiaries, the 
probability rose to .50, an odds ratio equal to 1. The intercept indicates that hospitals 
with 50% or more Medicare patients were more likely to vertically integrate skilled 
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nursing facilities than were those with fewer than 50% Medicare patients. The 
probability of vertical integration for hospitals with the highest proportion of Medicare 
patients was .785, or an odds ratio of 3.65. 
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Figure 4. The Effect of Proportion of Medicare Discharges on Probability of 
Vertical Integration 
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Contingency table analysis. Contingency table analysis was employed to 
evaluate nominal, ordinal, and continuous variables with integer values. Taking the 
variable, number of geriatric services, as an example, Table 12 portrays a 16-cell table 
with the number of geriatric services ranging from 0 to 7. The far left of the table shows 
that 682 of the 1,836 hospitals (37.1%) that provided no geriatric services chose 
hierarchy/hybrid arrangements of SNF. Among the hospitals that offered three items of 
geriatric services, more than half (180 out of 340) were in the hierarchy or hybrid group. 
A majority (131 out of 135, or 97%) of hospitals that offered 7 items of geriatric services 
were in the hierarchy/hybrid group. 
Table 12 
Contingency Table by Arran�ement of SNF and Number of Geriatric Services 
Arran�ement of SNF 
0 
Market 1154 
Hierarchy 682 
/Hybrid 
767 
559 
Number of Geriatric Services 
2 3 4 
397 85 
327 98 
5 6 
40 21 
66 32 
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7 
Total 1836 1326 724 340 183 106 53 135 
Likelihood Ratio 259.04; P-value =.000 
Obviously, hospitals that offered more than three geriatric services tended to 
employ hybrid or hierarchical arrangements. The association becomes stronger as the 
number of available geriatric services increases. The chi-square test also supports an 
association between the SNF arrangement and the number of geriatric services (not 
reported). It can be concluded that the probability of taking vertical integration grows 
with an increasing number of geriatric services. 
Figure 5 illustrates a better picture of a probability plot, on a 0-to-7 scale, as 
compared to Figure 4, on a 0-to-1 00 scale. The probability for a hospital to integrate 
SNF services was .357 if it provided no geriatric service. The probability increased to 
.549 (OR> 1) if a hospital offered three geriatric services items. If a hospital provided 
seven items of geriatric services, it was very likely to adopt the hierarchy arrangement 
(probability= .775, OR= 3.44). 
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Figure 5. The Effect ofNumber of Geriatric Services on Probability of 
Vertical Integration 
Table 13 depicts how the probability of a hospital's integration with a SNF 
increased along with an increase in the number of geriatric services at the hospital. For 
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example, the probability increased from .357 to .419 between a hospital that provided no 
geriatric services and a hospital that provided one item of geriatric services. 
Table 13 
Probability of SNF Integration by Change in Number of Geriatric Services 
Geriatric Probability Odds Ratio Number of Hospitals 
services 
0 0.357 0.556 1836 
0.419 0.721 1326 
2 0.484 0.936 724 
3 0.549 1.216 340 
4 0.612 1.578 183 
5 0.672 2.048 106 
6 0.727 1.946 53 
7 0.775 3.460 135 
Bivariate analysis. Correlation analysis was performed to detect potential 
collinearity problems. Table 14 presents the correlation matrix of the proposed 
independent variables. The relationship between each two proposed variables was 
examined without controlling for other variables. 
Overall, all variables were moderately and positively correlated except the 
proportion of Medicare discharges (MCR_D). The availability of home health services 
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(HOME _ I ) had the least correlated relationship with other variables. It should be noted 
that the within-construct variables were more highly correlated than the between-
construct variables. For example, the four variables representing transaction uncertainty 
were highly interrelated: individual hospital occupancy rate (H _ OPY) and area average 
hospital occupancy rate (AH _ OPY) had a correlation coefficient of 0.6887 (p = .00 I); 
another high correlation coefficient, 0.6965, was found between the ratio of skilled 
nursing beds to elderly population (SNF _OLD) and the area SNF beds occupancy rate 
(SNF _OPY). 
Table 14 
Correlation Matrix for Proposed Independent Variables 
AH OPY H OPY SNF OLD 
AH OPY 
H OPY 0.6887 
P=.OOO 
SNF OLD 0.1478 0.1942 
P= .000 P= .000 
SNF OPY 0.291 0.3657 
P=.OOO P=.OOO 
Gl INDX 0.2074 0.2413 
P=.OOO P=.OOO 
HOME 0.1259 0.2002 
P=.OOO P=.OOO 
MCR D -0.2288 -0.2912 
P=.OOO P= .000 
HMO 0.2861 0.3071 
P=.OOO P=.OOO 
PPO 0.1222 0.1795 
P=.OOO P=.OOO 
Note. 4,703 observations in all cells. 
0.6965 
P=.OOO 
0.121 
P=.OOO 
0.1026 
P=.OOO 
-0.1495 
P=.OOO 
0.2156 
P=.OOO 
0.1655 
P=.OOO 
SNF OPY GI INDX 
- -
0.1273 
P= .000 
0.0907 0.2633 
P= .000 P=.OOO 
-0.2275 -0.104 
HOME 
-0.0691 
P= .000 P=.OOO P=.OOO 
0.325 
P= .000 
0.2613 
P= .000 
0.2095 
P=.OOO 
0.1402 
P=.OOO 
0.1566 
P= .000 
0.1375 
P= .000 
MCR D HMO 
-0.2351 
P=.OOO 
-0.1798 0.5244 
P= .000 P= .000 
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PPO 
HMO affiliation and PPO affiliation, likewise, were highly correlated. The high 
correlation coefficients only imply rather than confirm the existence of collinearity. Two 
variables are considered collinear with each other only when their correlation coefficient 
reaches 0.95, which means one of the variables can convey essentially all of the 
information contained in the other (Afifi & Clark, 1990). 
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Collinearity dia!inostic analysis. The results of collinearity diagnostic are shown 
in Table 15. Two rules were followed to determine whether collinearity existed among 
variables. The first section of Table 15 shows, for certain variables, the amounts of 
variance that are explained by each group. Across a group, any pair of variables that have 
similar amounts of variance are considered collinear (Andrew, 1992). The second rule 
states that the variable with the smallest tolerance, or the largest values of variance 
inflation factor (VIF), may have collinearity problems (Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 
1990). 
Applying the first rule, three pairs of variables might be collinear -- area average 
hospital occupancy rate (.407) and individual hospital occupancy rate (.760) in group 6; 
ratio ofSNF-bed-to-elderly-population (.538) and SNF occupancy rate (.828) in group 8; 
and HMO affiliation (.587) and PPO affiliation (.720) in group 9. Applying the second 
rule, SNF occupancy rate has the smallest tolerance (0.437), and the largest VIF (2.290), 
and hospital occupancy rate has the second smallest tolerance (0.466) and the second 
largest VIF (2.144). 
The results of the correlation matrix and collinearity diagnostics were taken into 
account in deciding which variables were highly collinear with others. Individual 
hospital occupancy rate and SNF occupancy rate were both highly correlated with other 
variables, and had small tolerances and large VIF. In order to stabilize the estimated 
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regression coefficients, hospital occupancy rate and skilled nursing bed occupancy rate 
were removed from the original models (Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1990). Since the 
nature of HMO affiliation and of PPO affiliation were different and their VIF values were 
not higher than those of other variables, both were retained. 
Table 15 
MultiQollinearit� Diagnostic for PropQsed lndepend�nt Variables 
Group 
1 
2 
" .) 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Tolerance 
VIF 
AH OPY H OPY 
- -
0.001 0.001 
0.002 0.002 
0.000 0.000 
0.002 0.001 
0.005 0.004 
0.002 0.005 
0.023 0.109 
0.027 0.068 
0.407 0.760 
0.532 0.050 
0.514 0.466 
1.946 2.144 
SNF 
OLD 
0.003 
0.000 
0.041 
0.217 
0.019 
0.009 
0.168 
0.538 
0.003 
0.003 
0.506 
1.978 
Note. Large values are in bold type. 
SNF GI HOME 1 
OPY INDX 
0.002 0.005 0.004 
0.000 0.003 0.015 
0.017 0.711 0.028 
0.045 0.143 0.026 
0.000 0.091 0.897 
0.000 0.024 0.004 
0.104 0.011 0.000 
0.828 0.010 0.012 
0.002 0.000 0.001 
0.002 0.001 0.013 
0.437 0.874 0.899 
2.290 1.145 1.113 
Horizontal lines indicate large variance in those horizontal groups. 
MCR D HMO PPO 
0.001 0.004 0.004 
0.018 0.243 0.166 
0.001 0.000 0.005 
0.014 0.014 0.063 
0.016 0.002 0.000 
0.002 0.587 0.720 
0.198 0.142 0.008 
0.058 0.002 0.011 
0.295 0.002 0.001 
0.396 0.004 0.021 
0.879 0.639 0.706 
1.137 1.564 1.416 
Dimensionalization of modified variables. Factor analysis was performed again 
with two variables -- individual hospital occupancy rate and area SNF occupancy rate --
deleted because of their collinearity. The seven remaining variables were grouped into 
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three factors as shown in Table 16. Two variables, HMO affiliation and PPO affiliation, 
were identified as Factor I, accounting for 30.9% of the total variance. Three variables, 
area hospital occupancy rate, the ratio of SNF beds to elderly population, and the 
proportion of Medicare discharges, comprised Factor 2, explaining 15.3% of the total 
variance. The number of geriatric services and the availability of home health services 
were grouped into Factor 3, accounting for 13.7% of the total variance. Compared to the 
results of factor analysis in Table I 0, less of the total variance was explained. 
Nevertheless, three factor patterns tapped the proposed constructs fairly well. 
Table 16 
Factor Anal�sis for Modified Independent Variables 
Factor Loadings* Communalities 
ConstructsN ariables Fl F2 F3 h
2 
Transaction Uncertainty 
Area hospital occupancy rate 0.005 0.729 1 0.236 0.588 
SNF-beds-to-elderly-popu. ratio 0.246 0.421 0.090 0.246 
Transaction Specificity 
Number of geriatric services 0.063 0.200 0.746 1 0.601 
Availability of home health service 0.116 -0.031 0.799 0.652 
Transaction Frequency 
Proportion of Medicare discharges -0.135 -0.743 1 0.094 0.579 
Affiliation with HMO 0.784 0.289 0.141 0.718 
Affiliation with PPO 0.896 0.043 0.062 0.809 
Factor contribution (eigenvalue) 2.161 1.071 .961 4.193 
Variance explained (%) 30.9% 15.3% 13.7% 59.6% 
*Vertical lines indicate large loadings. 
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Multivariate Logistic Regression Analyses 
Two-phase multivariate logistic regression was performed to examine the 
simultaneous influences of the three constructs on the likelihood of SNF integration. 
Five primary models were analyzed at the first stage; analysis of the two models that 
included only the first-order and the second-order interaction effects followed at the 
second stage. This section first briefly introduces the model refinement. The results of 
the five primary models and the two interaction models are then reported. 
Refinement of Models 
In the initial run, the seven variables surviving the validation procedure were 
entered into the multivariate logistic regression model. The expected signs and 
significance levels for all variables and a statistical summary of each model were 
examined. Among all independent and control variables across all the five primary 
models, variables of the frequency construct had the smallest effects on hospitals' vertical 
integration. Of the three variables, only Medicare discharge proportion was influential on 
hospitals' integration decisions. Almost every variable in the constructs of transaction 
uncertainty and transaction specificity was significantly associated with SNF integration. 
However, the chi-square goodness-of-fit was not satisfactory. To improve the model fit, 
two dummy variables, HMO affiliation and PPO affiliation, were combined into one 
variable, HMO/PPO, to represent a hospital's involvement with managed care. 
HMO/PPO was coded as I if a hospital was affiliated with either HMOs or PPOs. 
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Although HMOs and PPOs differ in nature, they are both likely to pressure hospitals to 
discharge patients as soon as their stay is no longer medically necessary. 
Phase One: Five Primary Multivariate Lo�istic Re2ression Models 
Tables 17-21 present the results of the five primary multivariate logistic 
regression models, and show the likelihood of vertical integration of a skilled nursing 
facility to be contingent on transaction uncertainty, transaction specificity, and transaction 
frequency while controlling for seven hospital characteristics. The results of Model 1, 
which compared the hierarchy/hybrid and market groups, are presented in Table 17; the 
results of Model 2, which compared the hierarchy with market groups, are in Table 18; 
the results of Model 3, which compared the hierarchy and hybrid groups, are in 
Table 19; the results of Model 4, which compared the hybrid and market groups, are in 
Table 20; the results of Model 5, which compared the hierarchy and hybrid/market 
groups, are in Table 21. Finally, Table 24 summarizes the results of the five primary 
models. 
Model I: Hierarchy and hybrid vs. market. All of the variables that measured 
transaction uncertainty were statistically significantly associated with a higher likelihood 
of vertical integration (Table 17). Area average hospital occupancy was statistically 
significant and positively associated with the event (p = .000). Hospitals located in 
market areas with higher hospital occupancy were about 37% more likely to employ the 
hierarchy or hybrid arrangement for every 10% increase in average occupancy rate, as 
compared to those located in areas with relatively lower hospital occupancy (OR= 1.37; 
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95% CIE: 1.30, 1.44 ). The ratio of SNF beds to elderly population was negatively 
associated with the probability of vertical integration (p = .000; OR= 0.81; 95% CIE: 
0.76, 0.86), meaning a hospital was less likely to integrate a SNF in a market area that 
had a higher ratio of SNF beds to elderly population. The interaction of the below­
poverty-level-population and SNF bed supply was positively related to SNF integration 
(p=.OOI, OR= 1.00; 95% CIE: 1.00, 1.00). 
Two variables measuring transaction specificity both had significant and positive 
relationships with the likelihood of vertical integration. For every additional item of 
geriatric service a hospital offered, there was about 41% greater likelihood that it would 
use a hierarchy or hybrid arrangement (p = .000; OR= 1.41; 95% CIE: 1.34, 1.4 7). 
Hospitals offering home care services (either in-house or through contract/joint venture) 
were almost 1.8 times as likely to vertically integrate a SNF as were hospitals that did not 
offer home care services (p = .000; OR= 1.81; 95% CIE: 1.55, 2.1 0). 
Only one out of the three variables that measured transaction frequency was 
significantly and positively associated with the probability of vertical integration. For 
every 10% increase in elderly patients served, hospitals were about 13% more likely to 
take control over the SNF services, as compared to hospitals with relatively smaller 
proportions of Medicare patients (p = .00 I; OR= 1.13; 95% CIE: 1.05, 1.23). Neither 
affiliation with managed care organizations nor the cross-term of Medicare discharges 
and hospital size had significant impact on SNF integration. 
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Table 17 
Model I: Likelihood of SNF Integration : Hierarchy/Hybrid vs. Market Groups 
ili=4,7Q3) 
ConstructsN ariables Expected Beta P-Value Odds 95% CIE 
Sign Ratio 
Transaction Uncertainty 
Area hospital occupancy rate + 3.125 0.000 1.37* 1.30, 1.44 
SNF -beds-to-elderly-popu. ratio -0.213 0.000 0.81 0.76, 0.86 
Cross term of% of poor persons + 0.000 0.001 1.00 1.00, 1.00 
and ratio of beds to elderly popu. 
Transaction Specificity 
Number of geriatric services + 0.341 0.000 1.41 1.34, 1.47 
Availability of home care service + 0.591 0.000 1.82 1.55, 2.10 
Transaction Frequency 
Proportion of Medicare discharges + 1.258 0.001 1.13* 1.05, 1.23 
Affiliation with HMO/PPO + 0.067 0.400 1.07 0.91, 1.25 
Cross term of Medicare discharges and + 0.001 0.696 1.00 1.00, 1.00 
hospital size 
Control Variables 
State CON stringency score -0.064 0.000 0.94 0.92, 0.96 
Beds set up and staffed -0.001 0.074 1.00** 0.89, 1.00 
Availability of swing beds 1.439 0.000 4.22 3.49,5.10 
Member of health system 0.054 0.488 1.06 0.91, 1.23 
Located in rural area 0.597 0.000 1.82 1.51,2.19 
Governmental ownership 0.400 0.003 1.49 1.14, 1.94 
Not-for-profit ownership 0.433 0.000 1.54 1.22, 1.95 
Constant -4.308 0.000 
Goodness of Fit Statistic 
Chi-Square (15 dt) 1154.1 (p = .000) 
Correct Classification Rate 70.23% 
* Odds ratio and 95% C.I.E. based on continuous interval= I 0%. 
** Odds ratio and 95% C.I.E. based on continuous interval= 50 beds. 
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Overall, Model I was successful in testing the theory, according to goodness of fit 
statistics. The correct classification rate as shown in the classification table, which 
indicates the number of correctly predicted ("concordant") cases, is one of the goodness 
of fit indices. A total of 70.23% of the observations in Model I were classified correctly. 
The model chi-square value was 1154.1 with 16 degrees of freedom. The inclusion of 
continuous variables in this study created numerous covariate patterns, which may cause 
the extremely high chi-square value. The dependent and independent variables of Model 
1 (hierarchy/hybrid vs. market) were used to evaluate first-order and second-order 
interaction effects in Model 6 and Model 7. 
Model 2: Hierarchy vs. market. Table 18 presents the likelihood of integrating a 
SNF for the hierarchy and market groups. The results were very similar to those for the 
previous model. All of the variables that measured transaction uncertainty had significant 
and independent relationships with the likelihood of integration. Hospitals located in 
market areas with higher hospital occupancy were about 41% more likely to employ the 
hierarchy arrangement for every 10% increase in average occupancy rate, as compared to 
those located in areas with relatively lower hospital occupancy (p = .000; OR= 1.41; 
95% CIE: 1.33, 1.49). The ratio of SNF beds to elderly population, which measured the 
supply of SNF beds, had a significant and negative association with SNF integration (p = 
.000; OR= .79; 95% CIE: 0.74, 0.84). The variable measuring nursing homes' behaviors 
had a significantly positive, but light impact on SNF integration (p = .000; OR= 1.00; 
95% CIE: 1.00, 1.00). 
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Two variables (the number of geriatric services and the availability of home care 
services) that represented transaction specificity had significant and positive effects on 
SNF integration. For every additional item of geriatric services that hospitals offered, a 
hospital was 36% more likely to adopt a hierarchical arrangement for SNF services 
(p = .000; OR= 1.36; 95% CIE: 1.28, 1.44). The availability of home care service, 
another transaction specificity variable, also had a significant and positive association 
with SNF integration. Hospitals with home care services were 37% more likely to have 
hospital-owned SNFs than were those without home services (p = .000; OR= 1.37; 95% 
CIE: 1.18, 1.60). 
Of the three variables measuring transaction frequency, only the Medicare 
discharge proportion was positively associated with SNF integration. For every I 0% 
increase in elderly patients served, hospitals were about 14% more likely to have 
hierarchical arrangements for SNF services, as compared to hospitals with relatively 
smaller proportions of Medicare patients (p = .000; OR= 1.14; 95% CIE: 1.05, 1.23 ). 
Neither affiliation with managed care organizations nor the cross-product term of 
Medicare discharges and hospital size had any impact on the probability of SNF 
integration. 
The higher chi-square value (X2 = 1,138.7, p = .000) indicates an unsatisfactory 
model fit. The high chi-square may be due to the inclusion of many continuous variables 
in the model. Nonetheless, comparing the predicted probabilities and observed responses, 
the 72.69% correct classification rate indicates a high prediction accuracy. 
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Table 18 
Model 2: Likelihood of SNF Inte�ration: Hierarchy vs. Market Groups (N=4.703) 
ConstructsN ariables Expected Beta P-Value Odds 95% CIE 
Sign Ratio 
Transaction Uncertainty 
Area hospital occupancy rate + 3.411 0.000 1.41 * 1.33, 1.49 
SNF -beds-to-elderly-popu. ratio -0.239 0.000 0.79 0.74, 0.84 
Cross term of % of poor persons + 0.001 0.000 1.00 1.00, 1.00 
and ratio of beds to elderly popu. 
Transaction Specificity 
Number of geriatric services + 0.305 0.000 1.36 1.28, 1.44 
Availability of home care service + 0.317 0.000 1.37 1.18, 1.60 
Transaction Frequency 
Proportion of Medicare discharges + 1.270 0.003 1.14* 1.05, 1.23 
Affiliation with HMO/PPO + 0.123 0.149 1.13 0.96, 1.34 
Cross term of Medicare discharges and + 0.003 0.227 1.00 1.00, 1.0 I 
hospital size 
Control Variables 
State CON stringency score -0.079 0.000 0.92 0.90, 0.94 
Beds set up and staffed -0.002 0.021 0.99** 0.85, 0.99 
Availability of swing beds 1.516 0.000 4.55 3.75, 5.53 
Member of health system 0.033 0.699 1.03 0.87, 1.22 
Located in rural area 0.700 0.000 2.01 1.65, 2.46 
Governmental ownership 0.358 0.013 1.43 1.08, 1.90 
Not-for-profit ownership 0.380 0.003 1.46 1.14, 1.88 
Constant -4.385 0.000 
Goodness of Fit Statistic 
Chi-Square (15 dt) 1138.7 (p = .000) 
Correct Classification Rate 72.69% 
* Odds ratio and 95% C. I.E. based on continuous interval= I 0%. 
** Odds ratio and 95% C.I.E. based on continuous interval= 50 beds. 
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Model 3: Hierarchy vs. hybrid. The comparison of hierarchy and hybrid was 
focused on two groups with different degrees of SNF integration. Table 19 presents how 
the three transaction constructs influenced hospitals' forms of SNF services. All of the 
three variables measuring transaction uncertainty were significantly associated with a 
higher likelihood of SNF integration. Hospitals located in market areas with higher 
hospital occupancy were about 21% more likely to employ fully owned SNF services for 
every I 0% increase in average occupancy rate, as compared to those located in areas with 
relatively lower hospital occupancy (p = .00 I; OR= 1.21; 95% CIE: 1.08, 1.35). The 
ratio of SNF beds to elderly population was negatively associated with the probability of 
integration, meaning that a hospital was less likely to integrate SNF in a market area with 
a higher ratio of SNF beds to elderly population (p = .000; OR= .69; 95% CIE: 0.60, 
0.80). The last variable, the cross-product term of below-poverty-level population and 
the availability of SNF beds, was significantly associated with the likelihood of 
integration (p = .00 I; OR= 1.00; 95% CIE: 1.00, 1.00). 
With respect to the two variables measuring asset specificity, hospitals that 
provided home health care services were about 55% more likely to own SNFs than were 
those that contracted out for home health care services (p = .001; OR= 1.55; 95% CIE: 
1.19, 2.02). The number of geriatric services a hospital offered was marginally 
significantly associated with the likelihood of SNF integration (p = .080; OR= 1.09; 95% 
CIE: 0.99, 1.19). 
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Table 19 
Model3: Likelihood of SNF Inte[iration: Hierarchy vs. Hybrid Groups (N=2.075) 
ConstructsN ariables 
Transaction Uncertainty 
Area hospital occupancy rate 
SNF -beds-to-elderly-popu. ratio 
Cross term of % of poor persons 
and ratio of beds to elderly 
Transaction Specificity 
Number of geriatric services 
Availability of home care service 
Transaction Frequency 
Proportion of Medicare discharges 
Affiliation with HMO/PPO 
Expected 
Sign 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Beta 
I .888 
-0.371 
0.001 
0.082 
0.437 
1.474 
0.115 
Cross term of Medicare discharges and + 0.003 
hospital size 
Control Variables 
State CON stringency score -0.101 
Beds set up and staffed -0.002 
Availability of swing bed 1.401 
Member of health system -0.185 
Located in rural area 0.869 
Governmental ownership 0.164 
Not-for-profit ownership -0.347 
Constant -0.748 
Goodness of Fit Statistic 
Chi-Square ( 15 df) 416.0 (p= .000) 
Correct Classification Rate 81.40% 
P-Value 
0.001 
0.000 
0.001 
0.080 
0.001 
0.066 
0.473 
0.351 
0.000 
0.099 
0.000 
0.181 
0.000 
0.569 
0. !55 
0.171 
* Odds ratio and 95% C. I.E. based on continuous interval= I 0%. 
Odds 
Ratio 
I .21 * 
0.69 
1.00 
1.09 
I .55 
I. 16* 
1.12 
1.00 
0.90 
0.99** 
4.06 
0.83 
2.38 
1.18 
0.71 
** Odds ratio and 95% C.I.E. based on continuous interval= 50 beds. 
95% CIE 
I .08, I .35 
0.60, 0.80 
I .00, I .00 
0.99, 1.19 
1.19, 2.02 
0.99, I .36 
0.82, I .53 
1.00, 1.0 I 
0.87, 0.94 
0.80. 1.02 
2.60, 6.34 
0.63, I .09 
I .65. 3.44 
0.67, 2.07 
0.44, 1.14 
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None of the transaction frequency variables had a significant association with the 
likelihood of SNF integration. However, the proportion of Medicare discharges tended to 
be positively associated with SNF integration (p = .066). In other words, hospitals that 
served more Medicare beneficiaries tended to seek more control over the SNF. 
The chi-square of 416.0 was much smaller than that in the previous two models. 
The substantial drop of the chi-square value may be due to the reduced number of cases. 
Comparing the predicted probabilities and observed responses, overall, 81.40% were 
correct. 
Model 4: Hybrid vs. market. This model examined the likelihood of vertical 
integration in the hybrid and market groups (Table 20). Two out of the three variables 
measuring transaction uncertainty and both variables measuring transaction specificity 
were significantly associated with the event of integration. None of the variables from 
the transaction frequency construct had any association with SNF integration. 
Area hospital occupancy rate, which measured transaction uncertainty, was, as 
expected, positively associated with the probability of integration. Hospitals located in 
market areas with higher hospital occupancy were about 15% more likely to employ 
vertical integration arrangements for SNF services for every 10% increase in average 
occupancy rate, as compared to those located in areas with relatively lower hospital 
occupancy (p = .022; OR= 1.15; 95% CIE: 1.02, 1.29). The cross-product term of the 
below-poverty-level-population and the ratio of SNF beds to elderly population was 
significantly but negatively (i.e., opposite to the expected sign) associated with 
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integration. This finding indicates that hospitals were less likely to employ SNF 
integration if confronting SNF providers' behavioral uncertainty. Nonetheless, the 
probabilities of selecting either option (hybrid or market form) were very close (p = .021; 
OR= 1.00; 95% CIE: 1.00, 1.00). 
Both variables that represented transaction specificity had a significant and 
positive association with SNF integration. For every additional item of geriatric service 
hospitals offered their patients, hospitals were 68% more likely to use a hierarchical 
arrangement for SNF services (p = .000; OR= 1.68; 95% CIE: 1.57, 1.79). Home care 
service, another transaction specificity variable, also had a significant and positive impact 
on SNF integration. Hospitals with hospital-based or contracted home services were 
almost 4.16 times as likely to own a SNF as were those without home services (p = .000; 
OR= 4.16; 95% CIE: 2.81, 6.14). 
Model 4 had a relatively lower chi-square of 516.5 as compared with the previous 
models. The correct prediction percentage was much higher than for the previous three 
models. In total, 89% of observations were correctly classified. 
Model 5: Hierarchy vs. hybrid and market. Model 5 tested the probability of 
using vertical integration for the hierarchy group and for the hybrid/market group (Table 
21 ). All transaction uncertainty variables were significantly associated with SNF 
integration. Hospitals located in market areas with higher hospital occupancy were about 
39% more likely to vertically integrate SNF services for every I 0% increase in average 
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Table 20 
Model 4: Likelihood of SNF Inte2ration: Hybrid vs. Market Groups (N=3.022) 
ConstructsN ariables Expected Beta P-Value Odds 95% CIE 
Sign Ratio 
Transaction Uncertainty 
Area hospital occupancy rate + 1.374 0.022 1.15* 1.02, 1.29 
SNF -beds-to-elderly-popu. ratio 0.146 0.082 1.16 0.98, 1.36 
Cross term of % of poor persons + -0.001 0.021 1.00 1.00, 1.00 
and ratio of beds to elderly popu. 
Transaction Specificity 
Number of geriatric services + 0.516 0.000 1.68 1.57, 1.79 
Availability of home care service + 1.425 0.000 4.16 2.81, 6.14 
Transaction Frequency 
Proportion of Medicare discharges + 0.058 0.946 1.01 * 0.85, 1.19 
Affiliation with HMO/PPO + -0.114 0.468 0.89 0.66, 1.21 
Cross term of Medicare discharges and + -0.002 0.578 1.00 0.99, 1.00 
hospital size 
Control Variables 
State CON stringency score 0.024 0.217 1.03 0.99, 1.06 
Beds set up and staffed -0.001 0.517 0.99** 0.88, 1.07 
Availability of swing beds 0.148 0.526 1.16 0.73, 1.83 
Member of health system 0.278 0.035 1.32 1.02, 1.71 
Located in rural area -0.035 0.857 0.97 0.66, 1.41 
Governmental ownership 0.185 0.512 1.20 0.69, 2.09 
Not-for-profit ownership 0.477 0.041 1.61 1.02, 2.54 
Constant -5.137 0.000 
Goodness of Fit Statistic 
Chi-Square (15 df) 516.5 (p = .000) 
Correct Classification Rate 89.48% 
* Odds ratio and 95% C.I.E. based on continuous interval= 10%. 
* * Odds ratio and 95% C.I.E. based on continuous interval = 50 beds. 
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occupancy rate, as compared to those located in areas with relatively lower hospital 
occupancy (p = .000; OR= 1.39; 95% CIE: 1.13, 1.4 7). The ratio of SNF beds to elderly 
population had a negative influence on hospitals' decisions to use hierarchical 
arrangements (p = .000; OR= 0.78; 95% CIE: 0.73, 0.82). The cross-product term of the 
percentage of population below the poverty level and the ratio of SNF beds to elderly 
population had a positive impact on the event. This finding indicates that hospitals facing 
·higher behavioral uncertainty of nursing home providers were almost equally as likely to 
take control of SNF services as were those that did not confront such uncertainty (p = 
.000; OR= 1.00; 95% CIE: 1.00, 1.00). Nonetheless, the behavioral uncertainty of 
nursing home providers still contributed to the likelihood of SNF integration. 
Two variables measuring transaction specificity both had significant and positive 
relationships with the likelihood of vertical integration. For every additional item of 
geriatric service a hospital offered, it was 31% more likely to use the hierarchical form of 
SNF services (p = .000, OR= 1.31; 95% CIE: 1.24, 1.39). Hospitals offering home care 
services were almost 40% more likely to vertically integrate a SNF than were hospitals 
that did not offer home care services (p = .000; OR= 1.40; 95% CIE: 1.21, 1.62). 
Only one transaction frequency variable turned out to be significant. For every 
I 0% increase in elderly patients served, hospitals were about 14% more likely to take 
control over the SNF services, as compared to hospitals with relatively smaller 
proportions of Medicare patients (p = .00 I; OR= 1.14; 95% CIE: 1.05, 1.24). Neither 
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Table 21 
MQds:l 5; Liks:lihQQd Qf SNF Ints:gratiQn; His:rar�h:Y vs. H:Ybrid/Market GrQups (N=4, 703) 
Constructs/Variables Expected Beta P-Value Odds 95% CIE 
Sign Ratio 
Transaction Uncertainty 
Area hospital occupancy rate + 3.283 0.000 1.39* 1.31, 1.47 
SNF -beds-to-elderly-popu. ratio -0.254 0.000 0.78 0.73, 0.82 
Cross term of % of poor persons + 0.001 0.000 1.00 1.00, 1.00 
and ratio of beds to elderly popu. 
Transaction Specificity 
Number of geriatric services + 0.272 0.000 1.31 1.24, 1.39 
Availability of home care service + 0.339 0.000 1.40 1.21' 1.62 
Transaction Frequency 
Proportion of Medicare discharges + 1.332 0.001 1.14* 1.05, 1.24 
Affiliation with HMO/PPO + 0.128 0.124 1.14 0.97, 1.34 
Cross term of Medicare discharges and + 0.002 0.298 1.00 1.00, 1.01 
hospital size 
Control Variables 
State CON stringency score -0.079 0.000 0.92 0.90, 0.94 
Beds set up and staffed -0.002 0.016 0.99** 0.85, 0.99 
Availability of swing beds 1.491 0.000 4.44 3.68, 5.36 
Member of health system -0.011 0.899 0.99 0.84, 1.16 
Located in rural area 0.713 0.000 2.04 1.68, 2.48 
Governmental ownership 0.316 0.026 1.37 1.05, 1.79 
Not-for-profit ownership 0.295 0.020 1.34 1.05, I. 72 
Constant -4.345 0.000 
Goodness of Fit Statistic 
Chi-Square (15 df) 1209.6 (p = .000) 
Correct Classification Rate 74.17% 
* Odds ratio and 95% C. I.E. based on continuous interval = 10%. 
** Odds ratio and 95% C.I.E. based on continuous interval= 50 beds. 
HMO/PPO affiliation nor the interaction of Medicare discharges and hospital size had 
any impact. 
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Overall, Model 5 was successful in testing the theory, according to goodness of fit 
statistics. The model chi-square was I ,209.6 with 15 degrees of freedom (p = .000). 
About 74.17% of cases were correctly predicted. 
Phase Two: Models with Inter-Construct Interaction Effects 
Tables 22 and 23 present the results for the second stage of multivariate logistic 
regression analysis, which examined the inter-construct interaction effects on the 
likelihood of SNF integration. For each construct in Model I, the variable with the 
highest odds ratio and/or the greatest partial R2 was selected for the second stage of 
multivariate logistic regression models. The rationale behind this selection was that a 
variable with the greater predictive power (as judged by high odds ratios and partial R2) 
was assumed to be the most representative of a construct. These variables, named as 
"Interactors," were used to test the conceptual model. 
For the first-order interaction model, three interactors were created. For each 
interactor, the most representing variable was selected from each of two of the three 
constructs; these three pairs were each multiplied, to create the Interactors. For the 
second-order interaction model, variables from each of three constructs were multiplied 
to form one interactor. Using the selection rules, the variables of area average hospital 
occupancy rate, home care service, and proportion of Medicare discharges were chosen to 
represent the respective constructs. 
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Hierarchy/hybrid vs. market arrangements were the two forms compared. 
Because the interaction terms were the focal interest, they were considered as 
"independent predictors" instead of confounders, and the variables that had been 
hypothesized to have main effects (e.g., area average hospital occupancy) were removed 
from the models. The applicability of keeping only the interaction terms in a logistic 
regression model has been confirmed by other studies (Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990; 
Pindyck & Robinfeld, 1976). 
Model 6: First-order interaction. Table 22 presents the likelihood of SNF 
integration, using the first-order interaction term without measuring main effects while 
controlling for seven hospital characteristic variables. Two out of the three interactors 
had significant associations with SNF integration. Interactor AH_orv x GI_INDX• the 
interaction term of the area hospital occupancy rate and the ratio of SNF beds to elderly 
population, was significantly and positively associated with the hospital's decision to 
integrate (p = .000; OR= 1.65; 95% CIE: 1.43, 1.89). InteractorGI_INDX x MCR_D• the 
interaction of the number of geriatric services and the proportion of Medicare discharges, 
also had a significant impact on SNF integration (p = .000; OR= 39.05; 95% CIE: 17.84, 
85.50). A hospital was more likely to use vertical integration if it provided more geriatric 
services and had more Medicare discharges. 
Overall, Model 6 was successful in testing the theory, according to goodness of fit 
statistics. The model chi-square was 978.7 with I 0 degrees of freedom (p = .000). About 
70% of cases were correctly predicted. 
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Table 22 
Model 6: Likelihood of SNF lnte�ration with the First-Order Interaction Terms 
(Hierarchy/Hybrid vs. Market. N=4.703) 
Variables Expected Beta P-Value Odds 95% CIE 
Sign Ratio 
Interaction Effects 
InteractorAH_orv x GI_INDX + 0.499 0.000 1.65 1.43, 1.89 
InteractorAH_OPY x MCR_D + 0.104 0.361 1.11 0.89, 1.39 
InteractorGI INDX x MCR_D + 3.665 0.000 39.05 17.84, 85.50 
Control Variables 
State CON stringency score -0.064 0.000 0.94 0.92, 0.96 
Beds set up and staffed -0.001 0.032 1.00 0.95, 1.00 
Availability of swing beds 1.392 0.000 4.02 3.38, 4.79 
Member of health system 0.101 0.190 I. II 0.95, 1.29 
Located in rural area 0.564 0.000 1.76 1.49, 2.08 
Governmental ownership 0.501 0.000 1.65 1.28, 2.13 
Not-for-profit ownership 0.581 0.000 1.79 1.43, 2.24 
Constant -2.167 0.000 
Goodness of fit Statistic 
Chi-Square (I 0 df) 978.7 (p =.000) 
Correct Classification Rate 69.85% 
Model 7: Second-order interaction. The interaction effect of the same three 
variables selected for the first-order interaction model was tested in the second-order 
interaction model. Table 23 presents results of the hypothesis testing. The interaction 
effect was significantly and positively associated with SNF integration (p = .000; OR= 
ISO 
4.40; 95% CIE: 3.67, 5.27). Hospitals located in areas with high average hospital 
occupancy and having more geriatric services and a higher proportion of Medicare 
discharges were more likely to vertically integrate SNF services. In other words, 
hospitals with high levels of all three variables are the most likely candidates for 
hierarchy or hybrid groups. 
Table 23 
Model 7: Likelihood of SNF Intefiration with the Second Order Interaction Term 
(Hierarchy/Hybrid vs. Market. N=4.703) 
Variables 
Interaction Effects 
Interactor AH_OPY x Gl INDX x MCR o 
Control Variables 
State CON stringency score 
Beds set up and staffed 
Availability of swing beds 
Member of health system 
Located in rural area 
Governmental ownership 
Not-for-profit ownership 
Constant 
Goodness of fit Statistic 
Chi-Square (I 0 df) 
Correct Classification Rate 
Expected Beta 
Sign 
+ 1.481 
-0.047 
0.000 
1.395 
0.099 
0.466 
0.485 
0.634 
-1.420 
880.8 (p =.000) 
69.53% 
P-Value Odds 95% CIE 
Ratio 
0.000 4.40 3.67, 5.27 
0.000 0.95 0.94, 0.97 
0.070 1.00 0.96, 1.00 
0.000 4.04 3.40, 4.79 
0.191 1.10 0.95, 1.28 
0.000 1.59 1.35, 1.88 
0.000 1.63 1.26, 2.09 
0.000 1.89 1.51, 2.36 
0.000 
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Control Variables 
Finally, several control variables were consistently positively and significantly 
associated with SNF integration; they include state CON stringency, the availability of 
swing beds, and hospital location. State certificate-of-need stringency scores, indicative 
of restrictions on the construction or expansion of health care facilities, had a negative 
and significant association with SNF integration. In other words, hospitals located in the 
states with stringent restrictions on health care facilities were less likely to take on 
ownership ofSNFs. On the other hand, a hospital's swing bed status and location were 
positively related with SNF integration. Hospitals that were allowed to mobilize the use 
of beds or that were located in rural areas were more likely to integrate SNF services. 
Summary of Findings 
The results of univariate analysis, bivariate analysis, factor analysis, and 
multivariate logistic regression analysis are summarized in this section. 
Univariate Analysis 
According to the descriptive statistics of the study variables, the hybrid group 
seemed to have a greater likelihood than the hierarchy group of using hierarchical 
arrangements. The hybrid group had higher transaction uncertainty (area average hospital 
occupancy, hospital occupancy, SNF-beds-to-elderly-population ratio, SNF occupancy 
rate), higher transaction specificity (number of geriatric services, availability of home 
care services), and higher transaction frequency (HMO/PPO affiliation) than did the 
hierarchy group. After controlling for hospital characteristics, however, the contrast was 
reversed. This supports the importance of controlling for hospital characteristics when 
conducting hospital-related studies. 
Bivariate Analysis and Factor Analysis 
Through correlation analysis and collinearity diagnostics, two variables 
(individual hospital occupancy rate and SNF occupancy rate) were diagnosed to have 
collinearity problems and were deleted from further analysis. The results of factor 
analysis helped to validate the theoretically derived, three-construct model, because all 
the variables were loaded at least moderately on their intended constructs. 
Multivariate Logistic Regression Analysis 
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Model fit was assessed at a micro level -- individual variables, as well as at a 
macro level -- summary statistics. For the micro level, the expected sign, beta coefficient, 
odd ratio, and statistical significance level of each variable were evaluated. For the 
macro level, the assessment emphasized the residual or chi-square and correct prediction 
of the classification table. Table 24 shows a comparison of odd ratio and summary 
statistics for five primary models. Individual variables in each construct are summarized 
across all models first, and then the number of significant variables and overall goodness 
of fit statistic of each model are compared. 
Micro-level analysis. At least one variable representing each dimension had a 
statistically significant influence on SNF integration, with one exception -- the 
transaction frequency construct in Model 4. Area hospital occupancy, which measured 
transaction uncertainty, was significantly and positively associated with the event of 
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integration across all five variables. This indicates that hospitals located in market areas 
with a relatively higher hospital occupancy rate were likely to take more control over 
SNF services. The ratio of SNF beds to elderly population, another transaction 
uncertainty variable, had a significant and negative impact (as expected) on the action of 
vertical integration, except in Model 4. This finding implies that hospitals located in 
areas with more SNF beds were less likely to use a hierarchy or hybrid arrangement for 
SNF service. As reported earlier in the factor analysis, one transaction uncertainty 
variable, area hospital occupancy, was identified as demand uncertainty, and another, the 
ratio of SNF beds to elderly population, as supply uncertainty. Therefore, demand and 
supply for SNF beds affected a hospital's make-or-buy decision. 
The interaction term of the below-poverty-level population and the ratio of SNF 
beds to elderly population, representing SNF behavioral uncertainty, also had a 
significant association with SNF integration across the five models. Compared with 
previous variables, this cross-term had relatively weaker predictive power, because the 
probability of using SNF integration was about the same as that of not using SNF 
integration (OR= 1.00). 
The number of geriatric services and the availability of home services were used 
to measure transaction specificity. Both independent variables were positively and 
significantly associated with SNF integration in all models but Model 3. The findings 
indicate that geriatric services and home services were associated with the likelihood of 
SNF integration. The odds ratio ranged from 1.09 to 4.16. 
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Table 24 
CQmpari:mn Qf Qdds RatiQs and Sl.!mmar;i Statisti!;;S Qf Primar;i MQd�ls 
ConstructsN ariables Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Transaction Uncertainty 
Area hospital occupancy rate 1.367 § 1.406 § 1.208 § 1.147 t 1.389 § 
SNF -beds-to-elderly-popu. ratio 0.809 § 0.788 § 0.690 § 1.157 0.776 § 
Cross term of % of the poor and 1.00 I § 1.00 I § 1.001 § 0.999 t 1.001 i 
ratio of beds to elderly popu. 
Transaction Specificity 
Number of geriatric services 1.407 § 1.357 § 1.086 1.675 § 1.312§ 
Availability of home care 1.805 § 1.373 § 1.549 § 4.158 § 1.403 § 
service 
Transaction Frequency 
Proportion of Medicare 1.134 § 1.135 § 1.159 1.006 1.142 § 
discharges 
Affiliation with HMO/PPO 1.070 1.131 1.121 0.089 1.136 
Cross term of Medicare 1.001 1.003 1.003 0.998 1.002 
discharges and hospital size 
Control Variables 
State CON stringency score 0.938 § 0.924 § 0.904 § 1.025 0.924 § 
Beds set up and staffed 0.999 0.998 t 0.998 0.999 0.998 i 
Availability of swing beds 4.218 § 4.554 § 4.059 § 1.160 4.441 § 
Member of health system 1.056 1.034 0.831 1.320 t 0.990 
Located in rural area 1.817 § 2.013 § 2.384 § 0.966 2.401 § 
Governmental ownership 1.491 § 1.430 i 1.178 1.203 1.372 "!" 
Not-for-profit ownership 1.541 § 1.463 § 0.707 1.611 1.343 t 
Goodness of Fit Statistic 
Chi-Square 1154.1 1138.7 416 516.5 1209.6 
Concordant 70.2% 72.7% 81.4% 89.5% 74.2% 
Number of cases 4703 4703 2075 3022 4703 
t Significant at .05 level, two-tailed test 
i Significant at .0 I level, two-tailed test 
§ Significant at .00 I level, two-tailed test 
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Of the two variables measuring transaction frequency, only the proportion of 
Medicare discharges had a positive association in Models I, 2 and 3. Neither HMO/PPO 
affiliation nor the cross-product term of Medicare discharges and hospital size had a 
significant relationship with SNF integration. The predictive power of this construct was 
much weaker than that of the other constructs when judged by the number of significant 
variables. However, the odds ratios of the proportion of Medicare discharges were much 
greater than those of most variables from the other two constructs. To wit, a hospital's 
commitment to Medicare patient care influenced its form of providing SNF services. 
Macro-level analysis. This section summarizes comparisons of significant 
variables in five primary models. In Models I, 2 and 5, a hospital's decision about SNF 
integration was contingent on six out of the eight study variables. The three models, 
which essentially compared two more extreme forms of SNF integration, had similar 
significant variables. The consistent results show that hospitals were more likely to take 
hierarchical or hybrid control if they confronted environmental uncertainty, had more 
experience with related services, and had higher volumes of transactions. Models 3 and 
4, which compared two less extreme forms (i.e., hierarchy vs. hybrid and hybrid vs. 
market), had relatively fewer variables that reached statistical significance. 
The goodness of fit statistics and the correct prediction percentages of the five 
primary models were compared. Chi-square values of Models 3 and 4 were much lower 
than those of the other models, probably because these two models had many fewer 
observations. Since the p-values were less than 0.001 in all models, the differences in the 
chi-squares were not as discernible. As for the predicted probabilities and observed 
responses, Models 3 and 4 had higher percentages of correct prediction. (81.4% for 
Model 3; 89.5% for Model 4). Although Models 3 and 4 seem to have better summary 
statistics, this may be due to the fact that they included fewer cases, so the results were 
not disturbed by covariate patterns. 
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Overall, individual variables demonstrated fair predictive power in terms of odds 
ratios and the number of significant variables. While the chi-squares show unsatisfactory 
model fits, the high chi-squares may be caused by the inclusion of continuous variables. 
Other articles address the limitation of using either R2 or chi-square to measure the 
overall model fit without considering individual components (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 
1989; Rossiter, Chiu, & Chen, 1994). Nevertheless, the correct prediction is satisfactory. 
In sum, these models did fairly well in general, especially in predicting the event of SNF 
integration across all models. 
In the five primary logistic regression models, the effects of all the three 
transaction constructs were tested simultaneously. In the two interaction models, the 
interaction of each two constructs and that of the three constructs were found to have 
significant effects on hospitals' decisions about SNF integration. The interpretation of 
these results for testing the proposed hypotheses are discussed in the next chapter. 
Chapter 6 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study is to investigate why and how hospitals vertically 
integrate into skilled nursing care facilities, by using Williamson's transaction cost 
economics theory. Previous studies have rarely applied transaction cost theory to health 
care. Little theory-based research has been offered to explain why hospitals act to 
integrate into skilled nursing services. Thus, the focal interest of this study is to examine 
why hospitals expand their boundary to sub-acute care, which they have not traditionally 
provided. Understanding the organization of sub-acute care is essential to hospital 
management and health care policy planning. 
The analysis focuses on the determinants of vertical integration, with the objective 
of identifying the factors associated with a hospital's make-or-buy decision about 
providing sub-acute care. The general assumption, based on transaction cost economics, 
is that uncertainty, specificity, and frequency of transactions have a positive effect on 
SNF integration. 
This chapter first presents the results of individual hypothesis testing of the effects 
of the three constructs. Both the supported and the unsupported hypotheses are 
interpreted in terms of the theory. A discussion of whether the study has answered the 
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research questions successfully is presented. The application of the transaction cost 
theory to the health care field is then assessed by using Bacharach's (1989) criteria. 
Finally, the limitations of the study are addressed. 
Hypothesis Testinf,! and Interpretation 
This study offered four propositions and tested ten corresponding hypotheses. 
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The propositions and hypotheses are laid out in the order of the three transaction 
constructs-- transaction uncertainty, transaction specificity, and transaction frequency. 
Under each proposition, the derived testable hypotheses are restated. Interpretations are 
presented as to why some of the propositions and hypotheses are supported, whereas 
others are not. Table 25 summarizes the results of hypothesis testing for the five primary 
models; Table 26 presents the results of the two interaction models. 
Transaction Uncertainty on SNF Intef,!ration 
Proposition One addresses the transaction uncertainty dimension. It states that 
the more uncertain the SNF market is, the more likely a hospital is to undertake a higher 
degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services. In essence, transaction 
uncertainty embraces environmental and behavioral uncertainty, which are both important 
to a hospital's decision about SNF integration. Environmental uncertainty (market 
uncertainty) includes both supply and demand factors. Behavioral uncertainty refers to 
factors that emerge from humans' bounded rationality and opportunism. HI and H2 are 
used to test environmental uncertainty; H3 is used to test behavioral uncertainty. 
Table 25 
Results of Hypothesis Testing for Five Primary Models 
Hypo- ConstructN ariables Model 
thesis I 
Hierarchy 
/Hybrid 
vs. 
Market 
Transaction Uncertainty 
Hl Area hospital occupancy s 
rate 
H2 SNF -beds-to-elderly-popu. s 
ratio 
H3 Cross-product term of% of s 
the poor and ratio of beds 
to elderly popu. 
Transaction Specificity 
H4 Number of geriatric s 
services 
HS Availability of home health s 
services 
Transaction Frequency 
H6 Proportion of Medicare s 
discharges 
H7 Affiliation with -
HMOs/PPOs 
H8 Cross-product term of -
Medicare discharges and 
hospital size 
Note. S = Hypothesis was supported. 
= Hypothesis was not supported. 
Model 
2 
Hierarchy 
vs. 
Market 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
-
-
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Model Model Model 
3 4 5 
Hierarchy Hybrid Hierarchy 
VS. vs. VS. 
Hybrid Market Hybrid/ 
Market 
s s s 
s - s 
s - s 
- s s 
s s s 
- - s 
- - -
-
- -
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HI: A hospital that has a relatively higher occupancy rate and/or is located in an 
area with a high average occupancy rate is more likely to employ a higher 
degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services. 
HI is supported across all five models. The results indicate that the demand 
factor is influential on a hospital's decision about providing SNF services. This holds 
true regardless of whether the decision is between hierarchy and market, between 
hierarchy and hybrid, or between any other combinations. 
Due to the nature of the DRG prospective payment system, hospitals are under 
pressure to discharge patients quickly, if not prematurely. If hospitals cannot discharge 
patients to other institutions that will provide appropriate post-acute care, they incur 
opportunity costs and absorb the costs associated with delayed discharges. Therefore, 
utilization of hospital acute beds reflects the competition for discharge sites and the 
degree of demand uncertainty. For hospitals that are located in areas with higher average 
occupancy rates, the competition for nursing home beds becomes more severe. In order 
to overcome such demand uncertainty, hospitals are more likely to reduce their 
dependency on the environment by providing SNF services internally. 
H2: A hospital that is located in an area with a relative shortage of SNF beds 
and/or a high average SNF occupancy rate is more likely to employ a higher 
degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services. 
As opposed to H 1, which addresses uncertainty associated with the demand side, 
H2 focuses on the supply factor. The supply of SNF beds is hypothesized to have a 
direct and negative association with SNF integration. H2 is supported in all but Model 4. 
The supply factor is shown to be a key determinant of hospitals' SNF integration. It is 
specially influential for hospitals located in areas with relatively fewer SNF beds. 
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That the supply of SNF beds is constrained by Certificate of Need (CON) has 
been shown by the long waiting lists for nursing home replacements and by other access 
problems (Ettner, 1993; Harrigan, 1984; Nyman, 1993). States use CON to limit the 
nursing home supply, reasoning that if there are fewer nursing home beds, there will be 
fewer Medicaid patients to pay for. The stringency of CON varies by state. After 
controlling for CON, SNF bed availability still affects hospitals' forms of SNF services. 
This finding implies that, regardless of CON stringency, hospitals are apt to employ a 
higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services if the market supply of 
SNF beds is not assured. 
Model 4 is intended to differentiate hybrid from market arrangements. The 
results, however, fail to support H2. In other words, the supply of SNF beds does not 
affect a hospital's decision between hybrid and market arrangements. Three explanations 
are possible for this result. First, it may be due to the fact that in areas where the nursing 
home occupancy rate is high, few SNFs are available for hospitals to contract with them. 
Second, nursing homes probably are disinclined to be constrained by contracting. Once 
long-term contracts have been signed with hospitals, nursing homes may lose the ability 
to maximize their profits. Yet another explanation is information impactedness. Not 
every hospital has information on the availability of SNF beds in the market area. An 
uninformed hospital may not undertake any action even if it is located in an area with an 
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undersupply of SNF beds. In other words, those hospitals in the hybrid and market 
groups may not be aware of the degree of uncertainty about SNF bed supply. In this 
regard, the supply factor has no significant influence on the mode of SNF integration. 
H3: A hospital in an area with relatively more indigent persons and a shortage of 
SNF bed supply is more likely to employ a higher degree of vertical 
integration in providing SNF services. 
To address the uncertainty of nursing home behavior, the cross-product term of 
the SNF beds to elderly population ratio and the persons-below-the-poverty-level 
percentage is used in testing H3. This hypothesis is supported in all primary models with 
the exception of Model 4. It indicates that hospitals are more likely to use SNF 
integration if they perceive a threat from nursing home providers' price discrimination. 
Nursing homes are known for a tendency to discriminate against prospective patients on 
the basis of price (Dubay & Cohen, 1990; Scanlon, 1980; Shapiro & Roos, 1980). In 
order to maximize profit, nursing homes may select those patients from whom optimal 
revenue can be generated, and may be reluctant to accept patients who need heavy sub-
acute care. Such a situation becomes more obvious where the nursing home supply is 
tight and many patients are indigent, as shown by the delays in admission endured by 
Medicaid patients in counties where nursing home beds are limited (Ettner, 1993). 
Provided all other conditions are equal, however, nursing homes' behavioral uncertainty 
has no influence on whether a hospital chooses a hybrid or a market arrangement (Model 
4). 
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Thus for Proposition One, the three hypotheses derived for the construct of 
transaction uncertainty are sufficiently supported across the five primary models, except 
that H2 and H3 are not supported in Model 4. What makes Model 4 different from the 
other models may be that the difference between hybrid and market arrangements is 
minimal. The demand factor outweighs the supply factor only when a hospital has to 
choose between hybrid and market arrangements. Several studies also have shown that 
environmental uncertainty (Anderson, 1985; John & Weitz, 1988; Walker & Weber, 
1984) and behavioral uncertainty (John & Weitz, 1988) contribute to the firm's 
integration decision. 
Transaction Asset Specificity on SNF Integration 
Proposition Two is intended to measure the transaction specificity dimension. 
Where asset specificity is high, an internal organization is preferred because bilateral 
dependency is great. Where asset specificity is low because suppliers are 
interchangeable, the market mode is favored because of the bureaucratic disabilities of 
internal organization in controlling production cost (Williamson, 1985). This study 
assumes that the more experience or expertise a hospital has in caring for the elderly, the 
more likely the hospital is to pursue more vertical integration in providing SNF services. 
The number of geriatric services (H4) and the availability of home care services (H5) are 
used to measure asset specificity. 
H4: A hospital that provides a wider variety of geriatric services to elderly 
patients is more likely to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in 
providing SNF services. 
HS: A hospital that provides home health services to elderly patients is more 
likely to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF 
services. 
According to Williamson (1985), asset specificity includes site specificity, 
physical asset specificity, human asset specificity, and dedicated assets. Knowledge 
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about providing specific geriatric services is regarded as human asset specificity as well 
as physical asset specificity. A hospital's experience with providing elderly care is 
hypothesized to be crucial to the hospital's decision on SNF integration. H4 and H5 are 
supported across different degrees of vertical integration. A hospital is able to develop 
expertise through providing geriatric services and home health services. Consequently, a 
hospital should have specific personnel arrangements to provide specific geriatric 
services for the elderly. Such expertise and knowledge equip a hospital to manage 
nursing-home services and enable a hospital to accurately assess associated advantages 
and risks. All other things being equal, a hospital that is comparatively more prepared 
and experienced in elderly care (asset specificity) has the propensity to choose SNF 
integration and will be more selective in its placement of nursing home patients. It 
should be noticed that H4 in Model 3 is supported only at a marginally significant level 
(p = .080). 
The strong support of the two hypotheses confirms Williamson's (1985) assertion 
that specificity is the most important factor in decisions about vertical integration. 
Eastaugh (1992) has recently shown significant cost savings accompanying hospital 
service specialization. Several studies in other fields also have shown that asset 
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specificity is predictive of vertical integration (Anderson, 1985; Anderson & Coughlan, 
1994; Masten, 1984; Rangan, Corey, & Cespedes, 1993) 
Transaction Frequency on SNF Integration 
The objective of a governance structure is to economize not only transaction costs 
but also production costs. Whether transaction cost economies are reached at the expense 
of scale economies needs to be assessed. Transaction volume is used as a proxy for 
exchange frequency in several studies (Anderson & Coughlan, 1994; Anderson & 
Schmittlein, 1984; Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990). It is also suggested that volume may 
represent the production costs factor in the application of transaction cost theory (Klein, 
Frazier, & Roth, 1990). In this study, scale economy assumes that the higher transaction 
frequency a hospital has, the more likely the hospital is to use more vertical integration in 
providing SNF services. 
Proposition Three is intended to address the transaction frequency dimension. 
Three hypotheses are derived for this construct. H6 is tested by using the proportion of 
Medicare patients; H7 is tested by affiliation with managed care organization as a 
surrogate for private purchaser pressure. H8 is tested through a cross-term product of the 
proportion of Medicare patients and hospital size. 
H6: A hospital with a relatively higher proportion of Medicare patients is more 
likely to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF 
services. 
H6 is supported in the three models that compare two relatively extreme 
governance modes (Model I: hierarchy/hybrid vs. market; Model 2: hierarchy vs. market; 
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Model 5: hierarchy vs. hybrid/market). Only when a hospital has to decide between two 
extreme arrangements for providing SNF services does the proportion of Medicare 
discharges appear influential. That is probably one reason why H6 is not supported in 
Models 3 and 4. In terms of scale economies, only the hospitals with extremely high 
transaction volume will employ SNF integration to minimize production/transaction 
costs. It can be concluded that transaction frequency does not distinguish the use of 
intermediate exchanges from the use of either market exchanges or hierarchical 
exchanges, suggesting that high volume of transactions is a prerequisite only for the 
choice of either extreme. 
H7: A hospital affiliated with managed care organizations is more likely to 
employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services. 
A hospital's affiliation with a managed care organization was selected to measure 
transaction frequency, because managed care organizations are known for reducing 
patients' length of stay. The affiliated hospitals and affiliated physicians have to 
discharge patients to sub-acute care sites more frequently. Such frequent transactions, in 
turn, might lead hospitals to favor vertical integration. However, H7 is not supported in 
any model. 
Several explanations can be postulated for why HMO/PPO affiliation has no 
influence on a hospital's mode of SNF services. The most likely reason is that the 
measure did not capture the frequency of managed care discharges. Second, the 
suppressed use of inpatient services might balance out the volume of induced SNF 
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services even though managed care organizations tend to reduce enrollees' length of 
stay. Third, managed care organizations prefer to insure younger persons, who are not 
the major consumers of SNF services. 
H8: A hospital with a higher proportion of Medicare patients and a relatively 
larger size is more likely to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in 
providing SNF services. 
The cross-product term of Medicare discharges and hospital size is hypothesized 
to represent the absolute volume of patients transferred from an acute hospital to a skilled 
nursing facility. Theoretically, transactions are likely to be more frequent at a large 
hospital caring for a greater proportion of Medicare patients than at a large hospital with a 
smaller proportion of Medicare patients, or at a small hospital, regardless of its patient 
mix. However, H8 is not supported in any model. There is no interaction effect of 
Medicare discharges and hospital bed size on the mode of SNF integration. The lack of 
interaction effect may be due to the shared variances between the proportion of Medicare 
discharges and bed size. 
In summary, for Proposition Three, the hypothesis testing results indicate that the 
volume of patient transactions has less significant influence on a hospital's mode ofSNF 
integration than do uncertainty and frequency factors. Indeed, the influence of 
transaction frequency on a firm's integration decision presents a mixed picture. In some 
studies, frequency has been found to be significantly associated with the decision about 
integration (Anderson & Coughlan, 1994; Klein, Frazier, & Roth, 1990), while other 
studies have not concurred (John & Weitz, 1988; Masten, 1984). 
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Interaction Effects on SNF Inteljration 
Proposition Four is intended to address the interaction effects of the three 
dimensions on SNF integration. It assumes that the more uncertainty, specificity, and 
frequency are associated with the transactions of elderly patients at a hospital, the more 
likely the hospital is to employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF 
services. The interaction effects of the three transaction factors are tested in H9 and H 10. 
H9 is decomposed into three sub-hypotheses to address the interaction of each two of the 
three factors. Table 26 presents the results of the two interaction effect models. 
H9: The higher interaction effects of each two of the three constructs are (i.e., 
uncertainty x specificity, uncertainty x frequency, and specificity x 
frequency), the more likely the hospital is to employ a higher degree of 
vertical integration in providing SNF services. 
H9a: The higher the area average hospital occupancy associated with a hospital and the 
more geriatric services provided by the hospital, the more likely the hospital is to 
employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services. 
H9b: The higher the area average hospital occupancy and the higher the proportion of 
Medicare discharges associated with a hospital, the more likely the hospital is to 
employ a higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services. 
H9c: The more geriatric services provided by a hospital and the higher the proportion 
of Medicare discharges at a hospital, the more likely the hospital is to employ a 
higher degree of vertical integration in providing SNF services. 
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Table 26 
Results of Hypothesis Testing for Interaction Effects Models 
Hypothesis ConstructsN ariables Model6 Model7 
H9a Uncertainty x Specificity <AH_orv , GI_!NDXJ s NA 
H9b Uncertainty x Frequency (AH_orv, MCR_Dl NA 
H9c Specificity x Frequency cG1_1Nox, MCR_Dl s NA 
H lO Uncertainty x Specificity x Frequency NA s 
AH OPY' Gl INDX' MCR D 
Notes. S: Hypothesis was supported; 
Hypothesis was not supported. 
NA: Not applicable 
Williamson asserted that transaction specificity is the most important factor in the 
vertical integration decision. Both interaction terms tested in H9a (AH_OPYxGI_INDX) and 
H9c (GI_INDXxMCR_D) support this argument. Table 27 presents the interaction effect of 
transaction specificity and transaction frequency. The two-by-two table shows that a 
hospital prefers the hierarchy mode under high specificity and frequency. With low 
transaction specificity and frequency, a hospital tends to choose the market arrangement. 
Interestingly, transaction frequency, a relatively weak factor in primary models, becomes 
more influential when it interacts with transaction specificity. On the other hand, the 
interaction effect between environmental uncertainty and transaction frequency is not 
discernible as tested in H9b (AH_OPYxMCR_D) (Table 26). In other words, SNF integration 
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is not preferred for a hospital that is located in a competitive market area and that cares 
for a higher proportion of elderly patients. 
Table 27 
Hospital SNF Integration Based on Interaction of Two Dimensions 
Low Asset specificity High Asset Specificity 
� I··········· · · · · ·  
. . . . . .  
::<: .. {'  
Low Frequency HYBRID 
: 
:::::c { i , I···· . ; '' 
High Frequency HYBRID 
The first-order interaction models strongly support the absolute importance of 
asset specificity and the conditional importance of transaction uncertainty and transaction 
frequency when it comes to deciding on the degree of SNF integration for a hospital. An 
increase in uncertainty and frequency is of slight consequence for transactions that are not 
specific. This is not true, however, for transactions carried out by idiosyncratic providers. 
When suppliers are interchangeable so that new trading relations can be easily arranged, 
frequency matters little, and environmental uncertainty is not necessarily relevant. 
Conversely, when exchange is highly specific, increased transaction frequency and 
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environmental uncertainty make contractual gaps larger and the subsequent necessary 
adaptations more important. Therefore, it becomes essential for a hospital to set up a 
particular mechanism to provide SNF services (i.e., an integrated SNF) if exchange is 
highly specific. 
HlO: The higher the area average hospital occupancy, the more geriatric services 
are provided, and the higher the proportion of Medicare discharges is at a 
hospital, the more likely the hospital is to employ a higher degree of vertical 
integration in providing SNF services. 
The second-order interaction effect of three dimensions is tested in HIO. The 
importance of interaction effects is proven in this study. The results confirm 
Williamson's emphasis that the selection of vertical integration is simultaneously 
determined by three dimensions of transaction. SNF integration is a plausible choice for 
a hospital if the following conditions co-exist: its environment is more uncertain, it is 
more experienced in caring for the elderly patients, and it accommodates more Medicare 
patients. 
Summary of Hypothesis Testing 
The hypothesis testing results provide support for most of the fundamental 
predictions of transaction cost economics theory. The importance of transaction 
uncertainty (HI, H2 and H3) and transaction specificity (H4 and H5) are strongly 
supported. Transaction frequency (H6, H7 and H8) receives less support. Compared to 
the other two factors, transaction frequency has far less influence on a hospital's decision 
about SNF integration. As Williamson ( 1985) suggests, economies of scale are less 
relevant to a decision about forward integration. 
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The emergence of SNF integration is assumed to occur due to the failure of the 
nursing home market. In this case, market failure is considered to be the result of 
environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty. The hypothesized influence of 
uncertainty is strongly supported. The sustained H 1 and H2 indicate that environmental 
uncertainty affects hospitals' choice of a governance form to provide SNF services. H3 
supports the assertion that nursing homes' opportunistic behaviors also affect the decision 
about SNF integration. Coase ( 193 7) concluded that opportunistic behavior motivates 
vertical integration. The results of this study show that hospitals may select the hierarchy 
or hybrid form to solve their hold-up problems with nursing homes. 
The results of testing H4 and H5 confirm that transaction specificity is the most 
important and distinguishing construct for make-or-buy decisions, as Williamson (1975, 
1985) suggested. A hospital's experience and knowledge of elderly care is crucial in its 
choice of a form for providing SNF services. As compared to the number of geriatric 
services, furthermore, the availability of home health services is a more significant 
determinant of SNF integration. 
Transaction frequency is shown to be the least significant factor in a hospital's 
decision among different degrees of SNF integration, since H6 is supported in only three 
models, and H7 and H8 are not supported in any model. The results, which support 
Williamson's assertion (1985), indicate that scale economies are not as important to the 
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transaction cost paradigm as are the other two factors (i.e., uncertainty and specificity). 
Transaction frequency does not distinguish the use of hybrid exchanges from the use of 
either market exchanges or hierarchical exchanges, suggesting that only extreme 
transaction volume (very high or very low) has an impact on a hospital's form for 
providing SNF services. Similar findings have been reported for other industries 
(Rangan, Corey, & Cespedes, 1993; Walker & Poppo, 1991 ). 
Two out of the three first-order interaction terms are successfully tested in H9a 
and H9c. These results confirm that transaction specificity is the most important factor in 
vertical integration decisions. The second-order interaction effect of three dimensions is 
also successfully tested in HI 0. 
Responses to Research Questions 
This study is guided by three fundamental research questions, raised in Chapter I. 
The first question inquires about the degree to which hospitals choose vertical integration 
in response to delayed discharge problems; the second inquires about the determinants of 
hospitals' decisions about SNF integration. The analysis results presented in Chapter 5 
and the testing of the hypotheses summarized in the previous section have answered the 
first and the second questions. 
Assessment ofTCE by Using Bacharach's Criteria 
The third question, which focuses on the applicability of Williamson's transaction 
cost economics theory to the health care sector, is a more global question and so cannot 
be answered by hypothesis testing. To address the third question, Bacharach's (1989) 
174 
criteria of theory assessment are adopted. Bacharach's criteria propose that a theory can 
be assessed in terms of variables, constructs, and relationships. The falsifiability and 
utility of each of the three elements are evaluated. The following assessment discusses 
the value and usefulness of transaction cost economics as a research tool in the study of 
health services organizations. 
Variable falsifiability. Variable falsifiability is evaluated by whether the selected 
variables are operationally defined, valid, and reliable. It is obvious that transaction 
uncertainty, asset specificity, and frequency require more operational configuration if 
they are considered as variables. The selected variables in this study are all defined well. 
Measurement reliability is verified by the stable beta coefficients of each variable across 
all five primary models. 
Construct validity. There are three parts to construct validation: I) suggesting 
what constructs may account for test performance, 2) deriving hypotheses from the theory 
involving the construct, and 3) testing the hypotheses empirically (Kerlinger, 1986). 
Transaction cost economics proposes three discriminant constructs that determine 
the selection of governance structure -- uncertainty, asset specificity, and frequency. This 
study makes a particular effort to measure uncertainty, although most economic theories 
consider uncertainty as given. Environmental uncertainty is decomposed into demand 
and supply factors. The demand factor is represented by the average area hospital 
occupancy rate, and the supply factor by SNF-beds-to-elderly-population ratio. On the 
other hand, behavioral uncertainty of nursing homes is measured by a cross-product term 
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of the SNF-beds-to-elderly-population ratio and the persons-below-the-poverty-level 
percentage. The availability of home health services and the number of geriatric services 
are well representative of transaction specificity. The proportion of Medicare discharges 
and the affiliation with HMOs or PPOs are indicators of transaction frequency. From the 
results of factor analysis, all variables are found to be appropriate indicators of their 
respective constructs. In other words, the constructs are proven to have discriminant 
validity. 
Logical adequacy. Economic methodology has the capacity to develop falsifiable 
theories that precisely specify both constructs and their relationships. Two criteria must 
be met to achieve logical adequacy. First, the proposition must be nontautological. 
Second, the nature of the relationship between antecedent and consequent must be 
specified. Robins (1987) claimed that transaction cost analysis can "escape this sort of 
tautology by making the leap to causal explanation." In this study, all propositions and 
hypotheses are developed to specify the causal relationship between a hospital's mode of 
SNF integration and the characteristics of transactions. For example, a hospital located in 
the market with higher uncertainty is more likely to employ SNF integration. This 
application of transaction cost theory is logically adequate, because the relationship is 
specified clearly in the non-tautological proposition statements. 
Empirical adequacy. A principal reason for using transaction cost economics as a 
tool for health organizations research is that, to date, empirical work within TCE has been 
for the most part confirmatory. Research on vertical integration has been used to 
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examine how consistent the empirical evidence is with the hypothesis that organizations 
are likely to internalize exchanges involving high asset specificity and uncertainty. In 
this study, the results also confirm that a hospital's decision about SNF integration is 
associated with asset specificity and environmental and behavior uncertainty rather than 
with transaction frequency. This empirical adequacy may be due to a good model 
composed of valid and stable variables (Bacharach, 1989). 
Explanatory potential. Transaction cost theory not only provides an answer to a 
fundamental question: "why do organizations exist?", but also reframes our 
understanding of many issues through a novel approach to understanding organizations. 
Williamson (1975, 1985) provided an explicit statement that the emergence of 
organizations is due to the failure of a free market system. Because of supply restriction 
and price discriminating behavior, there can be little confidence that the nursing home 
market will achieve a competitive market ideal. SNF integration can be considered the 
result of failure of the nursing home market. 
In addition to providing a basis for identifying the forces that shape organization 
structures, the application of transaction cost theory also explains the diversity of 
governance structures in response to changing economic conditions. The findings explain 
what governance structures hospitals choose when confronting different degrees of 
uncertainty, asset specificity, and transaction frequency. In other words, this study's 
application of the theory explains how the selection of hierarchy, hybrid, or market 
arrangement is contingent on the three dimensions of transactions. 
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Predictive adequacy. The predictive adequacy of a theoretical system is judged 
by its ability to make predictions within specific spaces and times. With respect to 
organizational-level topics of vertical integration, evidence in the literature from different 
fields such as marketing, manufacture, and transportation, is relevant to the propositions 
and hypotheses of transaction cost economics. Similarly, the results of this study support 
what is predicted by transaction cost economics theory at the time specified by the cross­
sectional study design. 
To summarize the answer to the third research question, TCE is appropriate for 
application to analyze health services organizations, for the following reasons: First, it is 
possible for this scientific theory to be refuted by empirical experience. Based on the 
falsifiability of variables, construct validity, logical adequacy, and empirical consistency, 
the value of TCE is confirmed. Second, TCE is appropriate in terms of its capacity for 
explanation and prediction. As Bierstedt (1959) pointed out, utility may be viewed as 
"the bridge that connects theory and research." The utility ofTCE is demonstrated by its 
explanatory and predictive value in this study. 
Limitations of the Study 
This study is limited in several respects. The limitations due to limited data 
availability, measurement problems, and study design are addressed in this section. 
The dependent variables were abstracted from the AHA Data File, which records 
the form a hospital uses to provide SNF services -- in-house, long-term contracting, or no 
arrangements. Long-term contracting, by the definition in the AHA Data File, includes 
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two arrangements -- formal contracting and joint venture. These two arrangements differ 
in several ways. Formal contracting is a contractual relationship, whereas joint venture 
refers to co-ownership. Compared to formal contracting, a joint venture is associated 
with higher risks, since the involved parties are more closely affiliated. Such distinct 
natures are not differentiated in the AHA Data File. If they were, more variation might 
have been detected in the hybrid group. 
A hospital's affiliation with managed care organizations was chosen to represent 
the transaction frequency construct, but it turned out to be a statistically insignificant 
variable in the testing of Hypothesis 7 across all models. Such insignificance may reveal 
either I) that transaction frequency is less important than the other two factors in 
predicting the make-or-buy decision; or 2) that this indicator is not a good measure of 
transaction volume. As a remedy, other variables may be used, for example, the 
proportion of discharged hospital patients by destination (available in the MEDPAR 
Dataset) and by payment status. 
The goodness-of-fit of the models tested was not satisfactory. This may be due to 
the inclusion of continuous variables in the models, which may generate excessive 
covariate patterns. Moreover, if continuous variables are used, the more cases that are 
included in the models, the higher the chi-square obtained. The chi-square value dropped 
sharply when 5% or I 0% of random samples were extracted for analysis (not reported). 
Nevertheless, this limitation could be removed by recoding the continuous variables into 
dummy variables. 
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This study adopts cross-sectional analysis, which can establish association but not 
causality. In other words, this study cannot infer the cause-effect relationship, in which 
the emergence of a new governance structure is caused by the economic factors. 
The two-way contrasts serve to address the hypotheses across all models, but do 
not address the full-scale test of the models' adequacy to predict the range and ordinality 
of hospital response. Additional analyses using multi-nominal logit regressions are 
needed. 
Chapter 7 
Implications and Conclusions 
This chapter first presents several important implications of the findings from this 
study that are useful for hospital administrators, policy makers, and researchers in the 
areas of health services organizations and long term care. Suggestions for future research 
are presented. The chapter concludes with a statement of the significance of this study. 
Implications of the Study 
The results have implications from different perspectives-- theoretical, 
methodological, managerial, and health policy. 
Theoretical Implications 
The transaction cost perspective has not been much subjected to empirical testing 
in health care organizations. This study, an extension of an earlier study by Chiu and 
associates (1993), is the first empirical study of downstream integration in the health care 
field. Using transaction cost economics theory, this application explains well how the 
selection of hierarchy, hybrid, or market arrangement is contingent on the three 
dimensions of transactions. Thus, the applicability of transaction cost economics in 
health services organizations is supported. 
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The major assumption of transaction cost economics is that the emergence of an 
organization is due to market failure that is caused by environmental and human factors. 
The findings of this study imply that hospitals' vertical integration of skilled nursing 
facilities may be considered to be the result of the failure of nursing home markets. In 
this study, the environmental factors are represented by demand and supply factors 
instead of by uncertainty and small-number as Williamson ( 1975, 1985) proposes. From 
the perspective of economics, the dynamics of demand and supply can well represent 
market uncertainty. 
As the environment becomes more uncertain, the probability of opportunism 
increases. As Williamson argues ( 1975), vertical integration is preferred to long-term 
contracting or the spot market mode in circumstances where small numbers and 
opportunism conditions are joined. That argument is supported in this study by testing a 
cross-term of SNF beds to elderly population ratio and the percentage of persons-below­
the-poverty-level. In other words, the framework of market failure proposed by 
Williamson (1975) is empirically demonstrated in this study. 
The second dimension of transactions, asset specificity, has been operationalized 
in many ways. This study measures asset specificity in terms of hospitals' expertise or 
experience in providing geriatric services. The result is consistent with Williamson's 
(1985, 1991) emphasis on the importance of asset specificity in make-or-buy decisions. 
The third dimension, transaction frequency, is proven in this study to be the least 
significant factor in determining vertical integration, as Williamson argues. 
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Interestingly, among the three modes of SNF integration, the hybrid group is 
found to the smallest. This finding supports Williamson's argument that the contract 
arrangement is more difficult to monitor and control. For hospitals, the transaction costs 
of employing the hybrid form may be higher than those for market or vertical integration 
arrangements. Nursing homes, on the other hand, once they sign long-term contracts with 
hospitals, may lose the opportunity for profit maximization. 
Methodological Implications 
This empirical study, which applies transaction cost economics to the health care 
industry, is aimed at disclosing the reasons why certain institutional forms are selected by 
organizations. Several methodological implications should be noted. First, the results 
indicate that the semi-microanalytic level is appropriate for transaction cost analysis. 
Williamson (1975, 1985) suggests that research at this level is best served by using 
organizational and economic factors rather than accounting data. The well-established 
and confirmed models of this study imply that empirical studies of transaction cost 
economics are best conducted at a semi-microanalytic level of analysis. 
The necessity of controlling variables that covary with the dependent variables is 
another methodological implication. The variance in the dependent variables due to 
control variables should be teased out, to reveal the pure influence that the focal 
independent variables have on a hospital's form of SNF integration. In the pilot study by 
Chiu, Hurley, and Chen (1993), fewer control variables were used, and the hypotheses 
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received less support. Hypotheses in the present study are more strongly supported after 
controlling for CON and swing bed status. 
A persistent concern is the question of whether a sample is representative of its 
population. Hypotheses were comparatively less supported when 5% and I 0% of the 
population were tested (not reported in this study). The difference also appears when the 
current study is compared with the pilot study. More hypotheses are supported in the 
present study, which uses the entire population (all hospitals in the U.S.), than are 
supported in the pilot study, which uses a sample (hospitals in the Mid-Atlantic region). 
This comparison makes a strong case that researchers should study the entire population 
whenever possible. 
The last methodological implication concerns testing interaction effects. 
Williamson argues that the three dimensions simultaneously affect make-or-buy 
decisions, but this argument has not previously been empirically verified. In this study, 
the significance of second-order interaction effects has proven Williamson's argument. 
Managerial Implications 
In addition to theoretical and methodological implications, the findings capture 
several managerial implications for hospital administrators. More and more hospitals are 
expanding their service forward or backward into a diversity of services. As Robinson 
(1994) describes the trend, hospitals are becoming health care centers without boundaries. 
This study suggests that hospitals choose the most appropriate boundaries according to 
economic conditions. A hospital administrator has to be sensitive to the existence of 
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uncertainty in order to choose the most efficient boundary. Transaction specificity and 
frequency also should be taken into account in deciding on a governance structure. The 
study findings indicate that hospitals with more experience in geriatric care are more 
likely to use SNF integration if the nursing home market is relatively competitive. When 
a hospital considers integrating into long-term care services, the administrator has to 
assess organizational strengths in providing geriatric care and the proportion of patients 
needing long-term care, in order to arrive at scale economies. 
If a hospital selects a "wrong" mode of governance structure, it probably incurs 
higher transaction costs and production costs. If the "right" mode is selected, on the 
other hand, a hospital can minimize transaction costs and possibly production costs as 
well. If a hospital plans to provide a new service through either forward or backward 
integration, for example, by establishing an outreach cancer center or a satellite clinic, the 
hospital should fully assess the three dimensions of transactions as the first step. 
It is noteworthy that the mode of vertical integration should be selective. A 
higher degree of integration is not always the best choice for a hospital. As Coase (1937) 
first posited, the type of organizational arrangement used to govern any particular 
exchange depends on the cost effectiveness of the arrangement compared with that of any 
alternative arrangement. 
Health Policy Implications 
Calls for the development of"seamless" or "boundaryless" health care delivery 
systems have been increasingly voiced as a goal of health care reform in the United States 
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(Conrad & Jeppson, 1993; Gauthier, Rogal, Barrand, & Cohen, 1992; Hurley, 1993; 
Johnsson, 1992). This preference for seamless delivery implies that inattention to 
reducing the friction associated with imperfect linkages along the care continuum has 
impeded the efficiency of health care delivery. According to this study, in 1990 almost 
50% of all hospitals in the United States employed hierarchy or hybrid arrangements in 
providing skilled nursing care, and the other 50% chose spot markets. Since the findings 
show that the selection of governance mode for hospitals is determined by the three 
dimensions of transactions, all hospitals can be considered to be selecting the most cost 
efficient arrangements. In these terms, a seamless health care delivery system does not 
always guarantee reduced costs. 
This study has implications for CON policy. The results indicate that the 
probability of SNF integration is constrained by the stringency of CON. Hospitals 
located in a state with more stringent CON criteria are less likely to undertake SNF 
integration. In this regard, the CON regulations introduce barriers to a seamless health 
care delivery system. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
Based on this empirical study, several suggestions for future studies are provided. 
The first suggestion concerns efficiency measurement, which is the important construct of 
transaction cost economics suggested by Williamson. The next section on measurement 
issues suggests to include new variables or alternative variables of transaction frequency. 
Finally, a lagged panel design is recommended. 
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Efficiency Measurement 
The goal of a governance structure is to achieve efficiency, i.e., to reduce 
transaction costs (Willian1son, 1985). Although the concept of efficiency is critical to the 
transaction cost theory, the relevant literature does not elaborate on it. It has been 
maintained that transaction cost considerations are essential in defining the efficient 
boundaries. Organizations are assumed to choose governance structures through which 
efficiency goals may be realized. If this argument is sustained, hospitals that choose 
either hierarchy, hybrid, or market arrangement should be considered as equally efficient. 
In other words, the hospitals in each group should be considered to have selected the most 
efficient governance. However, there is no information to confirm whether the three 
groups are in fact equally efficient. Further research should derive valid indicators to 
compare the efficiency of hospitals with different modes of SNF integration. Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) may serve as a good evaluative tool for this purpose. 
Measurement Issues 
Transaction cost theory has been criticized for neglecting the social aspects of 
economic transactions (Granovetter, 1985). Transaction cost theory concerns itself solely 
with efficiency, neglecting other important factors that may contribute to organizations' 
decisions. For example, a community hospital's board composition may affect decisions 
about vertical integration. The following variables also may be considered for future 
research. First, patient characteristics may be good indicators of transaction frequency. 
For example, if hospitals care for more patients with functional disabilities, the hospitals 
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are probably more prone to undertake SNF integration. Therefore the proportion of 
functionally disabled patients may be used as a frequency indicator. By the same token, 
a hospital with a higher proportion of patients diagnosed in the top ten Drags requires 
more transfers for subacute care. Second, even though Williamson asserts that 
accounting data are unlikely to suit the needs of transaction cost studies, consideration 
can be given to including financial data (e.g., production costs). The HCFA Discharge 
Data is a source of hospitals' financial performance. 
Study Design 
Using a cross-sectional design, a study can show only an association, not 
causality, between economic factors and a hospital's decision about SNF integration. It 
would enhance the understanding of patient transactions if causality could be disclosed. 
Causality can be established better if the dependent variable is measured at a later time 
than are the independent variables. This can be achieved by adopting a lagged panel 
design. 
Conclusions 
According to the findings, this study has successfully explained, by using 
Williamson's transaction cost economics, why and how hospitals vertically integrate 
skilled nursing care facilities. Nationwide, over one third of hospitals expand their 
boundaries by providing skilled nursing care; over half of hospitals still rely on the spot 
market when discharging patients to nursing care; and fewer than I 0% of hospitals 
choose hybrid arrangements. The selection of SNF integration mode is found to be 
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contingent on three dimensions of transaction, as claimed by Williamson. In the presence 
of perceived uncertainty in the nursing home market, of specific investment in SNF 
services, and of the expected volume of transactions, hospitals have to decide among 
levels of vertical integration to minimize transaction costs as well as production costs in 
providing skilled nursing services. As assessed by Bacharach's (1989) criteria, 
transaction cost economics can be applied to the health care sector to explain and predict 
hospitals' make-or-buy decisions. This study has made a unique contribution to 
validating the applicability of transaction cost economics to the health care field. The 
results of this study not only enrich the body of theoretical knowledge, but also shed light 
on practical management and policy making. 
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Appendix A 
Literature: Pair Comparison of Governance Forms 
Authors Type of Industry Governance 
Forms 
Monteverde & Ford and GM, transactions Hierarchy vs. 
Teece (1982) across different firms Hybrid 
(backward) 
Anderson & Electronic products Hierarchy vs. 
Schmittlein (forward) Hybrid 
(1984) 
Masten Aerospace industry Hierarchy vs. 
( 1984) a single firm (backward) Hybrid 
Walker & Weber Automobile industry, Hierarchy vs. 
(1984) a single firm Hybrid 
(backward) 
Palay (1981) Railroad industry Hierarchy vs. 
shipper and its carried cars Hybrid 
(backward) 
Note. + = significant in positively direction; NA =not applicable 
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Uncertainty Asset specificity Frequency/ 
Scale economies 
NA - engineer efforts + -firm size+ 
-specific/generic+ 
NA -the evaluation of -firm size+ 
sale performance + 
- complexity + -design spec. NA 
-site spec. + 
-volume -changes in -production 
uncertainty + specifications costs savings + 
- technological 
improvements 
NA -design and NA 
handling+ 
Appendix B 
Literature: Three T;tpes of Governance Forms 
Authors Type of Industry Governance 
Forms 
Rangan et al. Survey of 5 industries Hierarchy vs. 
(1993) (forward) Hybrid vs. 
Market 
Klein et al. ( 1990) Survey of 6 industries Hierarchy vs. 
(forward) Hybrid vs. 
Market 
Walker & Poppo the assembly division of Hierarchy vs. 
(1991) a firm Hybrid vs. 
(backward) Market 
Joskow (1985) Electric firm and coal Hierarchy vs. 
mining Hybrid vs. 
(backward) Market 
Note. +: significant in positively direction; NA: not applicable 
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Uncertainty Asset Specificity Frequency/ 
Scale 
Economies 
-demand -sales expertise + NA 
uncertainty + 
-diversity - human spec. + -volume + 
-volatility -physical spec. 
(Hybrid +) (durable products) 
-supplier market -equipment+ NA 
competition -labor uniqueness + 
(Hybrid +) -investment in 
technology 
NA - site/location + NA 
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